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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this thesis is to reformulate the concept of international society, as 
it is predominantly used within the discipline of International Relations. In particular, 
this work analyses the conception of international society defined as a society of states, 
which is associated with the work of the so-called ‘English school’. An important recent 
development within the discipline of International Relations is the attempt to develop a 
notion of international society which is able to overcome the ontological divide between 
domestic and international politics. This work should be seen as part of the same 
intellectual enterprise.
The thesis starts by explaining the meaning of the expression “ontological 
divide” between domestic and international politics. In addition, it is claimed that the 
adoption of such a divide characterises the statist approaches to the study of 
international society. In the first part, two central points are addressed. First, how the 
English school developed the concept of international society as a reaction against the 
tradition of realpolitik, specifically against a definition of the states system in terms of a 
state of war. This work then discusses why the notion of the society of states has 
.ultimately failed to avoid the ontological divide.
In the second part, building on the republican political tradition, this thesis 
attempts to elaborate a conception of international society which escapes the ontological 
divide between domestic and international politics. It does so by developing the ideas of 
the international common good, mixed polities and divided sovereignty, and the 
international constitutional and ideological structure. As a result, this work reformulates 
the concept of international society, conventionally defined as a society of states. The 
thesis concludes by outlining the importance of this argument for the study of 
international relations.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary international political theory, the concept of international society, 
and the ‘ontological divide’ between domestic and international politics
Since the 1980s, one of the most significant developments within the discipline of 
International Relations has been the willingness to contest conventional conceptions of 
international anarchy.1 From a constructivist perspective, John Gerard Ruggie and 
Alexander Wendt have criticised the neo-realist conception of international anarchy. 
For Ruggie, Waltz’s neo-realist theory is ‘an unduly and unnecessarily undersocialized 
view of the world’.3 As for Wendt, he explicitly seeks to offer ‘a theory of the states 
system critical of Waltz’s’.4 On this side of the Atlantic, Barry Buzan and Richard 
Little, following their joint work with Charles Jones,5 continue to show a number of 
significant differences between their version of ‘structural realism’ and neorealism.6 In 
particular, they seek to escape the identification between international anarchy and the 
state of war. Adopting a more historical approach, Daniel Deudney has also tried to 
abandon the category of international anarchy, and has developed the concept of 
‘negarchy’, which escapes the conventional ‘dyad of hierarchy and anarchy’. From a 
more “critical” position, Andrew Linklater has investigated whether a ‘cosmopolitan’
o
model of international society is gradually replacing the ‘Westphalian’ one.
1 In this thesis, ‘International Relations’ refers to the discipline that studies ‘international relations’, the 
latter thus refers to the subject of study, like international politics or world politics.
2 See John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization 
(London: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, p.2.
4 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 8.
5 See The Logic o f  Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
6 See ‘The Idea of “International System”: Theory Meets History’, International Political Science 
Review, 3 (1994), pp.231-55; and ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural Realism Meets World History’, 
European Journal o f International Relations, 2, 4 (1996), pp.403-38.
7 See ‘The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American 
States-Union, circa 1787-1861’, International Organization, 49, 2 (1995), pp. 191-229; and ‘Binding 
Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems’, in Thomas J. Biersteker 
and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 190-239.
8 See ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State’, European Journal o f  International 
Relations, 2, 1 (1996), pp.77-103; and The Transformation o f Political Community (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998).
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In addition, such effort has been accompanied by what I call a return to history. 
A re-examination of modern international political history has been an important part of 
the attempts to reformulate the concept of international anarchy. Ruggie is particularly 
interested in investigating the historical transformation that occurred from the medieval 
to the modern political system and the possible transition from the latter to ‘a modified 
Westphalian system’ 9 In their efforts to reconceptualise international anarchy, Buzan 
and Little adopt an approach that rests on the ‘meeting between theory and history’.10 
Deudney’s notion of negarchy results from the belief that the republicanism of the 
American Founding Fathers constitutes an adequate starting point to redefine 
international society. Finally, Linklater also engages in a critical inquiry about the 
historical development of the Westphalian states system. Thus, what is at stake 
ultimately is an effort to reinterpret the concept of international anarchy by examining 
the nature of modern international society. This thesis should be seen as revealing 
similar theoretical concerns and as such as part of this broader tendency to reformulate 
the concept of international society by examining its historical development.
Contesting the ontological divide between domestic and international politics
One of the central issues of contention in this recent work within International Relations
is whether the modern states system may be defined in terms of an ‘ontological
separation’ between domestic and international politics.11 In a straightforward
formulation, the ontological separation expresses a sharp distinction between the
domains of domestic sovereignty and international anarchy. Using the expression ‘the
great divide’, Ian Clark has recently discussed the implications of such an ontological
distinction for the study of international relations.12 In his formulation, ‘The great divide
remains rooted in a belief that, for analytical purposes, we can pretend that there are
1 ^two separates spheres of political action, the domestic and the international’. In this 
thesis, the expression ontological separation is used in a similar way.14 In order to fully
9 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, pp.45-61.
10 See the essays cited in note 6 above.
11 The terms ‘ontological separation’ and ‘ontological divide’ will be used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis.
12 See Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 15-33.
13 Globalization and International Relations Theory, p.68. Emphasis in the original.
14 Yet, I disagree with Clark’s view that it is globalisation that challenges the great divide. In my view, 
the process of globalisation is not a necessary condition to question the conception of international society 
that rests on the ontological separation between domestic and international politics.
understand the nature of the ontological separation, this short definition needs to be 
further discussed.
Acceptance of the ontological separation stems from the belief that political 
society, with the institutions and rules that characterise its normative structure, results 
from the existence of a sovereign authority. This is, in short, the Hobbesian belief. As it 
is clear in Hobbes’s thought, it is the establishment of the sovereign state that marks the 
beginning of political and social relations. Martin Wight has such a belief in mind when 
he refers to ‘the sovereign state as the consummation of political experience and 
activity’.15 We find a strong expression of the Hobbesian view, for instance, in Kenneth 
Waltz’s theory of the international system. Following Hobbes, Waltz insists in reducing 
social orders to two types: sovereign and anarchical social orders, which are radically 
opposed.16 In fact, instead of referring to two social orders, it would be more accurate to 
say that in Waltz’s view the states system is in a pre-social and pre-normative condition. 
James Caporaso has referred to such a view as the belief that the ‘international 
system...is a competitive anarchy’, whereas ‘domestic society...is, by contrast, rule- 
based’.17 Four consequences follow from the ontological separation. The first two occur 
at the level of the international political structure. The third and the fourth distort our 
understanding of both the nature and identity of the international agents and the way 
they act.
The first consequence of the ontological separation is the absence of a social or 
normative conception of the international political system. Those who accept the 
ontological separation argue that there is no international political society due to the 
absence of an international sovereign authority. Hence, political societies only exist 
within sovereign states and international politics is in a state of nature. Ruggie reacts 
against this view when he criticises Waltz’s ‘undersocialized view’ of the states system. 
Against neorealism, Ruggie argues that ‘At the level of the international polity, the 
concept of structure...is suffused with ideational factors’.18 He goes as far as claiming 
that the world constitutes an ‘organized social collectivity’,19 with such a claim being 
captured by the expression ‘world polity’. As in the case of Ruggie, Buzan and Little
15 See ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: 
Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.20. See also the discussion in Andrew Linklater, 
Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations (Second Edition, London: Macmillan, 1990), 
chapter 1.
16 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
17 ‘Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 41, 4 (1997), p. 564.
18 Constructing the World Polity, p. 33.
59 Constructing the World Polity, p.2.
10
also stress the social nature of world politics, when they refer to ‘the communal 
institutions that are the hallmark of a maturing international society’.20 For Buzan and 
Little, a mature international society cannot be identified with the idea of state of nature, 
being rather an example of a social and political system. Accordingly, Buzan and Little 
shift from the Waltzian conception of the international system to a focus on the world 
political system as a whole, or what they call the ‘interhuman system’.21 Similarly, 
Deudney also sees the international system as a social domain with a strong normative 
content22 In this regard, his notion of ‘negarchy’, which refers to a constitutional 
political order, is explicitly opposed to the realist conception of anarchy as state of
23war.
• • 24  •The belief that ‘sovereignty precedes the international and gives rise to it’ is 
the second consequence of the ontological separation. As we shall see in the case of the 
English school, in historical terms such a belief is manifested in a historical narrative 
that gives ontological priority to the sovereign state over international society. In
• * * • 25Wendt’s terms, modem sovereign states are seen as ontological primitive agents, and 
not, as Wight puts it, ‘as parts of a greater whole’.26 The problem with this belief is the 
assumption that sovereign states emerged and acted, until they created international 
society, in a pre-social and pre-normative condition. Again, in Wendt’s words, states 
are understood as being ‘autonomous from the social system in which they are 
embedded’.27 The implication of this view is the belief that states create the normative 
structure of international society. Such a belief has also been recently criticised by 
Nicholas Onuf and Ruggie, who both reject the view that states are ontologically prior 
to international society.28 Starting from such an individualist assumption easily leads 
one to misunderstand not only the nature of modem international society, but also the 
nature of the modern sovereign state. In particular, one fails to notice that international 
normative and social structures have constitutive effects on the identity of sovereign 
states.29 This point leads us to the last two consequences of the ontological divide.
20 Buzan, Jones, Little, The Logic o f  Anarchy, pp.69-71.
21 The Logic o f Anarchy, p.30.
22 See Deudney, ‘The Philadelphian System’ and ‘Binding Sovereigns’.
23 ‘Binding Sovereigns’, p.205.
24 Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, p.76.
25 See Social Theory, pp. 1-44, and 198-214.
26 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p.95.
27 Social Theory, p.2.
28 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); and Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity.
29 See Wendt, Social Theory, pp.26-7, and 171-8.
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The third consequence is the view that the modern Westphalian political system 
is exclusively composed of unitary sovereign states. Thus, on the one hand, and 
according to the notion of unitary sovereignty, sovereign states are seen as absolutely 
independent, like autonomous individuals, and not integrated within larger 
constitutional entities. On the other hand, unitary sovereign states are the ‘only subjects 
of international law’.30 One of the consequences of this view is that international agents 
other than the unitary sovereign state are seen as political anomalies. In historical terms, 
those modern anomalies either tend to be dismissed as medieval legacies, such as for 
instance the German Empire (which lasted until the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
a rather long life for a ‘medieval’ institution). Or, alternatively, tend to be considered as
-I
‘post-Westphalian institutions’, such as for instance the European Union. In other 
words, if the autonomous and unitary sovereign state is considered to be the ‘normal’ 
modern political institution, then political systems constitutionally defined by a division 
of sovereign authority, such as the German Empire, or the European Union, are 
necessarily perceived as ‘abnormal’. A reaction against this approach is also clear in the 
current literature. For instance, Ruggie tries to abandon the conventional statist 
conception of international society, understood as a political system that is composed by 
sovereign states, conceived as like-units, and addresses the issue of functionally 
differentiated units.32 This shift leads him to consider the significance of political 
experiences such as the European Union, which should be seen in terms of a 
‘multiperspectival polity’, where a group of states ‘assume multiple identities, play 
diverse roles, and for some purpose act in different, more collectively legitimated, 
capacities’.33 The concept of ‘sharing authority’ is the result of states choosing ‘to 
organize activities internationally’.34 Again, like Ruggie, Buzan and Little also abandon 
the strict statist conception of international society, and argue that the idea of 
international anarchy is compatible with the differentiation of units. Likewise, ‘neo­
republican’ thinkers present alternatives to the unitary conception of sovereignty. 
Deudney, for instance, has been lately focusing on ‘interstate unions’, as ‘alternatives to
30 Wight, ‘Western Values’, p. 101. It should be noted that Wight here is criticising these views, as we 
shall see later.
31 See, for instance, Linklater, ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty’, pp.77-103; and The Transformation of 
Political Community, chapter 6.
32 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, pp.45-61, and pp. 146-7.
33 Constructing the World Polity, p. 135.
34 Constructing the World Polity, p. 147.
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the state and anarchy’.35 As for Onuf, he explicitly refers to the idea of divided
36sovereignty in the context o f ‘compound republics’.
The fourth consequence of the ontological separation between domestic and 
international politics is the view that national interest, or raison d ’etat, is defined in 
terms of pure self-interest, and not as including concerns for the international common 
good. In this regard, it is illustrative to note that, with their challenge to the realist 
conception of international anarchy, Ruggie and Deudney also propose a notion of 
external statecraft, distinct from Waltz’s notion of self-help, which emphasises the idea 
of the international common good. For Ruggie, states’ national interests should be 
concerned with respecting and increasing multilateral means to maintain international 
political order.37 Deudney has also included the idea of the international common good 
in his conception of statecraft, and focuses on foreign policy practices such as 
institutional ‘biding’.38 Following Ruggie and Deudney, it will be argued later in this 
thesis that, contrary to the realist conception of national interest, the republican 
conception of raison d ’etat considers the concern for the international common good as 
part of vital national interest. Here, the point is not to see the national interest and the 
international common good in opposite terms, or to abandon the notion of national 
interest altogether, but rather to see them as compatible.
These four implications of the ontological separation between domestic and 
international politics give origin to what one can refer as the statist approach to the 
study of international society. In accordance with the discussion up to this point, the 
‘statist’ approach is thus characterised by four elements. First, the identification 
between modem international relations and the Hobbesian notion of the state of war. 
Secondly, the view that the normative structure of modern international society was 
initially created by sovereign states living in the state of nature. Thirdly, the belief that 
modern international society is exclusively composed of unitary sovereign states. 
Fourthly, and finally, a conception of reason of state that rests purely on the idea of 
states’ self-interests. In historical terms, for the different statist approaches within 
International Relations, modern international society is preceded by the emergence of 
the sovereign state and thereby by the constitution of the states system. It is in this sense 
that I refer to states being ontologically prior to international society or being treated as 
primitive agents. Therefore, to overcome the ontological divide, it is necessary to
35 See ‘The Philadelphian System’ and ‘Binding Sovereigns’.
36 The Republican Legacy, pp.70-5, and pp. 126-38.
37 See Constructing the World Polity.
38 ‘Binding Sovereigns’, pp.213-6.
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develop a conception of international society that rejects the statist approach. It needs to 
be stressed from the outset that a non-statist approach to international society does not 
imply by any means an anti-statist argument. As it will be clear throughout the thesis, 
the reformulation of the concept of international society pursued here recognises the 
vital importance of the sovereign state, both empirically and normatively, in modern 
world politics.
In addition, a final implication of the ontological separation between domestic 
and international politics takes us to the level of theory, specifically to the distinction 
between political theory and international theory. According to Wight, political theory 
is that body of thought that speculates ‘about the state’, and ‘international theory’ 
speculates ‘about relations between states’.40 Given the belief that progress only occurs 
within the sovereign state, almost all modern political thought has been devoted to the 
study of domestic politics. As such, it ‘has become natural to think of international 
politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics’.41 This results in ‘a kind of 
recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about’. Thus, Wight affirms, 
‘international theory’ is ‘a tradition by negation’, and is opposed to the ‘great tradition’ 
o f ‘political thought’. 42 The effort to overcome such an opposition and to move towards 
a focus on ‘international political theory’,43 or on ‘political theories of international 
relations’,44 by reconsidering the significance of classical political thought to the study 
of world politics, has marked contemporary International Relations.45 The early work of 
Linklater is a good example of the attempt ‘to defend the enterprise of international 
political theory’ 46 He asks the ‘Kantian question’: ‘what makes international political 
theory possible?’ It is quite revealingly that the crucial point of his answer is that ‘both 
domestic and international political theory must possess at least one postulate in 
common’. As with political theory, ‘international political theory must contain some 
awareness of the possibility of human intervention in the social world in order to
39 It is appropriate to note, in this regard, that despite the fact that scholars such as Buzan, Little,
Deudney, Onuf, Ruggie, and Wendt criticise what I call the statist approach, they clearly recognise the 
crucial importance of the sovereign state.
40 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 15.
41 Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.20.
42 Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.32.
43 See Michael Donelan, Elements o f International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and 
Howard Williams, International Relations and the Limits o f Political Theory (London: Macmillan, 1996).
44 See David Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998).
45 See Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), Classical Theories o f International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1996).
46 Men and Citizens, p. 8.
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modify its nature’.47 The most important implication of Linklater’s argument is that 
international political theory helps us to reflect upon ‘alternative foundations of world 
political organisation’.48 This is a view entirely accepted in this thesis and indeed 
provides the starting-point to recover the republican political tradition in order to 
reformulate the concept of international society.
The English school *s early rejection o f the ontological divide
Within international political theory, we find in the work of the English school an early 
attempt to overcome the ontological separation between international and domestic 
politics, particularly in Wight’s ‘Western Values in International Relations’. In the 
beginning of the essay, Wight refers to a conception of international society that sees 
the states as ‘as parts of a greater whole’ 49 This conception is distinguished from the 
realist notion of state of nature.50 In addition, such a conception of international society 
is also distinguished from the legal positivist notion of ‘society of states’.51 For legal 
positivists, continues Wight, sovereign states are ‘the real political units’, and 
international society as a whole is simply ignored. As he puts it, ‘the doctrine that the 
state is the ultimate unit of political society entails the doctrine that there is no wider 
society to embrace states’.52 In other words, by placing such a strong emphasis on the 
state, legal positivists deny that international society exists as a political association 
above and beyond states’ interests. This observation even led Wight to associate legal 
positivism with realism.53 We can draw a number of conclusions from Wight’s views.
First, by attacking the view that the state is the ultimate unit of international 
society, Wight criticises the statist approach of both realism and international legal
47 See Men and Citizens, pp. 10-1. Although I entirely agree with Linklater’s arguments regarding the 
need to construct international political theory, I disagree with his assessment of Wight. As I will argue 
later in chapter 2 ,1 read ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ as an initial attempt to construct 
international political theory.
48 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p.4.
49 ‘Western Values’, p.95. Wight writes ‘as relatively, not absolutely perfect' (my emphasis). I replaced 
perfect by sovereign, for the term ‘perfect’ is borrowed from the Suarez’s expression, ‘perfect 
commonwealth’, which means a sovereign state in the sense of being completely autonomous.
50 ‘Western Values’, pp.92-4.
51 International legal positivism must be distinguished from John Austin’s legal positivism, which rejects 
the legal nature of international law.
52 ‘Western Values’, p.92.
53 Wight affirms that ‘in the nineteenth century, the separate influences of Hegel, of Social Darwinism 
and of legal positivism converged’, see ‘Western Values’, p.92. Likewise, in ‘Why Is There no 
International Theory?’, Wight refers to the work of J. J. Moser as coming as ‘near to codifying Realpolitik 
as any work of [positive] international law can do’, p.29.
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positivism. This indicates that, for Wight, none of these theories had produced a 
satisfactory conception of international society. Secondly, Wight saw the 
reconceptualization of international society as the adequate response to both realism and 
legal positivism. This suggests that Wight and his colleagues of the British Committee 
sat themselves the task of developing a conception of international society that could 
serve as an alternative to those two approaches.54 What is extraordinary is that in 
‘Western Values’ Wight anticipates many of the themes recently developed by Buzan 
and Little, Deudney, Onuf, and Ruggie as part of their reaction against the ontological 
separation between the domestic and the international. This can be seen in the way 
Wight opposes the four points that define the statist approaches to international society, 
summarised above. First of all, contrary to realism, Wight argues that international 
anarchy should not be defined in terms of the state of war. The consequences of 
international anarchy can be mitigated by the creation of common international norms, 
rules, and institutions, which demonstrates that the emergence of a political society does 
not necessarily depend on the existence of a common sovereign authority. Secondly, in 
opposition to international legal positivism, Wight denies that international society is 
exclusively created by states and affirms that the international normative structure can 
only be conveniently understood if we grasp that that the society of states is part of a 
greater political society. Thirdly, Wight disputes both ‘the orthodox doctrine’ that 
sovereign states are ‘the only subjects of international law’ and the conventional view of 
sovereignty as a unitary and absolutist concept.55 Fourthly, Wight’s treatment of states’ 
political interests stresses both the ideas of ‘common interests’ and ‘collective action’, 
and the principle of ‘rightful occasions for intervention’ to pursue the common good of 
‘human society’.56 By explicitly criticising these four elements of the statist approach, 
Wight’s argument therefore demonstrates that a reformulation of the concept of 
international society is required in order to overcome the ontological separation between 
domestic and international politics.
This last point leads us to draw a final conclusion from ‘Western Values’. 
Wight’s views also suggest that he would have not been entirely happy with Hedley 
Bull’s conception of international society as a society of states. This is not surprising
54 We should remember that ‘Western Values’ was the second paper presented by Wight before the 
British Committee, during its early period, when the development of a distinct approach to the study of 
international relations was at a crucial moment. This point will be developed in chapter 2.
55 See ‘Western Values’, p.93, p.95, and p. 101.
56 ‘Western Values’, pp. 109-10 and 116-9.
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given the influence of legal positivism, especially the work of Lassa Oppenheim, on 
Bull’s thought. As we know, Bull defines international society as
A society o f  states [which] exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set 
of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.
Then, he adds, to leave no doubts about his statist approach, that ‘an international 
society...presupposes an international system’.57 Borrowing Wight’s words, one could 
say from Bull’s definition that ‘by recognising no international society except the 
society of sovereign states’, it ‘denies the existence of an effective international 
society’.58 Wight’s argument suggests, first, that Bull’s pluralist conception of 
international society does not encompass all possible ways of conceptualising 
international society within the broad category of Rationalism. Yet, as it will be argued 
in chapter 2, despite Wight’s early attempt to distance himself from a strict statist 
approach, he and his colleagues were not entirely successful in escaping from the 
ontological divide either. Such a failure also shows that so far, within the English 
school, only Bull has managed to have fully developed a comprehensive conception of 
international society, as the frequent references these days to his definition demonstrate.
It should be noted at this point that the historical understanding of modern 
international society adopted by Buzan and Little, and by Ruggie is rather similar to 
Bull’s.59 This is clear in their definition of the Westphalian international society as a 
political system of like-units.60 The fact that these scholars try to reconsider the notion 
of international anarchy without questioning the account of political modernity 
developed by the English school shows that, to satisfactorily reformulate the concept of
57 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
p. 13. Emphasis in the original.
‘Western Values’, p.93.
59 Of course, these three authors themselves acknowledge the influence of the work of the English school 
on their thought. For the influence of the English school on Buzan, see Barry Buzan, ‘From International 
System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, 
International Organization, 47, 3 (1993), pp.327-52; see also Buzan’s paper presented in the 1999 BISA 
Conference, in Manchester, ‘The English School as a Research Program’. As for Little, see Richard 
Little, ‘Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical 
Reassessment’, European Journal o f International Relations, 1, 1 (1995), pp.9-34; and ‘International 
System, International Society and World Society: A Re-evaluation of the English School’, in B.A. 
Roberson (ed.), International Society and the Development o f International Relations Theory (London: 
Pinter, 1998), pp.59-79; see also Little’s paper presented in the 1999 BISA Conference, ‘The English 
School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’. Finally, as for Ruggie, he affirms that: 
‘The so-called English school influenced many constructivists, myself included’, see ‘Introduction’, in 
Constructing the World Polity, p. 11.
60 This point will be further developed in chapter 5.
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international society, it is also necessary to offer a different interpretation of the nature 
of modern international society. In short, this is the challenge faced by this thesis.
It is important to sum up the points made above. First, the need to overcome the 
ontological separation between domestic and international politics is a pressing issue in 
contemporary International Relations, with the literature briefly discussed above 
showing a strong dissatisfaction with such a separation.61 Moreover, the attempt to 
abandon such an ontological divide leads to a challenge to the statist conception of 
international society. Secondly, such a theoretical endeavour is associated with a 
historical re-examination of the nature of modern international society, as the recent 
return to history by International Relations scholars demonstrates. Thirdly, it has been 
argued that, by recovering the political language associated with the idea of 
international society, the work of the English school, and specially Wight’s ‘Western 
Values’, represents the first serious attempt to overcome the ontological separation. 
Fourthly, it was noted that, in the end, the English school had not completely succeeded 
in developing a conception of international society able to abandon the ontological 
separation. Indeed, the only conception of international society fully developed by the 
school was Bull’s pluralist notion of the ‘anarchical society’, which moves a 
considerable distance from Wight’s suggestion that international society must be 
understood as a political society greater than the society of sovereign states.
This thesis recovers Wight’s belief in the need to formulate a conception of 
international society as ‘a whole greater than the sum of its parts’, that is, distinct from 
the notion of a society of states. In other words, a political society that is above all 
national societies. In this regard, my reformulation of the concept of international 
society seeks to develop what I call the unexplored potential of the legacy of the English 
school. To achieve this purpose, I will try to develop a conception of international 
society that disputes the four central elements of the statist approach, as they were 
identified above. In addition, the thesis follows an intellectual route only briefly taken 
by Wight, but never pursued by Bull or for that matter by any subsequent member of the 
English school. By exploring the insights offered by the republican political tradition, 
almost ignored by international political theory,62 this thesis tries to correct some 
problems associated with the notion of the society of states. Yet, it should be clear from 
the outset that I am trying to offer neither a republican theory of international politics,
61 Of course, the criticism of the ontological separation does not mean that there is no substantial 
differences between domestic and international politics.
62 There are two notable exceptions. Deudney’s recent work on the ‘Philadelphian System’, and Onuf s 
The Republican Legacy.
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nor an intellectual history of republican international thought. At this point, we still 
need further clarification. It may seem that this thesis is attempting to address too many 
different issues at the same time. From the points just made, the argument addresses the 
notions of international anarchy, sovereign statehood, and reason of state. Obviously, a 
comprehensive treatment of these three concepts would require more than one thesis. In 
this regard, this thesis does not attempt to provide detailed discussions of all these 
notions. Its central focus is the concept of international society. In particular, it will try 
to show that a satisfactory conception of international society needs to abandon the 
ontological separation found in most conventional International Relations theories. Yet, 
as the discussion so far has suggested, to overcome the ontological separation, and 
thereby to formulate a satisfactory conception of international society, requires the 
treatment of the notions of international anarchy, sovereign statehood, and reason of 
state. Thus, when this thesis addresses those notions, it does exclusively with the 
purpose of reformulating the idea of international society, and not as an attempt to treat 
those notions in their own right.
The republican political tradition and the concept of international society
The republican revival in political thought
The republican revival in the history of political thought may be initially located in the 
work of the German emigrant historians, Hans Baron and Felix Gilbert. It was their 
work that started to call attention to the ‘civic humanism’ and the republicanism of 
Italian Renaissance political thought.63 After the pioneer work of Baron and Gilbert, it 
was the work of the historians J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner in the 1970s that 
mostly contributed to stress the importance of the republican political tradition in the 
development of modem political thought. In his book on the ‘Machiavellian moment’, 
Pocock argues that the classical republican paradigm, recovered by Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini in sixteenth-century Florence, had a tremendous influence on modern
63 See, respectively, Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1955); and Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in 
Sixteenth Century Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). For two brief but very helpful 
discussions of the emergence of the interest in the republican tradition within Political Theory and the 
History of Political Thought since the 1970s, see Philip Petit, ‘Republican Political Theory’, in Andrew 
Vincent (ed.), Political Theory: Tradition & Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp. 112-31; and Knud Haakonssen, ‘Republicanism’, in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp.568-74.
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politics until the eighteenth century.64 In addition to Pocock, Skinner is the 
contemporary thinker who has done most to emphasise the fundamental importance of 
the political ideologies of the Renaissance, and in particular of the republican ideology, 
in the establishment of ‘the foundations of modern political thought’.65 According to 
Skinner, one of the crucial questions of the formative years of political modernity was: 
How can a political community save itself from the rise of domestic despots and from 
external imperial threats? One of the central themes of Volume One of Skinner’s book 
is precisely the way Renaissance political thinkers tried to answer this question.66 The 
terms of the answer gave origin to the modem republican political ideology. 
Accordingly, Skinner’s history of Renaissance political thought starts with the struggle 
of the city republics against the Emperor and the Pope to achieve political liberty. It was 
during the Renaissance that the political argument to resist the ‘ideology of empire’ 
emerged. As it will be clear later, in chapters 4, 5 and 6, this was one of the central 
themes in the republican treatment of international relations well into the eighteenth 
century.
In the context of this thesis, there are two points in Pocock’s and Skinner’s 
works that need to be stressed. The first is historical. It emphasises the crucial 
importance of republican political thought to both modern political theory and to the 
political practices and institutions of modernity. One of the central goals for both 
Pocock and Skinner is the attempt to establish the significance of republicanism, 
alongside with other political ideologies such as absolutism, natural law, 
constitutionalism, liberalism, and nationalism, in the development of the modern 
Western political language. A central point of such an endeavour is the stress, which 
again is clear in both authors, on the importance of the Renaissance, and on the political 
ideas associated with its intellectual movements, in the transition from medievalism to 
modernity. This point is strongly expressed by one of the main conclusions of Pocock’s 
work. The American Revolution should be interpreted, claims Pocock, ‘less as the first 
political act of revolutionary enlightenment than as the last great act of the 
Renaissance’. Of course, here ‘America’ only serves as an example of a broader
64 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
65 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978).
66 Skinner, The Foundations, Volume One: The Renaissance.
67 Cited in David Wootton, ‘Introduction: The republican Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common 
Sense’, in David Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society 1649-1776 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), p.13. See also J.G.A. Pocock, “Between Gog and Magog: The 
Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana', Journal of the History o f Ideas, 2 (1987), pp.325-46.
20
claim: the rediscovery of the significance of republican thought and the removal of the
• • • • 68  • * ‘myth of liberalism’ from the centre of the Atlantic political tradition. Likewise,
Skinner argues that we cannot understand the foundations of the modern concept of the
state if we do not grasp that they were considerably influenced by the republican
ideology.69 This historical point will be a recurrent theme of my thesis. In particular,
one of the ideas that often appears is the significance of Renaissance republicanism for
our understanding of the emergence and development of modem international society.
The second point is a normative point. Pocock and Skinner are not satisfied with 
the study of republicanism only as a way to understand the nature of political 
modernity. Although it is most of the times concealed, it is possible to discern an 
element of urgency in their work, which points to the normative significance of 
recovering the republican ideology for contemporary liberal societies. This last point is 
more evident in Skinner’s work, particularly in his contemporary work on the 
significance of the republican conception of liberty.70 This tendency, albeit implicitly 
also appears in the later work of Pocock on eighteenth century republican thought; 
specifically in his views that the idea of European respublica provides the foundation 
for a just political order, both at the confederal level, and at the international level as a 
whole.71 Again following Pocock and Skinner, this thesis also reveals a similar 
normative concern.
The republican political tradition and international relations: clarifying the meaning o f 
the ‘international republican political tradition ’
It is now essential to establish that the modem republican political tradition has a 
concept of the international. One can point to two related reasons to explain why 
republican political tradition has been almost ignored in the study of international 
relations. First, the fact that republican thinkers, like for example Montesquieu and
68 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology’, Journal o f 
Modem History, 1 (1981), p.70.
69 See Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’, in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.90-131.
70 See Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
71 See in particular, J.G.A. Pocock, The Politics o f Extent and the Problems o f Freedom (Colorado 
Springs: Colorado College, 1987); ‘States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early 
Modem Perspective’, in Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (eds.), Conceptual Change and the Constitution 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), pp.55-77; and ‘Conservative Enlightenment and 
Democratic Revolutions: The American and French Cases in British Perspective’, Government and 
Opposition, 21, 1, (1989), pp.81-105.
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Hume, who have something to say about international relations are treated as only 
relevant to domestic politics. Secondly, many thinkers whose thought is influenced by 
republican themes, in particular in the treatment of international relations, are seen as 
belonging to other intellectual traditions. Thus, Justus Lipsius is normally dismissed as 
an absolutist thinker, Samuel Pufendorf is often included within the natural law 
tradition, Emmer de Vattel is considered to be a precursor of international statism, and 
often associated with international legal positivism, David Hume is presented as a 
‘realist’, and Baron de Montesquieu as a ‘liberal’. Given that, with the exception of 
Vattel, these thinkers will be central figures in this thesis, the argument being developed 
here involves a challenge to established paradigmatic categories. First, the thesis will 
challenge the view that Hume and Montesquieu are above all thinkers of domestic 
politics. Some of the conventional assertions within International Theory will also be 
challenged. Thinkers such as Lipsius, Pufendorf, and again Hume and Montesquieu, 
contrary to prevalent views, are treated here as republican thinkers.
Thus, it is at this moment necessary to answer a fundamental question: Does the 
republican political tradition have a conception of the ‘international’? Although it is not 
entirely clear in the work of Pocock and Skinner, who tend to focus on the 
constitutional organisation of independent political communities, historically,
79  • •republicanism did not emerge only as a theory of domestic politics. It is in this regard 
significant to note that in its original meaning the term respublica was not associated 
with the separation between the domestic and the international. Respublica was often 
employed to define the world political order as a whole. Indeed, form the Renaissance 
to the eighteenth century, the generic term international respublica was understood to 
refer to the ‘republic of all nations’.73 In this way, international respublica can be 
defined as an extended political society of diverse associations and institutions, which 
may encompass the whole world.74 For instance, Renaissance republican thinkers used 
to distinguish between respublica and the stato. Besides expressing the opposition 
between a free and a tyrannical political regime, such a distinction also referred to 
different types of political orders. Contrary to the stato, which was seen as a territorial 
bounded political system, the term respublica involved an extended political order.
72 To be precise, the exclusive focus on the domestic-constitutional implications of the republican themes 
applies more to Skinner than to Pocock. Indeed, from the 1980s, the latter has turned his attention to how 
republican thinkers, both European and American, conceptualise the idea of international respublica. This 
aspect of Pocock’s work will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
73 See Onuf, The Republican Legacy, p.71.
74 This is similar to the notion of civitas maxima. See Onufs discussion in The Republican Legacy, pp. 58- 
84.
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Hence, expressions such as Respublica Christiana, or even Respublica Mundana were 
often used to characterise the civilised world political system as a whole. In this regard, 
we find in Italian Renaissance the explicit attempt to extend the republican political 
order beyond the civitas. Likewise, early modern republican thought developed notions 
appropriate to the study of international relations such as the secular conception of 
raison d ’etat and the concepts of extended confederations and divided sovereignty. 
Finally, the idea of international respublica was central to the thought of eighteenth 
century republican figures. The emphasis on the international dimension of republican 
thought is related with one of the challenges to paradigmatic categories noted above, 
namely the need to interpret republican thinkers, such as for instance Hume and 
Montesquieu, normally associated with the analysis of domestic politics, as concerned 
with international issues.
It is also important to distinguish what I call ‘international republicanism’ from 
two other so-called republican approaches to international relations. First, the approach 
adopted here is different from ‘republican realism’, which is the result of two related 
tendencies. On the one hand, the republican order is reduced to domestic politics, and 
international politics is understood as remaining in the state of war. In other words, an 
international system of republics is still an anarchical international system. On the other
• • 76 •hand, republican realism tends to be associated with the thought of Machiavelli. As it 
was expressed by the Florentine thinker, politics outside the republican domestic orders 
is characterised by conflicts and conquest. Secondly, international republicanism should 
also be distinguished from ‘pacifist republicanism’. This latter form emerged during the 
eighteenth century as a critique of the ancien regime diplomacy, and gave origin to the 
doctrine of the republican peace. Its ideas may be, initially, found in the work of 
Thomas Paine and the French philosophes11 It is possible to discern the legacy of this 
form of pacifist republicanism in the current discussion of democratic peace, associated
75 Besides the Pocock’s work referred to above in note 74, for the emphasis on the international 
dimension of Hume’s and Montesquieu’s thought, see also Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All World: 
Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-1800 (London: Yale University Press, 1995); 
and John Robertson, ‘Universal Monarchy and the Liberties of Europe: David Hume’s Critique of an 
English Whig Doctrine’, in Nicholas Pliillipson and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Political Discourses in Early 
Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.349-73.
76 See Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, pp. 90-113, and 125-44; and Michael W. 
Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace (London: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp.93-110. The distinction between my 
version of international republicanism and republican realism will be further developed in chapter 4 of the 
thesis.
77 See David Wootton, ‘Introduction: The Republican Tradition’; Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace 
and War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas o f  Early 
American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 19-75.
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with the thought of K ant78 After having showed that the republican tradition has a 
concept of the international, which permits to conceptualise international society, and 
after having defined and clarified the meaning of international republicanism, let me 
briefly compare my approach with a recent work that tries to show the relevance of the 
republican political tradition to the study of international relations.
Within International Relations, the most important work on the republican 
political tradition is Nicholas Onuf s The Republican Legacy in International Thought. 
In common with Buzan and Little’s, and Ruggie’s works, Onuf also criticises the 
undersocialized view of world politics: ‘The world of states is social, just as any world
7Qof autonomous individuals must be’. Yet, unlike those scholars, Onuf s target is not 
only realism, but also liberal theories of international law.
In republican terms, society is neither an artifact of relations among self-regarding agents nor a jointly 
negotiated device to advance their several interests. Human association comes first. In the absence of 
association (republic, society), there is no agency and there can be no agents.80
In other words, what Onuf is criticising here is the view, which he calls ‘the liberal-legal 
story’,81 that gives the state ontological priority over international society. Such a view 
appears in all those theories that equate the states system with the state of nature. 
According to the naturalist logic, ‘independent agents (rights-holding individuals, 
independent states) come first’; subsequently, ‘they create society for their own 
convenience’. As we saw above, my argument entirely agrees with Onuf on this point. 
Moreover, as Onuf, I also rely on the republican political thought to develop a similar 
critique to the work of the English school and thereby to reformulate the concept of 
international society.83
Where I distance myself from Onuf is in the way he perceives the significance of 
the republican tradition for the study of international relations. As Onuf explicitly 
affirms his purpose is to see how the republican tradition ‘has strongly influenced 
modern international political thought’. To study the legacy of the republican thinking,
78 This strand of republicanism also appears as ‘republican liberalism’. See Doyle, Ways o f  War and 
Peace, pp.251-300; and Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, ‘Liberal International Theory:
Common Threads, Divergent Strands’, in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St.. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 107- 
50.
79 The Republican Legacy, p.4.
80 The Republican Legacy, p.5.
81 The Republican Legacy, pp. 12-3.
82 The Republican Legacy, p.5.
83 For Onuf s exposition of the republican conception of international society, see chapters 3 and 7 of The
Republican Legacy.
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Onuf builds an historical narrative around two points. First, the formative period of 
modern international society was strongly affected by early modern republican thought, 
that is from the Renaissance theories of Bartolus, Machiavelli and Althusius to the 
eighteenth century republican thought of Vattel and Kant, where the tradition comes to 
an end. The second point of Onufs historical view is that ‘Nineteenth-century 
liberalism eclipsed eighteenth-century republicanism’.85 The contemporary disciplines 
of International Law and International Relations are profoundly marked by this liberal 
legacy. Yet, Onuf argues that this is a mistaken view of the emergence and development 
of international political thought, and to correct such a view it is necessary to 
understand to what extent the contemporary intellectual discussion of international 
relations ‘bears the legacy of republican ways of thinking’.86 In this regard, Onufs 
primary goal is to improve our understanding about international thought by returning 
to a crucial historical juncture at which the way of thinking about international relations 
was first articulated. He believes that the result of this historical exercise is the 
acquisition of a self-conscious awareness of the way we employ central concepts in the 
analysis of world politics.
However, by being happy with pointing out the republican legacy in 
international political theories, Onuf does not, in my view, stress enough the 
discontinuities between the republican tradition and current international thought. Of 
course, we can find republican influences in liberal and realist theories. But the question 
is: did these traditions only eclipse republicanism or radically break with it? My view is 
that there has been a very strong break, particularly in the way we define the concept of 
international society, which is the concern of this thesis. Thus, it is my belief that we 
should not only clarify the terms of the republican legacy in international thought, but 
also and most importantly try to recover the republican way of thinking about 
international relations. I agree with Onuf that the republican tradition, to use Skinner’s 
terms, became ‘buried in the sands of time’.87 But more than excavating and showing its 
legacy, we need to reconsider it and to vindicate its relevance for the present. In short, 
the main difference between this study and Onufs concerns the way we use the 
republican tradition. Whereas Onuf seeks to understand the origins of international 
thought, by emphasising the importance of the republican tradition; I try to reformulate 
the concept of international society, by vindicating its enduring validity.
84 See The Republican Legacy, pp.21-3, and chapter 2.
85 The Republican Legacy, pp.2-5, and 10-6.
86 The Republican Legacy, p. 3.
87 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 111.
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A final point of disagreement concerns the way we see the legacy of 
republicanism in contemporary international thought. I deeply disagree with Onufs 
view that realists are ‘strong liberals’. As I will try to show in chapter 1, realism is the 
heir of the nineteenth century nationalist revolt against internationalist political 
traditions, amongst them liberalism. Indeed, Onufs study shows the oddity of his own 
judgement. Taking for instance the idea of international society, it is hard to find in the 
realist notion of a state of war any legacy of Wolff s idea of civitas maxima or even of 
Vattel’s notion of international society. If anywhere, we find the legacy of the 
republican conception of international society in the work of the English school. In this 
respect, it is the English school, particularly Wight’s work, as I briefly claimed above 
and as I will try to show in chapter 2, that bears the legacy of republicanism, despite the 
fact that the school had become finally too statist.
Plan of the thesis
My reformulation of the concept of international society will develop along the 
following lines. In chapter 1 ,1 will discuss the emergence of the tradition of realpolitik 
in the nineteenth century, which is associated with Leopold Ranke’s political thought, 
and how Hans Morgenthau presented it to the American audience as the foundation for 
a theory of international politics. It will be argued that the characterisation of the 
international system as the state of war, the first element of the ontological divide, is the 
result of a nationalist approach to politics adopted by the tradition of realpolitik.
In chapter 2 ,1 will focus on the reaction of the English School against the realist 
project of international relations. The central purpose of the English school was to 
recover internationalist political traditions, which had been strongly attacked by 
realpolitik during the nineteenth century and, within the discipline of International 
Relations, after World War Two. The result was the category of rationalism. In this 
chapter, I shall argue that rationalism opened up different ways to develop the concept 
of international society. In particular, I will claim that it is possible to find what I call a 
‘republican moment’ in the work of the English school, specifically in Wight’s early 
contributions to the British Committee.
In chapter 3, I will try to show how the broad category of rationalism evolved 
into the notion of society of states. I will try to highlight some problems with this statist 
conception of international society. In particular, it will be argued that two points of
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such a conception are deeply problematic. First, the distinction between international 
society and international system; secondly, the distinction between international society 
and world society. As I will argue, the incapacity to escape the ontological divide was 
the ultimate consequence of the statist turn in the work of the English school, and in this 
sense the conception of international political society put forward by Wight in ‘Western 
Values’ was never entirely developed. In the second part of the thesis, I will attempt, in 
the light of the republican political tradition, to pursue the suggestions offered by 
Wight.
Chapter 4 will develop a republican conception of raison d ’etat, as in opposition 
to the realist conception of national interest. As such, the chapter will try to accomplish 
two related tasks. First, it will formulate in explicit terms the idea of the international 
common good that we find implicitly in some writings of the English school. Secondly, 
it will argue that such a formulation is indispensable to reconceptualise international 
society in a way that avoids the ontological divide. Chapter 5 will constitute a further 
step to move beyond the statist conception of international society. By focusing on the 
work of Samuel Pufendorf, in particular on his analysis of the constitutional nature of 
the German Empire after the Peace of Westphalia, I will show that the ideas of 
republican confederation and divided sovereignty were part of both the theory and 
institutional practices of modern international society. As we shall see, such a 
reformulation of international institutions, avoids the ontological divide by escaping the 
opposition unitary sovereignty/ international anarchy. Finally, in chapter 6, the 
exploration of the idea of international respublica, associated in this thesis mainly with 
the thought of Hume and Montesquieu, will complete my attempt to develop a 
republican conception of international society. In a significant way, the concept of 
‘international respublica’ demonstrates that states have not emerged in a pre-societal 
and pre-normative state of nature, but rather within a social and normative context. In 
this way, it seems to me, it is possible to explain what Wight meant when he affirmed 
that international political society is greater than the society of states.
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CHAPTER 1: THE TRADITION OF REALPOLITIK AND THE 
ONTOLOGICAL DIVIDE: FROM RANKE TO REALISM
As it was argued in the introduction, the terms ‘anarchy’ and ‘state of war’ reflect one of 
the conventional images of the international system that we find in the discipline of 
International Relations. As it was also noted, Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f  International 
Politics1 may be considered a good example of such a view. In his structural realist theory, 
Waltz employs the idea of ‘anarchy’ to define the international system, and then 
characterizes international anarchy as ‘state of war’.2 This conception of the states system 
rejects the existence of an international society, and in this sense accepts the first element 
that defines the statist approach: an undersocialized and non-normative view of world 
politics. As it was noted before, a strong reaction against this formulation of international 
anarchy has recently emerged within International Relations. Notwithstanding some 
important differences, Waltz’s work can be seen in terms of continuing the argument 
developed by earlier realist authors.3 For instance, both Waltz and Hans Morgenthau define 
the international system in terms of the state of war, and what mainly distinguishes the two 
is the method used in their respective approaches.4 In this regard, neo-realism is a 
restatement of the conventional realist conception of the international system.
This chapter addresses two themes which appear in the realist theory: the definition of 
the international system as state of war, and the construction of the realist version of the 
historical category of the Westphalian system, which serves to validate the notion of 
international anarchy. Both themes are placed in the context of the emergence of the 
tradition of realpolitik in nineteenth century Prussia. It will be argued that the definition of 
the international system in terms of the state of war is the consequence of a nationalist
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979).
2 Theory, p. 102.
3 For the similarities and the differences between Morgenthau’s realism and Waltz’s neo-realism, see Joseph 
M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism’, in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 116-40; and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Realism, Neo-realism and the 
Study of World Politics’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26.
4 See Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.67-82.
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international theory. In other words, the realist notion of the Westphalian system results 
from a view of modern political history, which accents the triumph of the national state and 
national conflicts in modem politics.
To achieve its aims, the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the 
emergence of the tradition of realpolitik in the early nineteenth century Germany. Here, 
the central figure is the Prussian historian Leopold Ranke. With Ranke’s work, we see the 
emergence of a nationalist account of the politics of the modern states system, one which 
ignores internationalist considerations. What Friedrich Meinecke called ‘the idea of a 
completely independent State authority, not tied by any foreign considerations, and only 
founded on itself.5 In this chapter, the term ‘internationalism’ is used in a similar way as 
Martin Wight uses ‘rationalism’. As we shall see later, it is important to bear this point in 
mind. To avoid conceptual confusions, ‘nationalist international theory’ as it is used here 
shall be distinguished from other treatments of nationalism, in particular the liberal 
approach. In terms of international politics, the basic difference between the two 
approaches concerns the relation between the national state and international society. As 
we will see below, for realpolitik, the national state is seen in opposition to international 
society. For realists, the triumph of nationalism produces an international system defined 
in power politics terms. As a consequence, in historical terms, the triumph of the national 
state implied the failure of the idea of international society; this view is clear, for 
example, in the work of Morgenthau. For liberals, the emergence of nationalism as a 
modern political ideology is compatible with the existence of an international society. 
Indeed, a just and legitimate international society needs to accommodate within its 
normative structure the claims for national self-determination.6 This chapter will 
concentrate on the first type of nationalism, and will claim that it is historically linked to 
the tradition of realpolitik and to the theory of realism.
The second part of the chapter looks at Morgenthau’s realism as the ‘realpolitik 
moment’ in the discipline of International Relations. Here, the argument develops in two 
ways. The first discusses Morgenthau’s theoretical project, in the context of his attack on 
liberal political thought. The central goal of Morgenthau, after his arrival at the United
5 See Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine o f Raison d ’Etat and Its Place in Modem History 
(Introduction by Werner Stark, translated by Douglas Scott, London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p.386. 
Revealingly, Meinecke uses the term ‘foreign’ instead of ‘international’.
6 For the impact of the liberal conception of national self-determination on international society, see James 
Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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States, was to replace liberalism by realpolitik as the theory of American foreign policy. 
To achieve this, the crucial point was to show the utopian nature of liberal political 
thought. To demonstrate that the modern history of the relations between states could only 
be understood through the principles of realpolitik was a central part of the strategy to 
expose the idealism of liberals. In this regard, the second section concentrates on the role 
of history in Morgenthau’s theory and on his historical interpretation of the modern states- 
system. Both the criticism of liberal internationalism and the historical element of 
Morgenthau’s political realism show clearly the Rankean influence in his thought.
Before I start, it is important to make a further preliminary observation. Although the 
chapter focuses on the work of two thinkers, Ranke and Morgenthau, it does not seek to be 
a work about their thought per se. Rather, given the significance of their contributions to 
international political theory, I use their works to explain the nature of a political tradition, 
realpolitik, which in my view has played a fundamental role in the theoretical development 
of International Relations. My treatment of Morgenthau illustrates this point. I am not 
interested in the development of Morgenthau’s thought, but rather in his crucial 
contribution to what I call the ‘realpolitik moment’. Accordingly, I will ignore important 
late writings by Morgenthau, which may illuminate in important matters the evolution of 
his thought. Instead, I will focus on his work between 1946 and 1951, when he published 
his most important works, Scientific Man versus Power Politics in 1946, Politics Among 
Nations in 1948, and In Defense o f the National Interest in 1951.7 With the publication of 
this trilogy, Morgenthau laid the intellectual foundations of the discipline of International 
Relations in the United States. Here, the expression ‘realpolitik moment’ draws on the 
work of J. G. A. Pocock on the ‘Machiavellian moment’.8 The term ‘moment’ has a double 
meaning. First, it refers to a political problem which, given its importance, a particular 
thinker or a group of thinkers, writing in different historical periods, attempt to address in a 
similar way. This first meaning appears only implicitly in this chapter. Both Ranke and 
Morgenthau produced the most important body of their work during a period in which their 
respective countries, Prussia/Germany and the United States, suffered a radical 
transformation in their foreign policies, and as such the definition of the nature of the 
international system became the crucial problem they had to address. The second meaning
7 M. J. Smith also argues that this is the defining period of Morgenthau’s thought, see Realist Thought from 
Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1986)), p. 134.
8 See The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), the introduction.
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is related with the theoretical answers given to the political problem. We can properly talk 
of an ‘intellectual moment’ when those answers give origin to a tradition that is later 
adopted and developed by subsequent writers. To show the crucial contribution of Ranke 
and Morgenthau to the development of such an intellectual moment is a central theme of 
this chapter.
Ranke and the emergence of the tradition of realpolitik
This first part of the chapter starts by placing Ranke’s work in its historical context, the 
emergence of German nationalism. In Ranke’s political thought, the impact of the 
nationalist revolt in Germany was manifested in three ways. First, he embraced a 
nationalist political theory, in which the national state occupies a privileged place both in 
domestic and in international politics. Secondly, in his analysis of international politics, he 
stressed power politics with a consequent focus on the importance of great powers. Finally, 
he revealed a deep anti-internationalist attitude, which resulted from an intellectual 
reaction against Western, i.e. French and English, political traditions. The chapter then 
considers the central role of history in the full development of Ranke’s political theory. 
First, it addresses Ranke’s historicism, particularly the claim about the objectivity and the 
impartiality of his political history. Secondly, it discusses Ranke’s history of the modern 
states-system, which starts with the revolt of the ‘nascent national states’ against the 
papacy and the Emperor, then continues by treating the German Reformation as a 
nationalist movement, and finally sees the French Revolution as marking the final triumph 
of the national state. In the end of this first part, I shall define the political tradition of 
realpolitik.
Ranke's political thought: nationalism, power politics, and the 'primacy o f foreign policy ’
In his book, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, the German historian, Meinecke, has 
emphasized the influence of external impulses on the development of the idea of 
nationalism.
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Contacts between nations and national states can...determine their individual development in the most 
profound way. A single historical moment, a single great event in the international arena can so affect a 
single nation or national state that it follows a course that could not have been predicted before on the basis 
of its past behaviour.9
In the case of German nationalism, the ‘single historical moment’ that Meinecke refers to 
is the Napoleonic invasions. As another student of German nationalism has observed, ‘it 
was the defeat of Prussia in the course of the French revolutionary wars that finally 
ushered German nationalism into the world’.10 As a result, in the words of another German 
historian, ‘the German fatherland was to be found where every Frenchman is called foe, 
and every German is called friend’.11 Throughout Germany, the French armies became the 
common external enemy that made German nationalism a political force, and the Wars of 
Restoration turned into the first German national war. Moreover, the dominant figure of 
Napoleon symbolized the greatness and the historical triumph of the idea of the national 
state.
French political hegemony and the Napoleonic invasions have produced a tremendous 
impact on the political thought of Ranke who recognized that Napoleon was ‘the most 
grandiose phenomenon that we have seen passing before us’.12 At the intellectual level, the 
fact that a national state was able to dominate large parts of the German lands led to a 
philosophical focus on the idea of the nation-state. The result, as we shall see, was a 
political theory which combined an emphasis both on the uniqueness of the German 
national identity and on the duty of the Prussian state to exclusively follow its national 
interests in foreign affairs, ignoring any kind of normative obligations to international 
society.
Ranke formed most of his political views and theoretical concepts while working as 
editor for a semi-official journal, the Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift. During this period, 
Ranke developed a close political relationship with the Prussian state.13 The following
9 Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (translated by Robert B. Kimber, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 19.
10 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
p.358
1 Quoted in Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition o f Historical 
Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p.41.
12 Felix Gilbert, History: Politics or Culture? Reflections on Ranke andBurckhardt (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p.7.
13 For Ranke’s ‘dedication’ to the Prussian state and how this deeply influenced his historical work, see A.J.P. 
Taylor, ‘Ranke’ in Europe: Grandeur and Decline (London: Penguin, 1991, Second Edition), pp. 113-20.
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statement by one member of the nationalist circle close to the Prussian power is revealing 
as to what was expected in political and intellectual terms from the editor.
The editor must be a Prussian patriot in the truest and highest sense, possess the confidence of the department 
of foreign affairs, and know the spirit and intention of the Prussian administration in all its branches. He must 
be a historical writer.14
The decision to invite Ranke for the editorship of the journal was taken by the Prussian 
ministry of foreign affairs.15 The historian had thus the responsibility to defend Prussian 
policies, both within the German confederation and outside Germany. To do this 
successfully, Ranke had to deal with a dilemma faced by his government. On the one hand, 
Prussia was a conservative state which sought to preserve its traditional absolutist political 
and constitutional structure. Yet, on the other hand, it aimed at unifying Germany and thus 
was in opposition to the conservative European diplomatic system created in 1815. In this 
context, Ranke was expected to use his intellectual talents and his knowledge of history to 
reconcile a nationalist and revolutionary agenda in international politics with a reactionary 
agenda in domestic politics. To reject both the internationalist elements of the European 
states-system and the political agenda of the Prussian reformist party, which defended the 
universalism of certain liberal-constitutional principles, Ranke glorified the idea of the 
German nation.
Ranke’s view of politics was also influenced by the anti-internationalist intellectual 
tendency that emerged in Germany in the beginning of the nineteenth century. For many 
contemporary German thinkers, the ‘future belonged to the autonomy of the regenerated 
national state, not to the universalistic principle’.16 The anti-French feelings, which 
resulted from the Wars of Liberation, transformed into a general reaction against Western 
internationalist ideas, many of them with their origin in the Enlightenment. In Germany, 
the ‘Enlightenment faith in universally applicable ethical and political values...was now 
completely shattered’.17 In theoretical and intellectual terms, this meant a strong attack not
14 Theodore H. Von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950), pp.67-8.
15 According to Iggers, the journal ‘was founded under the initiative of Count von Bemstorff, the then foreign 
minister’. The central purpose of the journal was to combat ‘liberal’ ideas in Prussia. See Iggers, The German 
Conception o f History, p.70. For this period of Ranke’s life, see also Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, chapter 3.
16 Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism, p.216.
17 Iggers, The German Conception o f History, p.40.
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only on what was considered to be French political republicanism but also on English 
liberalism. Greenfeld called this intellectual nationalist revolt the ressentiment against the 
West.18 Ranke primarily developed this ‘ressentiment’ against Western political ideas in 
the context of Prussian domestic politics. One of the central arguments consistently 
developed by Ranke was that liberal values and institutions developed in other countries, 
i.e. France and Britain, did not apply to Germany. As he so clearly put it, Germans ‘have to 
solve a great German task, a task peculiarly our own: to develop a genuine German 
state’.19
The belief that the German nation had a moral right to follow its own cultural logic 
indicates the fundamental importance given by Ranke to nationalism. In his theoretical 
writings, Ranke continually stressed the central role played by nationality in political life. 
As he says in his ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, nationalism ‘must be the guiding principle of all 
human activity’.20 In political terms, this nationalist perspective leads to a strong emphasis 
on the link between the nation and the state. On the one hand, the state has the mission of 
unifying politically the nation. From the nation’s point of view, in order to fulfil its moral 
value, it ‘must achieve genuine independence’21, which means to be politically organized 
as a sovereign state. It is only as an independent state that the nation is able to control its 
own political destiny. We see here the beginning of an influential modern approach to 
politics: a nationalist conception of politics, with a strong connection between national 
identity and statehood. The nation ceases to be merely a cultural group, which can coexist 
with other nations in a common constitutional framework, and transforms into a political 
group, whose destiny can be fulfilled only through the acquisition of sovereign statehood. 
As a nineteenth century Prussian nationalist put it, ‘a people cannot be a nation without a 
state’.22 Such a nationalist perspective had a tremendous impact on the thinking about 
international politics.
At the external level, the emphasis on national self-determination produced a 
nationalist conception of foreign policy. As in the case of domestic politics, in foreign 
affairs, Prussia, and later a unified Germany, should also follow a ‘genuine German foreign 
policy’. Moreover, this nationalist conception of foreign policy was transformed into a
18 Greenfeld, Nationalism, p.313.
19 Cited in Laue, Leopold Ranke, p.74.
20 Leopold Ranke, ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, in Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p.175.
21 Ranke, ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, p. 167.
22 Quoted in Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism, p. 11.
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general theory of international politics. As Carsten Holbraad observed, Ranke’s 
international theory ‘was inseparably bound up with continual struggle between integrated 
national states’.23 In this respect, it is instructive to quote Theodore H. Von Laue:
every nation has a right to follow its own logic of politics as well as any other phase of national life, his 
[Ranke’s] theory therefore was limited not only to germanophilism. The original break with the standards of 
western liberal thought was carried forward...in a destructive but inevitable chain reaction into Slavophilism, 
Sinophilism, Indophilism, Turcophilism, etc. Wherever the standards of the most advanced western nations 
clashed with local traditions, a similar ideological revolt was the logical consequence of local nationalism.24
It may be pointed out that the identification between the preservation of the national 
identity and the independence of the state as such does not imply a view of international 
politics stressing conflicts and relations of power. As it was noted earlier, the liberal 
conception of national self-determination also equates the political fulfillment of national 
identity with the acquisition of sovereign statehood.25 There is, nevertheless, a crucial 
difference between the liberal conception of national self-determination and the Rankean 
idea of the individuality of national cultures. For liberals, the freedom of the nations does 
not necessarily mean endless competition between national states. In other words, national 
self-determination is not equated with power politics; rather, it is part of a just international 
political order. On the contrary, for Ranke, the awareness of their cultural individuality 
leads national groups to assert their superiority through conflicts and wars. To a large 
extent, this view is related with the historical circumstances of German national 
unification. From a Prussian standpoint, in the political context of the nineteenth century, 
the quest to unify the German nation necessarily involved a conflict with Western states. 
This seems to confirm not only the belief of contemporary historians of modern politics 
that the tradition of realpolitik grew out of a reaction against Western liberal thought,26 but 
also the view that historically there is a strong connection between realpolitik and 
nationalism.27
23 Carsten Holbraad, The Concert o f Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-1914 
(London: Longman, 1970), p.85, see also pp.86-7.
24 Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 100.
25 See Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, in particular chapters 2, 3, and 4.
26 See Peter Burke, ‘Ranke the Reactionary’, in Georg G. Iggers, James M. Powell (eds.), Leopold Von Ranke 
and the Shaping o f the Historical Discipline (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp.36-44; Karl H. 
Metz, ‘The Politics of Conflict: Heinrich Von Treitschke and the Idea of Realpolitik’, History o f Political 
Thought, 2 (1982), pp.269-84; and Laue, Leopold Ranke, chapter 4.
27 See, inter alia, Metz, ‘The Politics of Conflict’; and Laue, Leopold Ranke, chapter 5.
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Such a historical association has resulted into a theory o f ‘aggressive nationalism’: the 
political realization of a nation leads inevitably to expansionist policies. As it was noted by 
a historian of nineteenth century Germany, ‘the concept of national self-determination is 
easily transformed into a belief in national superiority and the right of dominion over alien 
cultural groups’ 28 This aggressive conception of nationalism is further reinforced by two 
other factors. At the theoretical level, we need to remember that Ranke, as with other 
German nationalists, saw the national state in organic terms. For such a view, the defining 
characteristic of a political organism is that of growth, which has to be achieved through 
conflict. In his more theoretical writings, Ranke developed the concept of ‘the organic 
power state’: a state founded on domestic political coercion and on external military might, 
whose vitality and individuality were shaped in conflicts with other states.29 For this theory 
of state nationalism, the independence of the nation, in a violent international environment, 
depends on the power of the state. The second factor is related with the particular German 
historical experience. Contrary to other European cases during the nineteenth century, 
Germany was struggling not only for national self-determination but also to be recognized 
as a great power.
The logical conclusion of Ranke’s thought is the belief in the primacy of foreign 
policy. According to Ranke,
The position of a state in the world depends on the degree of independence it has attained. It is obliged, 
therefore, to organize all its internal resources for the purpose of self-preservation. This is the supreme law of 
the state’.30
In this statement, the crucial point is the expression ‘self-preservation’. It is the perception 
that the existence of the state is permanently threatened by external enemies that gives 
origin to the doctrine of ‘the primacy of the foreign policy’. For Ranke, the permanent 
danger of foreign aggression makes the capacity of the state to defend national interests 
‘the supreme factor in political life’.31 Yet, and this is a crucial point, the primacy of
28 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development o f Germany, Volume I, The Period o f Unification, 1815-1871 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.69.
29 This view is the central theme of his essay, ‘The Great Powers’. For a discussion of this idea in nineteenth 
century Germany and in Ranke’s thought, see Pflanze, The Period o f Unification, pp.28-31.
30 Ranke, “A Dialogue on Politics”, p. 167.
31 For a discussion of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ in Ranke’s thought, see Herbert Butterfield, Man on His 
Past: The Study o f the History o f Historical Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969),
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foreign policy does not follow a defensive logic. Rather, the assumption is that in the 
international system aggression is a common political practice, which is moreover justified 
in moral terms. In the name of national preservation, the unilateral right to war is a 
legitimate instrument of foreign policy. In other words, for the perspective adopted by 
Ranke, national survival easily leads to offensive strategies.
As recent discussions within International Relations have emphasized, the 
distinction between a defensive and an offensive ideology in international politics is of a 
fundamental importance.32 When the former ideology prevails, the security dilemma is 
mitigated and states tend to establish institutional forms of collective security.33 On the 
contrary, when the latter ideology is dominant, national security is achieved through 
expansion.34 In addition, as it has also been noted, offensive policies and strategies tend to 
be closely connected with an aggressive nationalist political theory, or what Stephen Van 
Evera calls ‘war-causing nationalisms’.35 This form of nationalism creates an ‘ideology of 
the offensive’, which leads great powers to believe that security is best provided for by 
territorial expansion.36 This seems to suggest that a nationalist ideology gives raise to
•  • •  37situations where ‘the offensive posture is not distinguishable from defensive one’. As 
Robert Jervis has argued, this is the worst scenario of all.
There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to 
obtain...because the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what 
you have...The situation will be unstable. Arms races are likely. Incentives to strike first will turn crises into 
wars. Decisive victories and conquests will be common. States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be 
hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them.38
pp. 116-22. According to Holbraad, it was Dilthey who coined the expression ‘primacy of foreign policy’, and 
first used it about Ranke’s doctrine, see The Concert o f Europe, p.83.
32 For the ‘offense-defense distinction’, within realist theory, see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30 (1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and 
the Causes of War’, in Michael E. Brown, et. al. (eds.), Theories o f War and Peace (London: The MIT Press, 
1998), pp.55-93.
33 Jervis is quite clear: when the ‘offense-defense distinction is possible, the central characteristic of the 
security dilemma no longer holds, and one of the most troublesome consequences of anarchy is removed’. 
‘Security Dilemma’, p.206.
34 Jervis, ‘Security Dilemma’, pp. 186-7.
35 Stephen Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, in Brown, et al (eds.), War and Peace, pp.257- 
91.
36 See Jack Snyder, Myths o f Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First 
World War’, International Security, 9 (1984), pp.58-107.
37 Jervis, ‘Security Dilemma’, p.211.
38 Jervis, ‘Security Dilemma’, p.211.
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Jervis’ description corresponds to Ranke’s view of international politics and to his doctrine 
of the primacy of foreign policy. For Ranke, to increase the power of the state is what 
really matters in international politics. As Laue has observed, when it comes to foreign 
relations, ‘Ranke’s theory looses its vagueness and assumes the hard distinctive features of 
power politics and war’.
At this point, it is quite important to stress the revolutionary nature of Ranke’s work. 
The strong nationalist character of his international theory was the result of a reaction 
against political traditions with clear internationalist inclinations, most notably the 
traditions of liberalism, natural law, and republicanism. By identifying these traditions 
exclusively with the Western states and by associating the rise of nationalism with the 
‘reaction against the West’, the nationalist theory of politics rejects intellectual traditions, 
which were genuinely European, and indeed international, and not the exclusive preserve 
of particular national cultures (and to which, it must be added, German political traditions 
and thinkers have greatly contributed, as we shall see later in the thesis). The exclusive 
focus on political strategies appropriate to increase national power, and not to maintain 
international society, was one of the crucial implications of this revolution in the domain of 
international political theory. The emphasis on the uniqueness of the nations, and on its 
superior moral value, results in the destruction of the necessary intellectual foundations to 
build a concept of international society. For instance, according to the Rankean 
perspective, foreign policies should be exclusively guided by a narrow conception of 
national interest, which excludes any concern with the international common good. To 
grasp the revolutionary nature of the tradition of realpolitik, it is helpful to consider for a 
moment the extremely important work on ‘the transformation of European politics’ by the 
American historian Paul Schroeder.40
Schroeder defines the political system created in Vienna, in 1813-15, as a system 
based on ‘political equilibrium’, and not on power politics. According to Schroeder, the 
struggle for power that characterized international politics in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century and in the first decade of nineteenth century ‘gave away to an 
international system of political equilibrium based on benign shared hegemony and the
39 Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 99. Although not associating it specifically with Ranke, John Vincent also 
equates realpolitik with power politics. See John Vincent, '‘Realpolitik’, in James Mayall (ed.), The 
Community o f States (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp.73-84.
40 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation o f European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994).
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mutual recognition of rights underpinned by law’.41 Such an international system is defined 
by ‘a general legal and political system in Europe designed to ensure political equilibrium 
-  meaning a balance in rights, security, and independence -  between all states.. .despite the 
existence of permanent, unavoidable imbalances of power among them’.42 In this regard, 
the general diplomatic goal in Europe was to maintain a political equilibrium in the 
international system.43 As it is clear from the above, Schroeder explicitly opposes the 
system o f ‘political equilibrium’ to the realist system of power politics. For instance, in his 
survey of the ‘diplomatic correspondence and political writings from leaders’ of the major 
nineteenth century European powers, Schroeder has discovered ‘two divergent political 
vocabularies’. One, associated with the notion of equilibrium, which uses a ‘moral-legal’ 
language and often refers to ideas such as ‘the unity of the powers, the Concert of Europe, 
order and peace, and the independence of Europe’; the other, ‘balance of power 
terminology’, ‘flows into the language of realpolitik’, and sees international politics 
‘governed only by state interests rather than principles or moral rules’.44 The results of 
Schroeder’s historical investigation lead him to conclude that ‘pure balance of power 
politics destroys political equilibrium rather than sustains it’.45 Yet, during the nineteenth 
century, the older doctrine of political equilibrium was gradually replaced by the offensive 
ideology of power politics, associated with nationalism and realpolitik. One can safely say 
that, as the century advanced, international politics became deeply influenced by the 
nationalist ideology, by aggressive and expansionist diplomatic strategies, and were 
transformed into a condition of state of war. Such a state of affairs culminated in the 
outbreak of the First World War.
Further, from Schroeder’s argument it is easy to conclude that his idea of political 
equilibrium is quite similar to the notion of international society, developed by the English 
school. Borrowing from Michael Oakeshott, he defines international system in terms of
constituent rules of a practice or a civic association: the understandings, assumptions, learned skills and 
responses, rules, norms, procedures...which agents acquire and use in pursuing their individual divergent 
aims within the framework of a shared practice.46
41 The Transformation, p.580.
42 Schroeder, The Transformation, p.482.
43 Schroeder, The Transformation, p.482.
44 Paul W. Schroeder, ‘The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?’, Review 
o f International Studies, 15, 1 (1989), p. 135.
45 Schroeder, ‘The Nineteenth Century System’, p. 138.
46 Schroeder, The Transformation, p.x.
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Indeed, Schroeder himself identifies his concept with Hedley Bull’s conception of 
international society. As he says, the historical record of European politics after 1815 
proves that ‘international politics, even if they remain structurally anarchic... can none the 
less be restrained by consensus and bounded by law’.47 Schroeder’s analysis shows, first, 
that contrary to what is asserted by some, the realist notion of the state of war is inadequate 
to understand the nature of international order in the first half of nineteenth century 
Europe. Secondly, the age of realpolitik that came to dominate the politics of the states
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system shattered the belief in international political, legal, and ethical principles. This 
demonstrates that the emergence of the tradition of realpolitik was indeed quite 
revolutionary. Interesting enough, a politician who is often identified with political realism, 
the British Prime Minister, Disraeli, clearly perceived the revolutionary nature of 
realpolitik. Discussing the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 in 
Parliament, he affirmed that
This war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than the French Revolution of the last 
century...Not a single principle on the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for
49guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. You have a new world, new influences at work.
Before we move to the next section of the chapter, it is necessary to make a 
qualification. Despite the focus on the rise of German nationalism, it should not be 
concluded that nationalism was exclusively a German ideology. From the second half of 
the nineteenth century, all European great powers were strongly influenced by nationalist 
ideology, and pursued expansionist strategies. For instance, as Van Evera has observed, 
‘during the decades before the First World War a phenomenon which may be called a ‘cult 
of the offensive’ swept through Europe’.50 It was undoubtedly the case that nationalist
47 Schroeder, The Transformation, p. 803.
48 For an analysis of international power politics in the second half of the nineteenth century, see Hinsley, 
Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace, chapter 11. The period between the Crimean War and 1871 witnessed five 
wars between great powers in Europe. Then the period until 1914, although formally peaceful in Europe, was 
characterized by arms races, competing alliances, tariff wars and colonial conflicts in Africa and in Asia. It 
should be noted that Hinsley does not argue that the age of realpolitik during the second half of the nineteenth 
century was revolutionary, but rather a return to the eighteenth century politics of the ancien regime.
49 Cited in Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.244. In the same vein, 
Henry Kissinger calls Bismarck ‘the conservative revolutionary’, and argues that if ‘Prussia were going to 
realize its destiny and unify Germany, the Vienna system had to be destroyed’. For Kissinger’s analysis of the 
‘conservative revolutionary’ character of Bismarck’s policies, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & 
Schuster, 1994), in particular pp. 120-36.
50 ‘Origins of the First World War’, p.58. See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology o f the Offensive: Military 
Decision Making and the Disasters o f 1914 (London: Cornell University Press, 1984).
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ideology, associated with the tradition of realpolitik, had a considerable impact on both the 
conduct and the understanding of international relations on all European great powers. 
There are, however, two reasons why most of the discussion here concentrates on German 
nationalism. First, it is the case, historically, that German national unification marked a 
transition from, in Schroeder’s terms, a cooperative system of political equilibrium to a 
competitive system of balance of power. Secondly, and more important in the context of 
this thesis, the rise of the tradition of realpolitik in the nineteenth century Prussia, 
exemplified by the work of Ranke, is the historical moment where the nationalist character 
of what was to become later the American realist theory of International Relations is 
clearly visible; and this is one of the points that this chapter seeks to emphasize. In 
addition, this nationalist approach is reinforced by a construction of European political 
history centered on the historical triumph of the national idea. The work of Ranke also 
illustrates the utilization of history to validate the tradition of realpolitik, as we shall see 
now in the discussion of his account of modem political history.
Ranke's historicism: the strategy to validate realpolitik as a modern international theory
Briefly, in the study of politics, the concept of historicism has generally been understood in 
three different ways.51 The first use refers to the belief that political knowledge comes 
exclusively from history. Thus, any explanation or understanding of political phenomena is 
achieved through the study of history.52 A second use relates to what has been called the 
‘historicization of life’. In fact, this meaning reveals more a political philosophy than an 
approach to the study of history. Basically, it transforms the past into a continuation of the 
present. As a German historian has put it, ‘the patterns of life become the categories of 
history’. Translating into political language, political history is reconstructed in order to
51 According to Meinecke, the term ‘historicism’ was coined in 1879 by the German historian Karl Werner in 
his study on the Italian philosopher Vico. The initial English term was ‘historism’, which was a translation of 
the German historismus. In a revealing way, the title of Meinecke’s work on the emergence of ‘historicism’ 
was still translated as ‘historism’. See Friedrich Meinecke, Historism: The Rise o f a New Historical Outlook 
(Translated by J.E. Anderson, London: Routledge, 1972). Yet, gradually the term ‘historicism’ replaced the 
early ‘historism’. Accordingly, the fonner will be used in this paper. For valuable discussions on these 
questions, see Dwight E. Lee and Robert N. Beck, ‘The Meaning of Historicism’, The American Historical 
Review, 59 (1953-54); and David Boucher, Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History o f  
Ideas (Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1985), introduction.
52 Lee and Beck, ‘The Meaning of Historicism, pp.568-70.
53 Cited in Lee and Beck, ‘The Meaning of Historicism’, p.571.
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answer contemporary concerns. In the third common use, historicism means ‘historical 
relationism’, that is the ‘stress upon the contextual nature of understanding human 
beings’.54 In other words, the study of political actions and political ideas has to consider 
their historical circumstances. We find all these three meanings of historicism in Ranke’s 
work, but we shall now focus both on the first and the last meanings of historicism, given 
that it is the way he addresses these questions that permits him to substantiate both the 
historical and the theoretical claims of the realpolitik tradition.
The emphasis on the historical context inevitably raises some crucial questions. First 
of all one needs to think about the relation between the past and the present. Shall we study 
history just for the sake of knowing the past? Or is the engagement with history necessarily 
influenced by current political concerns? Then, we have also to ask to what extent can we 
really know the past? In other words, is history an objective activity, and is the ‘past’ 
‘fixed’, in the sense of being independent of any conception of it? Or are we bound to be 
subjective in our choices regarding what is historically relevant and, as such, the meaning 
of the ‘past’ is always constructed? These questions are treated by two different 
approaches to the study of history, namely historical realism and historical idealism55 The 
historical realist believes that it is possible to know the past as it really was. This in turn 
would lead to the assertion that one may do history just for the sake of knowing the past. 
However, in contrast, the historical idealist recognizes that ‘understanding the past is a 
present activity’.56 As a result he or she accepts that the historian is also engaged with 
political questions and, as a consequence, is necessarily selective in his or her choices of 
study. It is important to see how Ranke situates in this debate.
Ranke once famously wrote, in his ‘Criticism of Modern Historians’, that he only 
wished to show ‘what really happened’ in history.57 With this declaration Ranke sought to 
make two points. First, he stressed the importance of history to the study of politics. 
Referring to this feature of Ranke’s historicism, two editors of his work have defined it in 
the following way: ‘At the core of the historicist orientation was the insistence that man 
can be understood only in terms of his history, (and) that the sciences dealing with man’s
54 Boucher, Texts in Context, p. 14.
55 For a brief introduction to these approaches to the study of history, see Boucher, Texts in Context, pp. 14-19
56 Boucher, Texts in Context, p. 14.
57 Ranke developed this argument in the Preface to his first important historical work, The Histories o f  the 
Latin and Teutonic Nations, ‘Criticism of Modem Historians’, see Iggers, The German Conception o f History,
p.68.
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cultural creativity are historical sciences’.58 In terms of political thought, the implication is 
that the understanding of political institutions is only achieved through the study of their 
history. In a common formula, ‘political theory is the study of political history’.59
The second point made by Ranke referred to the possibility of reaching objective 
historical truth, which puts him clearly in the historical realism camp, as defined above. 
The Prussian historian always maintained that the study of history has to be accompanied 
by a ‘strict representation of the facts’. In his words, ‘without exact research, the general 
view would deteriorate into fantasy’.60 However, though this kind of documentary study 
characterized Ranke’s historical work, it should be noted that Ranke’s stress on the 
‘historical facts’ is not a narrow empiricist position. Ranke rejected and even condemned 
the positivist approach. The problem with positivism, says Ranke, is that it ‘does not see 
for what purpose all these things happen, why these men existed and lived; even the inner 
connection is distorted’.61 Despite the emphasis on ‘facts’, Ranke always aimed at 
something deeper. His ultimate focus was the ‘objective order behind the events’, the 
‘inner connection of history’. The task of the historian is to grasp that political order, what 
in a revealing way Ranke calls ‘the core of Existence’.62 There is something beyond and 
above the historical facts, which gives them unity and helps to know our present condition. 
Historical reality, according to the Prussian historian, was not exhausted by historical 
events. Crucially, the study and understanding of history is influenced by present political 
concerns. This seems to put Ranke in the idealist camp. Therefore, Ranke has oriented his 
historical work in two directions: on the one hand, ‘the investigation of the effective forces 
behind events’; and, on the other hand, ‘the perception of their general connection’.63 This 
latter point connects the historical past to the political present. It is this double method that 
permits Ranke to achieve what he calls ‘historical truth’. At this moment, a crucial
58 Georg G. Iggers and Konrad Von Moltke, ‘Introduction’ to Leopold Von Ranke, The Theory and Practice 
o f History (edited by Georg G. Iggers and Konrad Von Moltke, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), 
p.xliii.
9 See Michael Donelan, Elements o f International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.76- 
7.
60 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p.59.
61 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p.48.
62 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p. 58.
63 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p.59.
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question arises regarding Ranke’s apparent historical realism: is Ranke’s historical truth 
the ‘only historical truth’?64
It seems to me that contrary to what Ranke wants us to believe the search for 
‘historical totality’ is far from being an objective and ‘impartial’ intellectual activity. Such 
a task is, first of all, heavily determined by the political views of the historian. Here, the 
fundamental question is what kind of ‘true facts’ was Ranke looking for? Obviously, the 
‘facts’ he considered relevant in the conduct of politics. As we saw, his political theory 
rested on the belief that national states ‘constituted the sole viable units of historical 
investigation’.65 In this regard, it is not surprising that Ranke’s sources were mainly 
documents of state such as ‘memoirs, diaries, letters, (and) reports from embassies’.66 In 
particular, the study of the Relazioni of the Venetian ambassadors: ‘the reports which the 
ambassadors of the Republic had sent from all the courts of Europe in the course of more 
than three centuries’.67 Presented as politically neutral, ‘the true historical method’ shows 
in fact a close connection to a nationalist and statist theory of politics. In this regard, the
subjective nature of Ranke’s historical work is clear. As a student of Ranke’s work has put
• • • * 68 it, his claimed objective historiography was tinged ‘with a subjective bias’.
In his historical studies, Ranke was not able to transcend the present and thus starts
from his concept of the political developed in ‘The Dialogue on Politics’, and in ‘The
Great Powers’. The concepts developed in these theoretical writings guided his historical
investigations. Yet, Ranke attempted to make an ingenious mixture between historical
realism and historical idealism. Starting from a contemporary standpoint, the development
of the national state in Europe, and the German struggle for national unification, he
adopted an idealist position. However, by claiming that he wanted to show ‘what really
happened’ in history, he later tried to shift to a realist position. The crucial problem with
Ranke’s historicist approach lies in this shift. Ranke presented the results of a work, which
had clear ‘subjective’ premises, as ‘objective’. As such, he refused to acknowledge the
64 In the Preface to the History o f the Reformation in Germany (Translated by Sarah Austin, edited bby 
Robbert A.. Johnson, London: George Routledge and Sons, 1905), Ranke concludes the defense of his 
epistemological position saying ‘truth can be but one’, p.xxi.
6 Hayden White, The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), p. 175.
66 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p. 137. Ranke spent four years in Italy, between 1827 and 1831, where he 
researched diplomatic documents in Venice, Florence and Rome. The findings of this research were to 
become one of the central sources of his subsequent historical work. See Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, chapter 2.
67 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p.33.
68 Ferdinand Schevill, ‘Ranke: Rise, Decline, and Persistence of a Reputation’, The Journal o f  Modern 
History, XXIV, 3 (1952), p.221.
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extent to which his own political history was informed by his theoretical assumptions. To 
tell international political history in terms of the emergence and the development of the 
nation-states system is, according to Ranke, to tell an ‘objective history’ freed of utopian 
elements. Moreover, it was a necessary foundation to build a ‘realist’ theory of politics, as 
we shall see now.
Ranke’s modern political history : the triumph o f the national state
In striking accordance with his theoretical views, the ‘national idea’ is the ‘leading idea’ of 
Ranke’s modem political history. Ranke’s international political history focuses on 
‘nationalities engaged in the historical movement’, and ignores internationalist elements.69 
Modern political history started with the rise of the European nations through their 
constitution into sovereign states. The emergence of the states system was the result of the 
collapse of the universal church and the Imperial state. Ranke’s second major work, the 
History o f the Popes, gives an account of the clash between the Holy See and the ‘nascent 
national states’, and the subsequent decline of the papacy. Medieval Europe had been
• • 70politically dominated by the alliance between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor.
• • 71Yet, during the fifteenth century, the ‘movements in the history of the world’ turned 
against the universal institutions, both the religious and the temporal. It was then that the 
‘national idea’ ‘emerged as the self-consciously governing principle of the various peoples
noof Europe’. In Ranke’s own words,
we see one nation after another begin to feel its independence and unity: the public government of each will 
no longer own any higher authority; the popes no longer find allies in the middle ranks; their inroads upon 
national independence were repelled, in a determined spirit, by princes and people of all orders.73
69 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p. 52.
70 Leopold Ranke, A History o f the Papacy, Political and Ecclesiastical in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries (Vol. I, London: Blackie and Son, MDCCCL), see pp.26-8.
71 Ranke, A History o f the Papacy, p.34.
72 White, The Historical Imagination, p. 170.
73 Ranke, A History o f the Papacy, pp.35-6.
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The ‘act of wrenching oneself free from the idea of universal Christendom, was an 
indispensable step towards the development of a new form of the State, both without and 
within’.74 Thus, the defeat of the papacy marks the foundation of the modern states-system.
For Ranke, the political significance of the Reformation lies also in the fact that the 
Protestant religious movements were deeply informed by the ‘national idea’. This is clear 
in Ranke’s account of the impact of the Reformation in the German lands. The theme that 
runs through his History o f the Reformation in Germany is the relation between politics 
and religion during the development of the German nation. Most of the book discusses the 
period from the beginning of the Lutheran reformist movement to the Religious Peace of 
Augsburg of 1555. The anti-Papal reformist movement is presented as a national struggle 
against the universal empire of the papacy. During the sixteenth century, the nation 
demanded a reform against the ‘military-sacerdotal state’ that still exercised a great deal of 
authority over German affairs.
The whole future destiny of the German nation was involved in the question whether it could withstand this 
danger or not; whether it would succeed in severing itself from the papacy, and what form of constitution - 
for without political changes the separation was impossible - the nation would then assume.75
This was of course the crucial moment for the German nation. Despite the failure of the 
Protestant Reformation to unify the nation, the German national spirit became self- 
conscious with the Lutheran movement. Not surprisingly, Ranke called the Reformation 
‘the most beneficent event in German history’.76
As these last remarks suggest, Ranke saw the emergence and consolidation of national 
states as corresponding to a process which witnessed the blending of religion with 
nationalism. It is important to stress this historical process for it explains the ‘spiritual 
content’ that Ranke attributes to the national idea.77
In the pressure of universal strife, religion was adopted by the nations according to the different 
modifications of its dogmatic fonns. The system thus chosen had blended with and been fused into the 
feeling of nationality, had become, as it were, a possession of the community of the state, or of the
74 Quoted in Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.382.
75 Ranke, History o f the Reformation, p.246-48.
76 Cited in G.P.Gooch, ‘Ranke’s Interpretation of the German Histoiy’, in G.P.Gooch, Studies in German 
History (New York, NY: Russell and Russell, 1969), p.213.
77 Ranke, Theory and Practice, p.32.
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people... Thence it happened that the states... have formed themselves into great ecclesiastical-political 
bodies.78
Ranke arrives at this conclusion through an interesting and important argument. One of the 
far-reaching implications of the Reformation was a crucial change on the relation between 
individuals and religion. Before the Protestant challenge, Christianity was simply a matter 
of ‘simple acceptation’. After, it became a matter of ‘conviction’, of ‘conscious 
acquiescence’. ‘It is of great consequence that a man should have to choose between 
different creeds; that he can reject, apostatize, pass from the one to the other’. At he 
individual level, ‘it followed that Christian ideas penetrated still more deeply and fully into 
all life and thought’. At the collective level,
religion came to be embraced by the nations according to one or other of the various modifications that had 
taken place in its dogmatic structure; religious doctrine had become fused in one mass with feelings of 
nationality, as if it were a common property, an attribute of the government or of the people. It had been 
gained by arms, maintained amidst infinite dangers, and became part of their flesh and blood.79
Thus, embodying both secular and spiritual elements, modern European states grew as 
‘earthly-spiritual’ entities, with both ‘an ecclesiastical and a political individuality’. In 
other words, for Ranke, Reformation is seen as the first national moment in political 
modernity.
Ranke’s analysis of the impact of the French Revolution in Europe stresses again the 
conflict between universalism and nationalism. From the end of the medieval period to the 
end of the Thirty Years’ War, as we saw, the emergent national states struggled against the 
universalism of the both the Pope and the Emperor. In the period between the Peace of 
Westphalia and the Vienna Congress, the states-system had to withstand attacks of 
universal models of political organisation, most notably by Philip II, Louis XIV and 
Napoleon.80 In political terms, such universal attempts were identified with bids of 
particular monarchs for international hegemony, which threatened the survival of other 
national states. Yet, for Ranke, it is crucially important to investigate not only how 
nationalism opposes universalism but also how nationalism changes, and is changed by,
78 Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, pp. 131-2.
79 Ranke, A History of the Papacy, Vol. II, p. 154.
80 See Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, in Von Laue, Leopold Ranke.
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universal ideologies. In modern history, this has happened through a process in which 
those ideologies turned into forms of nationalism. Each nation is ‘modified by universal 
tendencies, but at the same time resist and react upon them’.81 This is clear in the period 
after the French Revolution, when European ‘nationalities were rejuvenated, revived, and 
developed anew’.82 Although France preceded all other states, this was ‘a general
• • • • • 83movement’ developed around the principle of the ‘individuality of the state’. The 
historical process that led to this stage is nicely defined by Felix Gilbert: modern history 
witnessed ‘the gradual renunciation of all commitments to cosmopolitan values until at the 
end the sovereign national state is recognized as the supreme value and final goal of 
history’.84 Thus, according to Ranke’s interpretation, the French Revolution reinforced the 
unity and continuity of modern history in terms of the prevalence of the national idea.85 As 
he puts it, as a result of the French Revolution, ‘the nations had come into a final stage of 
self-consciousness’.86 We have therefore in the Reformation and in the French Revolution 
the crucial moments in the modem triumph of the national state.
Furthermore, in Ranke’s historical work, the development and the final triumph of the 
national idea are strongly connected with power politics, which again follows from his 
political theory. In a revealing way, Ranke believes that only the ‘more prominent nations’ 
become great powers. As he puts it: ‘All states that count in the world and make 
themselves felt are motivated by special tendencies of their own’.87 This argument appears 
in his essay, ‘The Great Powers’. In all cases of the rise of the five European great powers, 
France, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the existence of a strong national identity 
plays a crucial role. For instance, German history illustrates quite well this point. The rise 
of Prussia to the status of a great national power is associated with the ‘development of the 
national spirit’, which in turn is the result of the international struggle for power.88 
Following his ‘history of the Reformation in Germany’, Ranke’s account of the historical 
development of Prussia starts with the decline of the Holy Roman Empire after the Thirty 
Years’ War. By reinforcing its Protestant identity, the religious conflicts helped Prussia to
81 Iggers, Moltke, ‘Introduction’, p.xl.
82 Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, p.215.
83 Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, p.216.
84 Gilbert, ‘Introduction’, Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism, p.ix.
85 Ranke, The Theory and Practice, p. 163.
86 White, The Historical Imagination, p. 171.
87 Ranke, ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, p. 168.
88 Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, p.204.
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rise to the status of great power, more specifically a Protestant German great power. After 
1648, Prussia continues its rise by competing with Austria for hegemony within the 
German Empire. During this period, Frederick the Great gave a decisive impulse to what 
Luther had started in 1518. At this point, as a political entity, Prussia was strong enough to 
attract the German nation, but not to be a truly great power, as Britain, France and Russia 
were. To achieve this position, it needed the moral and political strength of the whole 
German nation. It was at this critical historical moment that Napoleon’s forces invaded 
Germany offering the ‘external impulse’ that later made possible the Prussian unification 
of the German nation, under Bismarck’s leadership. Thus, as the Neo-Rankeans were to 
put it, the history of the German unification can be summarized under the heading ‘From 
Luther to Bismarck’.89
The second theme of the essay on ‘The Great Powers’ is the French attempts, both 
Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s, to consolidate its political hegemony in European politics. 
This is indeed a narrative quite familiar to students of International Relations. As soon as 
French preponderance set over Europe, an alliance of all other European great powers 
formed against France. Ranke sees in this example a case of the functioning of the 
principle of the balance of power. ‘The concept of the European balance of power was 
developed in order that the union of many other states might resist the pretensions of the 
“exorbitant” court, as it was called’.90 As for many other political traditions, for Ranke, the 
balance of power is an institution that guarantees national independence. Yet, the problem 
with Ranke’s conception of the balance of power is that it is not developed in the context 
of a conception of international society. Being unable to distinguish between defensive and 
offensive aims, as we saw before, Ranke ends up by admitting that the maintenance of the 
balance of power serves as an excuse to expand political power. In this regard, it is 
illustrative to compare Ranke’s notion of the balance of power with Schroeder’s concept of 
political equilibrium. Whereas for Ranke, the notion of balance of power is understood in 
the context of power politics and struggles for hegemony, in which it is assumed that each 
state tries to maximize its power; for Schroeder, the balance of power, or political 
equilibrium, is seen as a fundamental institution to preserve international order.
89 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ‘Ranke and the Neo-Rankean School in Imperial Germany: State-oriented 
Historiography as a Stabilizing Force’, in Iggers, Powell (eds.), Leopold Von Ranke (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), p. 137.
90 Ranke, “The Great Powers”, p. 188.
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Therefore, in Ranke’s modern European history, we find the attempt to write political 
history in terms of a perennial struggle between major national powers. As he says, 
‘independent national states in all their original power had taken over the world stage’ 91 
Rightly, Bull has observed that Ranke tells ‘the story of European international history.. .as 
the history of relations among the great powers’.92 Such a story starts with the defeat of the 
papacy and with the effective collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, after the Thirty Years’ 
Wars, and has since then defined modern political history. As for international norms and 
institutions, they are never treated as compatible with states’ political independence. 
International normative principles are either seen as the consequence of one state’s 
political hegemony, which, in Ranke’s words, ‘would bring ruin to the others’. Or, 
alternatively, as a mixture of national identities which ‘would destroy the essence of each 
one’.93 As such, Ranke ends up with a nationalist view of international politics, where 
nations are unique and individual entities, that interact with each other only through power 
politics and wars.
We are now in a position to define the tradition of realpolitik as it emerged in 
Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century.94 Such a tradition rests on three central 
ideas. First, as an international political theory, it focuses on power relations between 
sovereign states, ignoring other type of political processes. In the familiar language of 
international relations, the states system is defined in terms of anarchy and state of war. 
Second, at the epistemological level, it is founded on the double belief that all knowledge 
derives from the study of history, and that it is possible to achieve a true account of 
political history. Finally, it is based on an historical narrative that emphasizes the absolute 
triumph of the national idea, and the historical defeat of internationalist political 
ideologies. It is in this regard that history is used to legitimize a particular political theory. 
By telling modern political history in nationalist and statist terms, Ranke tried to 
demonstrate the ‘truthness’ of realpolitik as a theory of international politics. The result
91 Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, p.206.
92 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977),
p.206.
Ranke, ‘The Great Powers’, p.218.
94 Here, I am using realpolitik in a broader way as an intellectual tradition. The term is often used in a narrow 
way as meaning the formulation of practical and possible policies in a context of power politics. Historically, 
the former, as a general theory of international politics, only emerged in Germany in the nineteenth century. 
The latter, as a theory of foreign policy, is much older and its origins can be traced to the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, then often referred to as raison d ’etat. However, as this Thesis claims, the two must not 
be confused. See also the discussion in chapter 4 of this thesis.
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was the construction of the historical category that came to be known, within International 
Relations, as the ‘Westphalian system’, which is founded on a twofold view of the history 
of the modern states system. First, it defines modern politics in terms of the historical 
triumph of the nation-state. The national idea emerged as a political principle in the early 
modern Europe against the imperialism of the Pope and the Emperor. Then, its ideological 
power was reinforced with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and 
subsequently has dominated the modern political world. Secondly, international political 
history is a history of power politics between national great powers, where national 
survival is always at stake. In other words, world politics is seen as in a state of war, and 
incapable of being organized in terms of an international society. Yet, the identification 
between the triumph of the national state and the international state of war should be seen 
as a sign of particular conceptions of the sovereign state and of the international states 
system. The second part of the chapter tries to show how Morgenthau established 
realpolitik as the dominant intellectual tradition in the discipline of International Relations.
Morgenthau and the ‘realpolitik moment9 in International Relations theory
The purpose of this second part of the chapter is to show the fundamental importance of 
the Rankean intellectual revolution to the development of Morgenthau’s international 
political theory is As it is often pointed out, after arriving in the United States, Morgenthau 
sought to ‘speak truth to power’.95 Early realists, and in particular Morgenthau, attempted 
to educate American politicians to think and to act as leaders of a great power. Stanley 
Hoffmann has made this point: ‘Morgenthau’s ambition was to be the teacher of realism in 
the New World, bringing Old World wisdom to the continent of Utopia’.96 For 
Morgenthau, the country’s status as a new great power invited the tradition of realpolitik to 
become the doctrinal framework for American foreign policy. The United States, so
95 See Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Hans Morgenthau: The Limits and Influence of “Realism”’, in Janus and Minerva: 
Essays in the Theory and Practice o f International Politics (London: Westview Press, 1987), pp.70-81; 
Kenneth W. Thompson, ‘Hans Morgenthau: Principles of Political Realism’, in Masters o f  International 
Thought (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp.80-91; and Robert J. Myers, ‘Hans 
Morgenthau’s Realism and American Foreign Policy’, Ethics and International Affairs, 11 (1997), pp.. 253- 
70.
96 Hoffmann, ‘Hans Morgenthau’, p.76.
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• • • • 97believed Morgenthau, should come to terms with the use of power in world politics. But 
to be able to ‘speak truth to power’, Morgenthau would have to develop a ‘true’ theory of 
international politics. In other words, he would need to show that the European political 
tradition that he was bringing to the United States was the most apt in the ‘quest for 
theoretical truth’.
Morgenthau’s task rested on a double strategy. First, he denounced dominant theories 
in American political thought as inadequate to a proper understanding of international 
politics. Morgenthau did this by attacking American, mainly liberal, political thought for 
being utopian. In his view, liberalism could not provide a suitable (‘realist’) theoretical 
framework to guide American involvement in world politics. Secondly, Morgenthau 
produced a ‘true’ theory of international relations. It was at this moment that Rankean 
historiography started to play its role in the development of the realist theory. Basically, 
Morgenthau sought to offer an interpretation of modern political history stressing the 
continuity in terms of the rise and fall of great powers between the classical European 
states system and the bipolar system of the Cold War. As a new great power, the Unites 
States had to learn some important lessons about statecraft, and there was no better school 
available in this regard than the German historical school. By telling Americans the true 
nature of the modern states system, Morgenthau was able to put forward the political 
principles that should guide the foreign policy of a great power. This reveals Morgenthau’s 
historicism: a theory o f ‘politics as it is’ has to be founded on ‘history as it is’. By showing 
the ‘true’ nature of modern political history, Morgenthau could dismiss theories with 
different historical interpretations of modern politics as utopian.
The attack on the political rationalism o f the 1scientific man ’.
Morgenthau started his attack on the liberal political tradition by strongly criticizing its 
‘scientific rationalism’.98 According to Morgenthau, both liberal political thinkers and 
statesmen tried to transfer the scientific method to the understanding and practice of
97 See Robert E. Osgood, ‘The Mission of Morgenthau’, in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds.), 
Truth and Tragedy (London: Transaction Books, 1984), p.32.
98 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1946). For an interesting analysis of Morgentliau’s book, see Tang Tsou, ‘Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
Revisited’, in Thompson and Myers (eds.), Truth and Tragedy.
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politics. The belief that science can replace politics is defined by the three following 
characteristics. First, education leads individuals to act rationally. Secondly, a rational act 
inevitably produces the common good. Thirdly, reason is universal, both in its capacity to 
make individuals acting morally and in the universal effects of such rational behaviour." 
Against this rational tradition, Morgenthau develops a number of criticisms. Two are 
particularly important. First, Morgenthau says that, in the domain of international politics, 
liberal rationalism gives origin to legalism, which rests on nothing but ‘legal fictions’. 
Secondly, scientific rationalism reveals a mistaken view of history,100 which Morgenthau 
calls ‘a fictional account of the past’.101
For Morgenthau, a central characteristic of the ‘scientific man’ is the ‘belief in the 
redeeming power of the rule of law’.
The idea of a coherent system of legal rules regulating the relationships of men is intimately related, logically 
as well as historically, to the general philosophy of rationalism. Such a system of legal rules...is only the 
image... of the rational order which dominates the world102
In the case of international politics, the rule of law is seen as an instrument to change 
political life, in the sense of implementing a liberal political order. Morgenthau finds two 
key historical moments in the development of liberal ‘legalism’. The first occurred with the 
‘rationalist philosophy’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which gave rise to 
‘abstract systems of international law’, as instruments to build a ‘perfect international 
society’. The second moment resulted from the ‘political experience of domestic 
liberalism’.
After rationalist philosophy, in its liberal manifestation, had passed successfully its domestic trial, the general 
idea of extending those same principles to the international field was transformed into a concrete political 
problem to be put to the test of actual realization.103
99 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p. 13.
100 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of the United States’, The American 
Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), p.965, and p.976.
101 ‘Another Great Debate’, pp.969-70. Morgenthau also criticizes the liberal conception of history for seeing 
‘in history only a process through which reason realizes itself in time and space’, see Scientific Man, p.32.
102 Scientific Man, pp.23-4, and p.27.
103 Scientific Man, p.42.
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What the rule of law had done in domestic societies was, basically, to transform societies 
affected by anarchy, insecurity, and disorder into ‘well-ordered societies’. If ‘the rule of 
law had accomplished this in the domestic field’, ‘the rule of law would accomplish it 
again in the international sphere’.104 Thus, the experience of political reforms in liberal 
countries originated the doctrine of the domestic analogy: the ‘application of domestic 
legal experience to international law is really the main stock in trade of modern 
international thought’.105 It was such a doctrine that gave rise to the liberal idea of ‘peace 
through law’. As Morgenthau says, the belief that ‘wars can be abolished through 
international law’ became ‘the great hope of the age’.106 The first half of the twentieth 
century witnessed the most important historical manifestations of the ‘science of peace’. 
For instance, the Hague Peace Conference was a significant attempt to establish an 
international liberal society ruled by law. Later, after the First World War, the scientific 
approach to international peace gained new momentum with the establishment of the 
League of Nations.
Morgenthau uses two arguments to attack the liberal tendency ‘to think of politics in 
terms of law’.107 He first refers to the classical Hobbesian argument, which identifies the 
creation of a legal system with the existence of a sovereign authority. In a well-known 
proposition, law is the command of the sovereign. Given the absence of an international 
sovereign, the application of international law is always precarious. If we compare the 
domestic and the international spheres, we find a fundamental difference. Whereas the 
domestic legal system functions within a framework of law enforcement, created and 
implemented by the state, in the international field, without the existence of a sovereign 
state, such a framework does not exist, and thus the enforcement of international law 
depends always on the interests of the states. For Morgenthau, the problem with liberal 
legalism is that it deeply misunderstands the relationship between law and politics. In 
particular, ‘it overlooks the particular conditions which the rule of law encounters in the 
international sphere’.108 In part, it is such an Hobbesian analysis that explains why 
Morgenthau attributes an utopian character to liberal international thought. Without a
104 Scientific Man, p. 112.
105 Scientific Man, p. 113. For a discussion of nineteenth and twentieth centuries theories of international order 
based on the doctrine of the domestic analogy, see Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World 
Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
106 Scientific Man, pp. 111-3.
107 Scientific Man, p. 110.
108 Scientific Man, pp. 115-7.
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common international sovereign authority, world politics remains in the state of nature, and 
as such it is hopeless to expect the implementation of the rule of law. Yet, Morgenthau 
does not stop here. His second argument to demonstrate the utopianism of liberal thinking 
rests on the lessons of history. This is an argument on which Morgenthau heavily relies on 
Ranke, and where the influence of Ranke’s historical thinking is obvious. Morgenthau 
constructs the history o f ‘liberal legalism’ in a way that is meant to show its ‘utopianism’. 
It is important to note, in this regard, that Morgenthau relates the triumph of liberalism on 
the international scene with the League of Nations.109
By identifying the League with the application of liberal and legal principles to 
international politics, Morgenthau prepares the way to make the further inevitable step: the 
historical failure of the League signifies the collapse of liberalism as a valid intellectual 
foundation for international order. Then, from a historicist perspective, Morgenthau makes 
the final verdict: liberal theoretical devices ‘to reorganize the relations between 
states...have failed to stand the trial of history’.110 Above any other consideration, it is this 
failure ‘to stand the trial of history’ that makes liberal legalism utopian. Moreover, in an 
intelligent way, Morgenthau goes further. One could plausibly argue that the failure of the 
League resulted above all from particular historical circumstances, and many of them not 
resulting exclusively from the failure of liberal principles and policies. The immediate 
implication of this reasoning would be to recover some of the principles of the inter-war 
liberal project to reformulate the notion of a liberal international order.111 Yet, Morgenthau 
does not pursue this line of thought. For him, the failure of the League reveals a much 
deeper problem. It derives ultimately from a conflict between science and history. Given, 
on the one hand, the abstract scientism of liberals and, on the other hand, the repetition and 
recurrence of international politics, liberals are bound to fail again: the ‘search for the 
scientific formula, and an obstinate reality again and again makes the solution of today the
109 Scientific Man, p.41. Morgenthau also associates the United Nations with the ‘legalistic spirit’, see Hans J. 
Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination (London: Methuen & CO., 1952. The book 
was published in the United States in 1951 under the title In Defence o f the National Interest: A Critical 
Examination o f American Foreign Policy), pp. 101-4.
110 Scientific Man, p. 3 9.
111 For recent attempts in this direction, see Charles W. Kegley, ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International 
Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities’, International Studies Quarterly, 37, 2 (1993), 
pp. 131-46; Stanley Kober, ‘Idealpolitik’, Foreign Policy, 79, 1 (1990), pp. 3-24; and David Little, ‘The 
Recovery of Liberalism’, Ethics and International Affairs, 7, (1993), pp. 171-201. For a general treatment of 
the inter-war international liberal thinking, see David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers o f the Twenty 
Years ’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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fallacy of tomorrow’.112 Therefore, it is history, this ‘obstinate reality’, in Morgenthau’s 
terms, that demonstrates the errors of liberal international theory. This leads Morgenthau to 
affirm that liberals ‘never learn from history’.113 Before we discuss what Morgenthau has 
learned from history, it is important to briefly make some points regarding his conception 
o f ‘liberal legalism’.
There are, at least, two basic errors with Morgenthau’s conception of liberal legalism. 
First, in historical terms, it is a mistake to reduce the legalist tradition to the doctrine of 
domestic analogy. It is true that most of modern international legalist doctrines believe in 
the possibility of improving international political life, but historically such a belief is not 
associated with any kind of domestic analogy; for the simple fact that some of the most 
important modern international legalist approaches have emerged long before the 
beginning of the liberal domestic reforms. The idea of the domestic analogy can be traced 
back to Hobbes’s thought. More precisely, in the absolute opposition made by the English 
thinker between the anarchical state of nature and political order under a sovereign 
authority. The implication of this reasoning seems to be that, as in the domestic case, only 
the constitution of a world sovereign could abolish international anarchy. Yet, during the 
sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, before Hobbes had produced his 
political thought, the doctrine of the law of nations dominated the discussions about 
international politics, and considerably influenced the practice of sovereign rulers. In 
addition, domestic reforms mostly occurred during periods in which the rule of law 
prevailed in international relations. This suggests that the realist distinction between 
domestic politics as the domain of progress and reform and international politics as the 
realm of repetition is historically not correct. To use Martin Wight’s terms, the ‘good life’ 
at the domestic level is closely connected with the ‘good life’ at the international level. Or, 
if you want, miserable life within the states is often the result of wars among them, as 
Hobbes so clearly saw.114
The second error is associated with what Morgenthau calls the ‘science of peace’. The 
pacifist idea of achieving permanent peace through law mainly emerged during the
112 Scientific Man, p. 101.
113 Scientific Man, p.37.
114 For instance, one of the central themes of Hobbes’s history of the English Civil War was how the general 
European religious conflict aggravated religious conflicts witliin England, in particular due to the Pope’s 
influence and intervention. See Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Edited by Ferdinand 
Tonnies, and Introduction by Stephen Holmes, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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nineteenth century. Contrary to what Morgenthau attributes to liberal legalism, that the rule 
of law is seen as an instrument to end all wars, for older legalist traditions, war was a 
mechanism to implement the law.115 Both the ‘natural law’ and the ‘public law’ schools of 
the sixteenth and seventeen centuries recognized the existence of conflicts and wars 
between states, and their members did not believe in the possibility of creating a condition 
of ‘perpetual peace’. Yet, they certainly believed in the application of the rule of law to 
international wars. In this sense, they avoided the position of contemporary realists who 
see war as merely the continuation of politics by other means. The problem with 
Morgenthau is that he seems to be unable to see the merits of a middle position, which falls 
between the pacifist ideal and the realist argument. A more serious problem that these 
historical errors reveal is a tendency to see the history of the modern states system through 
the lens of the realist-idealist debate.116
*History as it is the foundation o f a realist theory
In good historicist manner, Morgenthau considered history to be an essential foundation 
for the study of international politics.117 The very first page of the Politics Among Nations 
provides a good example of Morgenthau’s historicism. Morgenthau refers to a ‘contest’ 
between two different conceptions ‘of the nature of man, society, and politics’. But it is 
also, and more importantly, a contest about how to produce theory. One conception
believes that knowledge derives from ‘universally valid abstract principles’. The other
• • • • 1 1 8  • ‘appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles’. What makes this
epistemological dimension of the confrontation quite important is its decisive nature.
115 For the growth of the nineteenth century liberal-pacifist idea of achieving permanent international peace 
though the rule of law, see Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); 
F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace, chapters 5,6, and 7; Michael Howard, War and the Liberal 
Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
1.6 For two recent critiques of the tendency to treat international political thought of the inter-war period in 
terms of the dichotomy realism-idealism, see David Long, ‘Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal 
Internationalism, and Contemporary International Theory’, in Long, and Wilson (eds.), Thinkers o f the 
Twenty Years ’ Crisis', and Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate” , Review o f International 
Studies, Special Issue (1998), pp. 1-16.
1.7 See Norman A. Graebner, ‘Morgenthau as Historian’, in Thompson and Myers (eds.), Truth and Tragedy,
p.66.
18 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th Edition, Revised by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, London: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p.3.
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Morgenthau never compares in a systematic way the respective merits of the different 
conceptions o f ‘man, society and politics’. In this regard, the issue is resolved without a 
serious discussion, and merely by resorting to the use of history. Before Morgenthau 
investigates the relative merits of the two positions, he resolves the issue by saying that one 
is realist for it relies on historical knowledge, and the other is utopian for it ignores history. 
The ‘theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes 
as they actually take place, has earned the theory presented here the name of realism’.119
After having emphasized the importance of history, Morgenthau defines international 
politics as a continuous struggle for power between national states, which must fight for 
their interests. However, this is terribly vague. Every theory of international relations that 
pretends to be sound has to consider the questions of power politics and national interests. 
The crucial point concerns the terms in which these issues are discussed. In particular, 
whether a theory is able to reconcile states’ concerns for power and interests with the 
respect for international norms, or whether the questions of power politics and national 
interests are seen through a nationalist approach which completely ignores international 
considerations. The way Morgenthau tells modern international political history suggests 
that he embraced the second option.
Morgenthau considers nationalism as a central force of modern politics, particularly 
after the Napoleonic Wars. Those conflicts, he says, ‘began the period of national foreign 
policies and wars; that is, the identification of the great masses of the citizens of a nation 
with national power and national policies’.120 This observation indicates that the French 
revolution and the Napoleonic Wars marked a crucial transformation in the history of the 
modern states-system. However, by locating the final triumph of nationalism only in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Morgenthau seems to suggest that political traditions 
that value international institutions were important in earlier periods. In fact, Morgenthau 
recognizes the existence of an international society in the eighteenth century Europe. In 
such a political society, states opposed each other ‘within a framework of shared beliefs 
and common values’, which imposed ‘effective limitations upon the ends and means of 
their struggle for power’.121 Discussing the political principles of this period, Morgenthau 
even uses the language of the international society tradition. For example, he says that a
119 Politics Among Nations, pp.3-4.
120 Politics Among Nations, pp. 115-8.
121 Politics Among Nations, p.242.
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‘core rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in relation to 
each other developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries’.122 Therefore, on the one 
hand, Morgenthau emphasizes the emergence of nationalism in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century; but, on the other hand, he admits that the notion of international society 
was historically important. In this situation, he faced two alternatives. Either he would 
privilege the national idea and thus would treat modem political history in terms of the 
gradual triumph of nationalism over the idea of international society. Or, alternatively, he 
would study the historical evolution of the modern states system through the notion of 
international society.123 As it was already implied, Morgenthau followed the nationalist 
thesis.124
In a revealing passage of the Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau says that ‘the 
Treaty of Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the 
cornerstone of the modern state-system’.125 In another passage, he situates ‘the beginning 
of the modern state system at the turn of the fifteenth century’. Moreover, ‘the active 
elements’ of such a political system were the ‘European nations\ 126 These observations 
show that Morgenthau subscribes to the view that the gradual triumph of the national idea 
occurred in the period between the fifteenth and the eighteenth century. Although it took 
three centuries to complete, the process that eventually led to the victory of nationalism 
started with the emergence of territorial entities in early modern Europe. Thus, as with 
Ranke, the significance of the Napoleonic Wars should be understood not as marking the 
emergence of the national idea but as reinforcing the nationalist nature of modern 
international politics. More importantly, when Morgenthau adopts the thesis of the triumph 
of the national idea, he is in fact dismissing the relevance of international principles and 
institutions in the evolution of modern international society. In its confrontation with 
nationalism, the idea of international society has suffered a historical defeat and thereby 
‘became a historic reminiscence...no longer capable of moving men to action’.127 What 
Morgenthau is saying here is that internationalism, as a legacy of medieval universalism,
122 Politics Among Nations, p.254.
123 The best example of someone who pursued this second option is Bull, in The Anarchical Society. Seeing 
the question in these terms, we realize the extent to which Bull distanced from realism. This point is further 
developed in chapter 2.
124 This does not mean that Morgenthau glorifies the nation as for instance Ranke did.
125 P.254.
126 Politics Among Nations, p.206, my emphasis.
127 Politics Among Nations, p.244.
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belongs to past historical epochs. In historical terms, nationalism is equated with 
modernity, and internationalism with the medieval ages. In this vein, the period between 
the Peace of Westphalia and the Napoleonic Wars witnessed the unfolding of the two 
fundamental modern historical processes: the gradual defeat of internationalism, and the 
gradual but sure triumph of nationalism. The political result was the destruction of the 
notion of international society, both as a relevant concept and as a guide to states’ 
behaviour.128 Therefore, directly addressing those with more internationalist inclinations, 
Morgenthau says that it would be a dangerous illusion to overlook the significant change 
brought about by the triumph of nationalism and to persist in defending the idea of 
international society.129
The nationalist nature of Morgenthau’s realism is also clear in the way he discusses 
the concept of national interest. In his view, political realism ‘erects the national state into 
the last word in politics and the national interest into an absolute standard for political 
action’.130 In his discussion of national interest, Morgenthau ignores, for instance, a crucial 
idea developed by the early-modern tradition of raison d'etat. As it will be discussed later 
in chapter 4, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was a conception of 
reason of the state that distinguished between interests that take into account the general 
public good and interests only concerned with the power of the ruler. Although
131 *Morgenthau refers to the importance of considering the interests of other states, his 
discussion lacks a notion of the common good, of the general international interest, which 
is more than the mere sum of the different national interests.132 This is clear in his 
contradictory treatment of the ‘morality of pluralism’. The ‘morality of pluralism’ in the 
international sphere allows a state to secure its vital interests and at the same time to follow 
principles of political morality which permit it ‘to deal with divergent
interests... with... methods of genuine compromise and conciliation’.133 What Morgenthau 
here has in mind is the moral duty of each country to contribute to the existence of an 
international society. Yet, this view clashes with Morgenthau’s historical account of
128 See Politics Among Nations, pp.240-1.
129 Politics Among Nations, p.244.
130 ‘Another Great Debate’, p.972.
131 See in particular the chapters on ‘Diplomacy’ in Politics Among Nations.
132 For a comparison between the realist conception of national interest and a conception which takes into 
account the ‘international public interest’, see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘On the Notion of “Interest” in 
International Relations’, International Organization, 36, 1 (1982), pp. 1-30.
133 “Another Great Debate”, p.985.
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international politics as a continuous struggle for power. To investigate if and how the 
‘morality of pluralism’ has influenced American foreign policy, Morgenthau should have 
studied, in his historical narrative, if and how the United States had pursued principles of 
‘genuine compromise and conciliation’. However, to analyze international politics in terms 
of these principles of political coexistence, one needs to have a notion of international 
society, and not to see the states system in terms of the state of war. Accepting the 
existence of an international society, based on normative principles of coexistence, one 
must define the national interest as being concerned with the international common good, 
that is, with the maintenance of the normative structure of international society. By 
ignoring such considerations in his conception of the national interest, Morgenthau adopts 
a nationalist perspective, which is a legacy of the realpolitik tradition. In the end, national 
interest is defined as being concerned merely with the increase of state’s power.
Morgenthau’s discussion of the theory and practice of the balance of power also 
illustrates Morgenthau’s nationalist approach to international politics. Morgenthau starts 
his discussion on the balance of power with the following sentence: ‘The aspiration for 
power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status 
quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies 
that aim at preserving it’.134 What does Morgenthau mean with the expression ‘policies that 
aim at preserving the balance of power’? Does it reflect merely a nationalist perspective, or 
a concern for the good functioning of international institutions? Morgenthau’s answers 
offer no doubts regarding his theoretical orientation. Be it the ‘patterns’ of the balance of 
power (‘the pattern of direct opposition’, or ‘the pattern of competition’) 135, or the 
‘different methods’ of the balance of power (‘divide and rule’, ‘compensations’, 
‘armaments’, or ‘alliances’)136, Morgenthau maintains a systematic national perspective in 
his analysis. It is clear that his conception of the balance of power stems from a view of 
international politics, where national states are engaged in a permanent struggle for power. 
In such an environment, states’ main strategies are to consolidate their power and to divide 
and manipulate the power of their rivals. The balance of power is important only in the 
sense that it guarantees national security, but not as an institution to achieve international 
order. Even in Morgenthau’s discussion of the ‘general nature of alliances’, where he
134 Politics Among Nations, p. 183.
135 Politics Among Nations, pp. 188-92.
136 Politics Among Nations, pp. 194-202.
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refers to ‘a community of interests’, he ends up with a nationalist perspective. ‘Identical’ 
and ‘complementary’ interests are applied to those specific cases where national interests 
of different states converge for a brief period, and not to the interests of international 
society as a whole.137 Richard Little has named this conception of the balance of power, 
‘the adversarial balance of power’.138
If we compare Morgenthau’s conception of the balance of power with the rationalist 
account of the balance of power, or the ‘associative balance of power’,139 we notice the 
difference between the nationalist character of the former and the internationalist concerns 
of the latter. The associative conception rests on the constitutional and republican idea of 
mixed government where the parts of a political system live in a ‘just equilibrium’.140 This 
implies the espousal of the notion of international society. Historically, it is associated 
with the view of Europe as a respublica,141 For this latter conception of the balance of 
power, besides the independence of each state, an even distribution of power is 
fundamental for an overall international order. In this regard, the conduct of states must 
take into account the common international interest to maintain a ‘just equilibrium’.142 
Moreover, as Little notices, ‘states operating on realist premises’ may well subvert the 
balance of power.143 So, there is little doubt that we should refer to two different meanings 
of the balance of power. One, ‘the adversarial balance of power’, embraced by 
Morgenthau, emphasizes states’ exclusive concerns with their political power, and 
overlooks the general interest of the international society. The other, ‘the associative 
balance of power’, is above all concerned with the political order of international society as 
a whole.144
137 Politics Among Nations, pp. 197-9.
138 Richard Little, ‘Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought’, Review of  
International Studies, 15, 1 (1989), pp.88-92.
139 Little, ‘Deconstructing the Balance of Power’, pp.92-8.
140 See Martin Wight, ‘The Balance of Power and International Order’, in Alan James (ed.), The Bases o f  
International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). Wight identifies the ‘constitutional’ conception 
of the balance of power as the ‘international counterpart of liberal constitutionalism’, p. 111.
141 Little, ‘Deconstructing the Balance of Power’, pp.94-5.
142 See Wight, ‘The Balance of Power’, pp. 100-9. It should be noted that this conception is similar to 
Schroeder’s idea of political equilibrium, discussed above.
143 Richard Little, ‘Friedrich Gentz, Rationalism and the Balance of Power’, in Ian Clark, and Iver B. 
Neumann (eds.), Classical Theories of International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1996), p.225.
144 For a comparison of the realist and the rationalist conceptions of the balance of power, see Martin Wight, 
International Theory: The Three Traditions (Edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, London: Leicester 
University Press, 1994), chapter 8, ‘Theory of Diplomacy: Balance of Power’.
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In Morgenthau’s history of the modern states-system, we see therefore the close link 
between the content of the historical narrative and the nature of the international theory 
that we also find in Ranke. As Morgenthau puts it, his realist theory ‘appeals to historic 
precedent rather than to abstract principles’.145 Embracing the tradition of realpolitik as a 
sound foundation for a theory of international relations, like the German historian, 
Morgenthau stresses power politics and conflicts between national states as defining the 
history of the modern states-system.146 Moreover, in another parallel with Ranke, 
Morgenthau also attacked internationalist theories. As we saw above, Ranke’s historical 
paradigm emerged as a reaction against the internationalism of the legal, liberal, and 
republican political traditions. In the case of Morgenthau, the tradition of realpolitik was 
recovered to oppose American liberal internationalist political culture. The unfortunate 
result was to condemn not only liberalism but also older political theories, which Wight 
included within the broad category of rationalism, as ‘idealists’ or ‘Utopians’. Despite the 
effort of the English school, which is the focus of the next chapter, the discipline of 
International Relations has lived with this legacy since then.
Conclusion
To conclude, let me briefly recall the main points developed in this chapter. The purpose 
was to show the crucial moments of the intellectual revolution that caused the emergence 
of realism, which has strongly determined the language used by contemporary international 
political theory. The first part of the chapter discusses the emergence of the Rankean 
nationalist international theory. Its origins were placed within the tradition of realpolitik, 
which emerged in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century. The target of 
realpolitik was internationalism, as it had been developed by older political traditions, 
namely liberalism, international constitutional and legal approaches, natural law, and 
republicanism. Such an attack was in turn associated with the rise of nationalism. A
145 ‘Another Great Debate’, p.962.
146 In his ‘intellectual autobiography’, in a revealing way, Morgenthau treats ‘Bismarck’s Realpolitik’ as ‘a 
coherent system of thought... that appeared to support my isolated and impressionistic judgments on 
contemporary issues of foreign policy’. Such a tradition became, Morgenthau adds, his ‘way of thinking about 
foreign policy’. See, Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932’, in 
Thompson and Myers (eds.), Truth and Tragedy, pp.5-6.
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commitment to nationalist policies and the reaction against internationalism led to a view 
of international politics as power politics between national states, which dismisses the idea 
of international society. This theory of the state of war was reinforced by the construction 
of the ‘Westphalian system’ as a historical category. The theoretical credibility of the 
notion of state of war rests on such a historical category.
The second part considers Morgenthau’s political realism by placing it within the 
realpolitik tradition.147 We can see the influence of the latter in the former in a number of 
ways. First of all, as Ranke did in the first half of the last century, Morgenthau also started 
by attacking the traditions of liberalism and natural law, and legal approaches to the study 
of international relations. In this regard, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics can be read as 
addressing the same issue, and in a similar way, treated by Ranke in ‘A Dialogue on 
Politics’. Then, we find in Morgenthau the same conception of the states system, defined in 
terms of state of war, that we found in the realpolitik theory. Finally, in order to legitimize 
his realist theory, Morgenthau adopts the historical category, the ‘Westphalian system’, 
that was constructed by Ranke in his studies of modem political history. The way that 
some recent works continue to use the notions of anarchy, state of war, and ‘Westphalian 
system’ demonstrates the impact that the tradition of realpolitik has had on international 
political theory, even among non-realist authors. Hence, I call Morgenthau’s contribution 
the ‘realpolitik moment’ in International Relations.
In addition, such a moment has strongly contributed to the acceptance of both the 
ontological divide between domestic and international politics and the statist approach. In 
particular, the first element of the statist approach, the identification between international 
politics and the state of war, is the central point of the realpolitik analysis. As a 
consequence, the fourth element, a conception of reason of state that rests purely on the 
idea of self-interest, also receives a privileged place in the realist studies. These two points, 
but specially the first, remind us of the critique raised by Buzan, Little, Ruggie and others 
against Waltz’s view of the states system, which demonstrates the elements of continuity 
between the two realist approaches, specifically their agreement regarding the 
characterization of the international system as an undersocialized and non-normative state 
of war.
147 For the influence the Rankean nature of contemporary realism, which however does not develop the terms 
of the connection between Ranke and realism, see John Farrenkopf, ‘The Challenge of Spenglerian Pessimism 
to Ranke and Political Realism’, Review o f International Studies, 17, 3 (1991), pp.267-84.
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The intelligent use of history by both Ranke and Morgenthau makes it possible for 
them, and also for their followers, to argue that the ‘Westphalian system’ emerged with the 
creation of the modern sovereign state. Thus, we have realism as the ‘modem’ 
international political theory, and the ‘Westphalian system’ as the description for ‘modern’ 
international political history. This historical claim clearly gives political realism an 
intellectual legitimacy that is not easy to question. Such a legitimacy is further reinforced 
with the triple identification o f ‘post-realism’, ‘post-Westphalian system’ and ‘beyond the 
sovereign state’ recently made by some non-realist works. One of the aims of this thesis is 
to show that what has become familiar for us, namely the association between ‘modern’ 
international politics, realism, anarchy and state of war, turns out to be quite revolutionary 
if placed in a longer historical perspective. This point explains why it is crucial to place 
contemporary theories of international relations within the context of modern intellectual 
traditions, as it was argued in the introduction of the thesis. The first step that needs to be 
taken is to show that realism as a theory of international relations is not as old as the 
‘modern’ international system; rather, it was mainly developed during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and only became dominant towards the end of that century. Within 
contemporary International Relations, Wight was one of the first to grasp this point, and 
refers in the conclusion to the lectures on ‘international theory’ to ‘the erosion of 
rationalism’, which occurred mainly during the nineteenth century.148 As I noted in the 
introduction of the chapter, the identification between Ranke’s internationalist intellectual 
targets and Wight’s rationalism is a crucial point. It shows the extent to which Wight and 
his fellow members of the English school developed the rationalist tradition as part of a 
reaction against the revolution of realpolitik. Interesting enough, such a reaction sought to 
recover those very same theories that had been attacked by figures such as Ranke and 
Morgenthau. The account of how this occurred is the focus of the next chapter.
148 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Edited by Gabriele Wight, and Brian Porter, 
London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p.260.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ENGLISH SCHOOL’S REACTION AGAINST 
REALPOLITIK : CREATING THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
The last chapter located the origins of the contemporary realist theory of International 
Relations in the emergence of the tradition of realpolitik, associated with the ideology 
of offensive nationalism, during the nineteenth century. It was argued that the realist 
conception of international anarchy, defined in terms of state of war, is the result of 
such an intellectual development. Moreover, as we also saw, the realist theory is 
sustained by a historiography that defines modern politics in terms of the triumph of the 
national state. In the case of international political theory, the adoption of the nationalist 
narrative resulted into the conclusion that the concept of international society is an 
‘historic reminiscence’, to use Hans Morgenthau’s words.1 From that moment, realist 
and neo-realist scholars have argued that the international system is in a pre-social and 
pre-normative condition, which is captured by the expression “state of war”. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show how the English school reacted against the realist 
conception of international anarchy, and how as a result of such a reaction its members 
developed the notion of international society.
Within International Relations, the pioneer work on the concept of international 
society rests with a group of scholars, based in British Universities, who came to be 
known as the English school. During a period characterised by the hegemony of realist 
theory in the study of international relations, this group of scholars reacted against the 
nationalist language of the realists and argued that modem world politics is better 
understood through the concept of international society. Indeed, in my view, this is the 
main contribution of the English school. When the central figure of the realist school 
claimed that the idea of international society was a ‘historic reminiscence’, the English 
school argued that the fundamental task of any student of international relations is to 
define the idea of international society. After a brief discussion on the identity of the 
English school, the chapter shows, in the second part, how the English school, since its 
origins, reacted against realism. The third part of the chapter will analyse how the 
central members of the school developed the rationalist tradition, by reinterpreting 
modern political history and recovering past political thought. In the end the chapter
1 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (601 Edition, Revised by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, London: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p.244.
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will argue that rationalism opens different possibilities to conceptualise international 
society.
Defining the English school
Given that there is no general consensus regarding the identity of the English school, 
before I develop the argument of this chapter, it is necessary to address such a question, 
and to indicate the approach adopted by this thesis. The ‘first’ debate on the English 
school occurred in the 1980s.2 The discussion concentrated on two questions: whether 
there was a school in first place, and, if there was a school, how to assess its 
contribution to the study of international relations. It is to the first question that we shall 
turn now. With the exception of Sheila Grader, all other participants in the debate 
agreed that there is an English school of International Relations. Regarding the 
existence and the identity of the English school, it was the ‘Suganami-Wilson thesis’ 
that prevailed. In the writings of these two authors, the English school is implicitly 
associated with the Department of International Relations of the London School of 
Economics, and its central members are Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Fred 
Northedge, Hedley Bull, and Alan James; indeed all of them have worked at some point 
in that Department.3 As for the conceptual identity of the school, Peter Wilson says that 
it ‘does to a large extent coalesce around the concept of international society’.4 The 
centrality of the concept of international society not only unites the work of the different 
members of the school, but also gives it a distinctive character. Indeed, excluding the 
dismissal o f ‘scientific methodology’, the other three criteria that, for Wilson, identify 
the school, namely the focus on ‘order’, on ‘normative rules’, and the ‘rejection of 
utopian schemes’ for organising international politics,5 derive all from the privileged 
place given to the idea of international society. As Wilson himself says, they are the
2 The ‘first’ debate was conducted by Roy E. Jones, ‘The English School of International Relations: A 
Case for Closure’, Review o f International Studies, 7 (1981), pp. 1-13; Hidemi Suganami, ‘The Structure 
of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations’, International Relations,
7 (1983), pp. 2363-81; Sheila Grader, ‘The English School of International Relations: Evidence and 
Evaluation’, Review o f International Studies, 14, (1988), pp.29-44; and Peter Wilson, ‘The English 
School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader’, Review o f International Studies, 15 (1989), 
pp.49-58.
It should be noted that Suganami does not explicitly discuss Wight’s writings, but includes the book 
edited by him and Butterfield, Diplomatic Investigations, in the main body of work of the English school. 
As for Wilson, he also includes R. J. Vincent and James Mayall in the school.
4 Wilson, ‘A Reply to Sheila Grader’, p.49.
5 Wilson, ‘A Reply to Sheila Grader’, pp.55-6.
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result of ‘breaking down the idea of international society into more specific 
components’.6 Likewise, Hidemi Suganami considers that international society provides 
the conceptual identity of the school. For him, such a concept heavily determines the 
way the members of the school treat the institutions of international politics, and 
moreover leads them to reject solutions based on domestic politics to reform the states 
system.7 The Suganami-Wilson thesis has to a considerable extent marked the 
subsequent debates on the nature of the English school, and it is generally accepted that 
one of the defining features of the English school is its emphasis on the concept of 
international society. However, the following question is still worth raising: is the focus 
on the concept of international society sufficient to identify the English school? The 
question is still more difficult to answer when such a concept is indeed seen, as in the 
case of this thesis, as one of the central defining elements of the school.
There is, in my view, a crucial problem with focusing exclusively on the idea of 
international society. According to such a criterion, a number of other figures, 
belonging to different intellectual traditions, from international law to political theory, 
would be included in the English school. For instance, international lawyers of the first 
half of this century, such as J.L. Brierly and Hersh Lauterpacht, who approached the 
study of international politics in terms of the concept of international society, would 
certainly be members of the school. Moreover, their concept of international society is 
also associated with the notion of political order, reveals a concern with normative 
questions, and finally reflects a distrust o f ‘utopian schemes’.8 Indeed, the importance 
given to the idea of international society by Manning, Wight, Bull and James is largely 
the result of the influence of international legal thought in their understanding of 
international relations. In this regard, it is true to say that all these four thinkers reveal 
common intellectual influences, but in my view this is not enough to treat them 
collectively as a school. In other words, the focus on the concept of international society 
is necessary but not sufficient to define the English school. To a certain extent, Grader 
has a point when she says that Manning, Northedge, Wight and Bull did not see 
themselves as forming a particular school. Yet, the fact that these four figures never
6 ‘A Reply to Sheila Grader’, p.49.
7 See ‘The Structure of Institutionalism’. For the discussion on the ‘domestic analogy’ as a source of 
proposals for international reform, see Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order 
Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
8 The same three criteria are found in Rawls’s and Walzer’s conceptions of international society, who can 
hardly be seen as members of the English school. See John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ in Stephen 
Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp.41-82; and 
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2nd edition, New 
York: Basic Books, 1992).
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constituted a school should not lead one to conclude, as Grader does, that the ‘evidence’ 
for the English school ‘does not exist’ 9 The evidence for the existence of the English 
school is clear when we establish other criteria to identify a school of thought. As a 
result of such criteria, the identity of the English school, as we shall see below, is found 
in the work of the British Committee for the Theory of International Politics.10
Beyond the agreement on the centrality of a key concept, we need three further 
criteria to identify a distinct school within a given academic discipline. First, a sense of 
collective purpose among a group of scholars, which gives rise to a specific research 
agenda. The research purpose of the British Committee appears clearly in the Preface of 
the first work produced by the Committee, Diplomatic Investigations, where the group 
established a threefold theoretical goal. First, to investigate the concept of international 
society; second, to conduct such investigation in historical terms, both in the field of the 
history of political thought and in more empirical historical analyses; finally, the 
Committee stressed the normative dimensions of its enquiry.11 Subsequently, this sense 
of collective purpose has been restated by Bull and Adam Watson on different 
occasions.12 Excluding perhaps some shared beliefs regarding the function of a 
department of International Relations, there is no evidence to believe, at least it has not 
been given by Suganami and Wilson, that scholars such as Wight, Bull, Manning and 
Northedge were self-consciously engaged in a collective research enterprise. For 
instance, contrary to the cases of Wight and Bull, analyses of the history of political 
thought do not play a central role in the work of Manning, Northedge and James. A 
second criterion to identify a school is an explicit rejection of the approaches developed 
by other schools. As this chapter will argue at length, the reaction against realism was a 
central characteristic of the British Committee. Although the work of Manning, 
Northedge, and James should not be included within the mainstream realist school, it is 
hard to find in these authors an explicit rejection of realism.13 The final criterion, closely
9 ‘Evidence and Evaluation’, p.41.
10 It has been noted that the debate of the 1980s was marked by ‘the complete absence of the British 
Committee’. See Timothy Dunne, ‘International Society: Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?’, Cooperation 
and Conflict, 20 (1995), p. 128.
11 Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1966), Preface.
12 See Hedley Bull, ‘Introduction: Martin Wight and the Study of International Relations’, where Bull 
refers to the work of the British Committee as a ‘collective enquiry’ (p. 15), in Martin Wight, Systems of 
States (Edited by Hedley Bull, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977). See also Hedley Bull & 
Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion o f International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), the 
Preface; and Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.2-5.
13 In this regard, it is interesting to note that R.J. Vincent opposes Wight’s approach in Systems o f States 
to ‘the LSE orthodoxy of system dominance’, associated with the work of Northedge. See ‘The Factor of 
Culture in the Global International Order’, The Yearbook o f World Affairs, 34 (1980), p.255. It should be 
noted that in a later article co-authored by Wilson, he accepts that there are important differences
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related to the others, is the willingness to contribute in a distinctive way to the 
theoretical development of a given discipline. The English school is not only a school, 
but a school of International Relations. Again, it is in the work of the British Committee 
that we find a clear purpose to have an impact on the evolution of International 
Relations. This last point is particularly important in the sense that for new generations 
of students that seek to pursue the research agenda of the English school, it is essential 
to understand how its original members sought to influence the discipline. By including 
these further three criteria, we are able, I believe, to approach the concept of 
international society in a new light. It is not enough to say that it is the focus on the idea 
of international society that separates the English school from realism. Rather, what we 
need to see is that it was the reaction against realism that made the English school to 
focus on the concept of international society. As it will be argued, when Wight affirms 
that the crucial question to ask about world politics regards the nature of international 
society, it is already a sign of his dissatisfaction with realism, and not a theoretical 
concern that just appears in Wight’s mind.
Thus, to sum up, the English school, as it is conceived in this work, has its 
origins in the work of the British Committee.14 It is in the collective project of the group 
of scholars that formed such a Committee that we clearly find a well-defined research 
agenda, a reaction against the dominant intellectual tradition within International 
Relations, realism, and thereby an effort to influence the theoretical development of the 
discipline. From the ‘Suganami-Wilson’ thesis, I retain the claim that the concept of 
international society is the central issue of the school’s theoretical investigations.
As it was referred above, one of the foci of the debates on the English school 
was the assessment of the contribution of the school to the study of international 
relations. For those who saw the contribution of the school in negative terms -  i.e., as a 
‘case for closure’ -  the way to express such an assessment was to include the school 
within the realist paradigm. In developing my argument, I will challenge both the 
position that includes the English school in the Realist paradigm15 and its variation that
between, on the one hand, Wight, Bull, and Vincent, and on the other hand, Manning, Northedge, and 
James. See Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, ‘Regime Theory and the English School of International 
Relations: A Comparison’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 21 (1992), see pp. 332, 333, and 
336. Nevertheless, these authors are all still included together within the English school.
14 For a work that locates the origins of the English school in the British Committee, see Tim Dunne, 
Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School (London: Macmillan, 1998).
15 See Michael Banks, ‘General Theory in International Relations: New Directions’, Millennium: Journal 
o f International Studies, 8 (1979-80), pp.252-66; Jones, ‘A Case for Closure’; Martin Shaw, ‘Global 
Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of International 
Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21 (1992), pp.421-34; and Justin Rosenberg, The
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sees the English school as a form o f ‘normative realism’, distinct from Kenneth Waltz’s 
neorealism, but quite close to Morgenthau’s classical realism.16 The argument presented 
here also goes further than the views of those who have recently noted the differences 
between these two schools. In many of these discussions, there is a tendency to see the 
English school or, alternatively, the work of its key members, as occupying a kind of 
middle ground, with close affinities in many respects to the realist theory. Normally, 
such a view is presented in terms of an evolution of thought from an early ‘realist’ phase 
to a later ‘rationalist’ or ‘solidarist’ period. For instance, discussing the contribution of 
Bull to the study of international relations, Andrew Hurrell recognises, on the one hand, 
that Bull is ‘close to realism’ in the sense that he acknowledged ‘the continued 
importance of power and the politics of power’. Yet, on the other hand, Hurrell argues 
that Bull’s conception of international society might have started ‘with realism’ but ‘it 
could never end with realism’.17 In the same vein, Andrew Linklater maintains that the 
English school, like realism, ‘begins with anarchy’ but departs from the realist theory 
‘by seeking to explain how states control the quest for power in the context of anarchy’. 
For Linklater, the work of the English school has evolved from the realism of the early 
Wight to the ‘rationalism’ of the later Wight and Bull, and the ‘solidarism’ of Vincent.18 
Similarly, in their treatment of ‘Bull’s intellectual journey’, Nicholas J. Wheeler and 
Timothy Dunne see Bull as moving away from issues of power politics towards a more 
solidarist position.19
More recently, Tim Dunne has emphasised English school’s reaction against 
realism.20 He rejects the views of those who see the English school ‘as a derivative of 
realism’. For Dunne, these arguments miss ‘the contribution of the English school to 
International Relations’. By telling the story of the evolution of the English school, 
Dunne tries to show how ‘the School developed precisely as a ‘move’ away from pure
Empire o f Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory o f International Relations (London: Verso,
1994).
16 See Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.255-300; R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: 
International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, in particular 
pp.32-4. Fred Halliday falls in between these two positions. On the one hand, he acknowledges that the 
focus on the concept of international society distinguishes the English School from ‘the school of 
Germanic-American realism’ (p.97). Yet, on the other hand, he says that the notion of international 
society is a ‘conventional realist category’ and thus treats the English School as ‘British realism’ (p. 98). 
See Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994).
17 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Society and Anarchy in the 1990s’, in B. A. Roberson (ed.), International Society and 
the Development o f International Relations Theory (London: Pinter, 1998), pp.20-1.
18 Andrew Linklater, ‘Rationalism’, in Scott Burchill et. all., Theories o f International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), 93-118.
19 See Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism 
of the Will”, International Affairs, 72 (1996), pp.91-108.
20 See Inventing International Society.
71
realism’.21 Moreover, Dunne not only claims that the approach of the English school ‘is 
incompatible with mainstream realist theories’,22 but also that there is a ‘radical 
potentiality’ in the work of ‘the Grotian or Rationalist tradition’.23 I entirely agree with 
Dunne on the need to see the work of the English school as opposing realism. Where 
my argument distances from Dunne’s is in the way we regard the significance of the 
English school’s challenge. For Dunne, the major contribution of the original members 
of the English school lies in their anticipation of many of the themes that are now being 
treated by normative and constructivist theories in International Relations.24 
Notwithstanding the merits of this interpretation, it is my belief that the significance of 
the work of the English school lies in the way its members engaged in exercises of 
historical reinterpretation. It was by stressing the value of historical research, and indeed 
by returning to history, that the members of the English school opposed realism and 
thereby tried to set the discipline on new foundations. This is connected with another 
distinction between my approach and Dunne’s. Inventing International Society is mostly 
concerned with the internal perspective of the school. The contribution of the English 
school is recovered by reconstructing ‘the conversation which took place between the 
members of the School’.25 My approach attempts to place the work of the English 
school not only in the context of the discipline but also within a broader historical 
perspective. As it was already observed in the introduction of the thesis, I follow the 
maxim that we can hardly know about International Relations theories if we only study 
them as ‘something’ that emerged in 1919. Rather, it is necessary to see them as part of 
larger intellectual and historical debates. In significant aspects, the English school and 
realism belong to different modem intellectual traditions. It is my belief, as we shall see, 
that this broader perspective is the best way to show the distinction between realism and 
the English school. As we saw in the last chapter, contemporary realist theory of 
international relations is largely the result of the nineteenth century tradition of 
realpolitik, and the nationalist ideology associated with it. These traditions, as it was 
noted, emerged as a reaction against older internationalist traditions, such as 
international legal approaches, liberalism, natural law, and republicanism. In other 
words, those same traditions that the English school tried to recover.
21 Inventing International Society, pp. 1-3.
22 Inventing International Society, p.5.
23 Inventing International Society, p.xi.
24 Inventing International Society, Conclusion.
25 Inventing International Society, p. 2
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Attacking the tradition of realpolitik
As in the case of the English school, the inclusion of Wight within the realist tradition
has become a common view in International Relations.26 More than any other work, it is
the famous article, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’27 that gives Wight his
realist reputation. In particular, it is often argued that Wight’s realist position derives
from the opposition between ‘domestic politics’ and ‘international politics’, with the
28  •corresponding separation between political theory and international theory. By treating 
domestic and international politics as completely distinct domains, it is argued, Wight 
accepts that ‘relations between states are incapable of being fundamentally modified or 
reconstructed’.29 Apparently, starting from this premise, he is bound to end up with the 
familiar realist assertion that politics at the international level are reduced to essentially 
the same type of diplomatic and military strategies; being domestic politics the domain 
that is concerned with issues such as equality, freedom, justice, rights, and so forth. The 
other implication of such an opposition is Wight’s problematic definition of ‘political 
theory’, as the discipline that studies the domestic politics of the sovereign state. Given 
such a definition, political theory is at once excluded from the study of international 
politics, seen as inter-state relations. In order to build a body of ‘international theory’, 
Wight has to look then for traditions that begin with the ‘world of the sovereign 
states’,30 and live on the margins of political philosophy. Not surprisingly, international 
theory is marked by intellectual poverty. Yet, as it has been pointed out, that ‘poverty’ is 
more a result of Wight’s definitions than of the nature of international politics.31 This
26 See, for instance, Kenneth W. Thompson, Masters o f International Thought (London: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1980), pp.44-66, who treats Wight as a ‘Christian realist’. From a more radical position, 
Justin Rosenberg calls Wight a ‘realist historian’, The Empire of Civil Society, pp.43-6. Although 
disagreeing on almost everything else, Michael Nicholson and Alan James also see Wight as a realist, see 
the exchange between the two in Review o f International Studies, ‘The Enigma of Martin Wight’, 7 
(1981), pp. 1-18; ‘Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight: A Mind Passing in the Night’, 8 (1982), pp. 117- 
23; and ‘Martin Wight: Enigma or Error?’, 8 (1982), pp. 125-8.
27 Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, in James De Derian (ed.), International 
Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 15-35.
28 Such an opposition is stressed by most of those who discuss Wight’s work. See, inter alia, Andrew 
Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations (Second Edition, London: 
Macmillan, 1990), Chapters 1 and 2; Robert H. Jackson, ‘Martin Wight, International Theory and the 
Good Life’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 19 (1990), pp.261-72; R. B. J. Walker, 
Inside/Outside, pp.33-4; and Ian Clark, ‘Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International 
Relations’, in Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), Classical Theories o f International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1996), p.2.
29 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p.l 1.
30 Timothy Dunne, ‘Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in International Relations’, Review of  
International Studies, 3 (1993), pp.316-7.
31 See Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp.6-7; and David Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p.5.
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reading of the argument developed in ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ 
concludes that the inaugural paper of the British Committee is a ‘strikingly realist
• • • 32statement’, where ‘we catch a glimpse of Martin Wight the arch-realist’. Given that 
the judgement of Wight as a realist rests heavily on ‘Why Is There No International
• • • • • 33Theory?’, it is important to start our discussion with this article.
To consider ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ as a realist piece of work 
may lead to a serious puzzle. Such a reading may be sensible for those who include the 
English school within the realist tradition. Yet, for those who believe that the school 
constitutes an alternative to realism and identify the origins of the school in the British 
Committee, it seems to be quite contradictory to share that reading of Wight’s inaugural 
presentation. How could someone, who is committed to participate in a collective 
research project with the goal of developing an alternative to realism, present a realist 
paper in the very first meeting of the group? In a polemical manner, Wight starts indeed 
by affirming that ‘international theory is marked, not only by paucity but also by 
intellectual and moral poverty’.34 According to Wight, such a theoretical poverty results 
from the nature of international politics, in particular from two reasons. The first is the 
consequence of the historical triumph of the sovereign state, which has imposed an 
‘intellectual prejudice’ on political theorists since the Renaissance.35 This prejudice 
results from ‘the belief in the sovereign state as the consummation of political 
experience and activity’ during the entire modern era: ‘That belief has absorbed almost 
all the intellectual energy devoted to political study’.36 The unfortunate consequence of 
the focus on the sovereign state for international theory is that ‘ [i]t has become natural 
to think of international politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics’. In this regard,
32 The first phrase is by Linklater, ‘Rationalism’, p.94. The second is found in Robert Jackson, ‘Is There a 
Classical International Theory?’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International 
Theory: Positivism & Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 104. It should be noted 
that, for Linklater and Jackson, the reading of Wight as a realist corresponds to the ‘early’ Wight, later his 
thought evolved towards the rationalist tradition. For a further argument that sees Wight’s reputation as a 
realist thinker as resting on ‘Why Is There No International Theoiy?’, see Roger Epp, ‘Martin Wight: 
International Relations as Realm of Persuasion’, in F.A. Beer and R. Hariman (eds.), Post-Realism: The 
Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), p. 121.
33 For many observers, Wight’s Power Politics also serves to illustrate Wight’s realism. Yet, a careful 
reading of the book shows that Wight merely treats the ‘realist’ argument of ‘power politics’ as a 
‘working hypothesis’, which is abandoned during the book for the conception of international society and 
a normative approach to the study of international relations. See Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, 
‘Introduction’ to Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), and in 
particular Chapters 1, 9, 10, and 24.
Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 19.
35 Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 19.
36 Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.20.
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Wight tells us, the study of international politics amounts to nothing more than the study 
o f ‘problems of foreign policy’.
The second reason which explains the intellectual poverty of international theory 
is that, contrary to domestic politics, international politics are ‘less susceptible of a 
progressivist interpretation’38. As Wight famously put it, ‘[international politics is the 
realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political action is most 
regularly necessitous’.39 Thus, the intellectual poverty of international theory is the 
result of
[A] kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorised about. The reason is that the 
theorising has to be done in the language of political theory and law. But this is the language appropriate 
to man’s control of his social life. Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action 
within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life. 
International theory is the theory of survival. What for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, 
or civil war) is for international theory the regular case.40
This shows that Wight’s argument seems to accept the opposition between domestic and 
international politics, which would reveal a realist view of international politics. 
However, one should be careful before reaching such a conclusion. Given the language 
used by Wight, it is not easy to grasp at once that he is in fact criticising realism. 
Indeed, one could safely say that two thirds of the essay concentrate on the difficulties 
of developing a rationalist tradition. Yet, Wight does not give up and in the end tells his 
colleagues that, in order to create a satisfactory conception of international society, it is 
absolutely necessary to escape realism.
To grasp Wight’s intentions, it is necessary to understand what he means by 
‘international theory’. Wight used the expression ‘international theory’ not only in one 
but in two senses: a broad and a narrow sense. This can only be grasped if we read 
‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ in the context of both the argument of 
International Theory and the broad research project of the British Committee. This in 
turn requires taking a slightly different approach, from the conventional one accepted in 
the discipline, to the analysis of International Theory. The prevailing view is that 
International Theory should be seen as presenting ‘international theory’ in terms of a
37 See Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.20.
38 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.25.
39 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.25.
40 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.32.
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conversation between three traditions of thought41 Yet, to present Wight’s lectures as a 
debate or a dialogue between three traditions is to ignore a crucial historical distinction 
that appears in International Theory. According to Wight, until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, rationalism was one of the central intellectual traditions of modem 
international theory.42 Its theoretical principles were formulated and developed by major 
figures such as Grotius, Locke, in the seventeenth century, Hume, Burke, in the 
eighteenth century, and Toqueville, in the nineteenth century. Yet, such a tradition 
virtually disappears during the twentieth century.43 In a very conventional way, Wight 
sees the history of international thought during the twentieth century in terms of the 
triumph of realist theory over other intellectual traditions.44 However, contrary to those 
who see Wight as a realist, he was far from being satisfied with the dominance of 
realism, as indeed his treatment of Carr’s and Morgenthau’s works in the lectures 
demonstrates 45 Now, in the sense that Carr and Morgenthau were undoubtedly the two 
central International Theorists in the 1950s, Wight’s critical attitude towards realism 
reveals a broader dissatisfaction with International Theory as a whole. In particular, he 
is very critical of Carr’s and Morgenthau’s presentation of the history of international 
thought in terms of realism opposed to utopianism or idealism. As he says in the 
conclusion of his lectures, one of his ‘conscious aims’ was ‘to show that the two- 
schools analysis of international theory is not adequate’.46
41 See, inter alia, Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p.xi, and p.xvii; Clark, ‘Traditions of Thought’, p.6; Dunne, 
‘Mythology or Methodology?’, p.318; Epp, ‘Martin Wight’, pp. 132-5; and Jackson, ‘Is there a Classical 
International Theory?’, p.207.
42 As he put it, rationalism is ‘the great central stream of European thought’. Cited in Bull, ‘Martin 
Wight’, p.xiv.
43 This is clear in Martin Wight, ‘An Anatomy of International Thought’, Review o f International Studies, 
13 (1987), pp.221-27. Realism includes modem International Relations figures such as Carr and 
Morgenthau; Idealism, or Revolutionism, includes President Wilson; Rationalism starts with Suarez and 
Grotius and stops with Locke. In the lectures, Wight refers only to two examples of Rationalism in 
twentieth century international theory: George Kennan (pp. 113,120,133, and 265); and pre-1939 
Rationalist thinkers associated with the League of Nations, such as Alfred Zimmem, Norman Angell and 
Lassa Oppenheim, among others, p. 129. Yet, given the ‘confluence of traditions’ in the same thinker or 
school, Wight is not consistent and elsewhere treats Kennan as a realist, the school of the League of 
Nations and Zimmem as idealists, p. 17, and Oppenheim as a realist, pp.234-5.
44 In terms of statecraft, the picture is different. Wight saw tire early years of tire Cold War as a conflict 
between two versions of Revolutionism: the American Kantian one against the Soviet Marxist one. Yet, 
this should not concern us here.
45 Carr is consistently treated, and often attacked, as a major realist figure, throughout International 
Theory. For Wight’s view on Carr’s work, see also Peter Wilson, ‘Tire Myth of the First Great Debate’, 
Review o f International Studies, 24 (1998), p.7. As for Morgenthau, although he is mostly seen as a 
realist, some confusion might arise given that in p. 160 he appears under tire label of a ‘Grotian realist’. 
However, in the end of the book, Wight leaves no room for any doubt, and says that ‘Morgenthau is 
fundamentally a Realist’, p.267.
46 Wight, International Theory, p.267.
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Wight’s dissatisfaction is clear from the very beginning of the lectures, when he 
says that the ‘central question of international theory is, what is international society?’47 
As Wight well knew this was not, and could never be, the central question either for 
realists or for revolutionists. Whereas the former deny the existence of international 
society, the latter see the international society of sovereign states as a ‘fiction’, which 
needs to be transcended.48 Only thinkers who belong to the rationalist tradition start 
their analyses of international politics from that question. Thus, given its initial 
question, International Theory should be read as the beginning of Wight’s recovery of 
past political thought in order to construct the category of rationalism. In fact, when 
Wight started his lectures, in the middle 1950s, there was no distinct rationalist voice in 
the discipline of International Relations. As such, the conversation between the three 
traditions, or at least a conversation with a rationalist participation, had stopped in the 
beginning of the twentieth century. To rescue the rationalist view was one of Wight’s 
central purposes in International Theory. Such a task required, first of all, a return to 
classical political thought to recover, or to develop, intellectual traditions that could 
serve as an alternative to both realism and idealism. As we know, this was achieved 
through the construction of a the category of rationalism, which rested entirely on past 
political thought: mainly on the Grotian theory of international law, on Locke’s classical 
political liberalism, and on Burke’s constitutional Whigism.
In the light of what has been just argued, it is rather strange that, despite the 
general account of Wight as a rationalist, his reaction against realism in International 
Theory has not been sufficiently recognised. The problem stems largely from the 
‘conversation thesis’ generally adopted to explain the content of the lectures. Here, 
Jackson expresses the common view when he says that for Wight, ‘the study of 
international theory involves exploring all three traditions’.49 Seeing the ‘tripartite 
scheme’ as the ‘Wightian legacy’50 naturally overlooks Wight’s reaction against the 
dominance of twentieth century international theory by the realist school. For instance, 
although Jackson notes that Wight saw realism as dominating International Relations 
theory since the end of the Second World war,51 he ignores Wight’s reaction against the 
realist theory in International Theory. Among those who discuss Wight’s legacy, Bull 
and Dunne are the only ones who clearly say that in his lectures he showed a
47 International Theory, p.30.
48 Wight, ‘An Anatomy of International Thought’, pp.222-4.
49 ‘Is There a Classical International Theory?’, p.213.
50 Clark, ‘Traditions of Thought’, p. 16.
51 ‘Is There a Classical International Theory?’, p.211.
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52‘dissatisfaction’ with the work of modern realists such as Carr and Morgenthau. Yet, 
Bull does not fully explore this line of thought. As for Dunne, he argues that in the 
lectures Wight goes ‘beyond power politics’, but hesitates between treating Wight’s 
Rationalism as a via media between the traditions of realism and idealism or as ‘a 
meaningful category in itself.53 Here, part of the problem derives from the fact that 
Wight himself is not entirely consistent in his views. On some occasions, he refers to 
rationalism in terms of a via media54 However, this view is contradicted by Wight’s 
assertion that the conceptualisation of international society is the central issue of 
international theory. The implication of this view is that rather than seeing rationalism 
as a via media, it is realism and revolutionism that are defined in comparison to 
rationalism. This is particularly clear in the case of revolutionism: the only reason for 
including Kant, Hitler and Marx in the same category is the answer they give to Wight’s 
initial question. This shows that rationalism is indeed a ‘meaningful category in itself: 
it is the only tradition that sees international society as the central concept of 
international relations.55 At this moment, we need to consider the research project of the 
British Committee.
The argument of Wight’s inaugural paper to the British Committee should be 
seen as reflecting the same concerns that appear in his lectures. When Wight presented 
‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, he was above all concerned with presenting 
an alternative to the realist theory. The difference is that whereas in the lectures Wight 
uses ‘international theory’ in a broad way, including almost everything written or said 
about international politics by theorists, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and even novel 
writers, in ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, he is concerned with the narrow 
notion o f ‘international theory’, meaning rationalism. In International Theory, given the 
vast focus of the lectures, Wight’s purpose in recovering the rationalist tradition is not at 
all evident; in fact, it only becomes explicit in the conclusion. On the contrary, that 
purpose appears more clearly in ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’. We shall 
now see how, on the way from the London School of Economics to Cambridge,56 the
52 Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p.x.; and Dunne, Inventing International Society.
53 Inventing International Society, pp.54-63.
54 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Uniwin, 1966), p.91.
55 The fact that Wight makes this question his starting point shows at once his rationalism. For instance, 
for Morgenthau the question reveals a great deal of utopianism; the initial question should be rather how 
can a state increase its political power?
56 The meetings of the British Committee, during its initial phase, were held in at Peterhouse, Cambridge. 
See Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp.90-4.
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hidden agenda of the International Theory became the explicit goal of the British 
Committee.
It is helpful, at this point, to use some of the findings of Dunne’s research on the 
‘history of the English School’. From the correspondence between Butterfield, 
Thompson, Wight and Watson before the establishment of the British Committee, we 
can draw some important points. First, Wight was considered to be an essential element 
for the whole project and the ‘theory man’. Second, Wight had firm beliefs about the 
way the Committee should evolve. These included the development o f ‘some corporate 
purpose’ and the establishment of a clear ‘line of enquiry’. Above all, it was imperative 
to avoid the development ‘into a collection o f distinguished amateurs, rather than a
S7 • • •body of people having the same language and frame of reference’. In this respect, it is 
illustrative to see Wight’s response when faced with the perspective of E. H. Carr 
joining the Committee: ‘I hesitate about E. H. Carr...he is himself so much a Great 
power in this region that...he might deflect our discussions into channels opened up by 
his own work’.58 This seems to suggest that Wight himself wanted to direct the 
theoretical orientation of the Committee and that part of that orientation would be to 
escape Carr’s realism. Now it is to be expected that someone, who had strong views 
about the role and the purpose of the British Committee, uses the initial presentation to 
set the future research agenda. On the other hand, by giving him the privilege to be the 
first speaker and by seeing him as the ‘theory man’, the other members also expected 
from Wight some guiding lines regarding the theoretical activity of the Committee.59 It 
is in this sense that it is crucial to understand the argument of ‘Why Is There No 
International Theory?’ in the context of the establishment of the British Committee.
In his reaction against realism, Wight focused on two points. First, instead of 
studying international society as a whole, realists, and here Wight refers explicitly to 
Morgenthau, have merely focused on states’ foreign policies and on the concept of 
national interest60 Secondly, the impact of political realism has led to the abandonment 
of classical approaches to international law and to the consequent development of a 
positivist conception of international law, to which the creation and the application of 
legal rules are entirely dependent on the will of states.61 Thus, the rejection of realism
57 Wight cited in Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp.92-3. Emphasis in the original.
58 Wight cited in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.92. Emphasis in the original.
59 According to Dunne, Wight ‘provided the intellectual leadership in the first phase of the Committee’s 
proceedings’, Inventing International Society, p. 182.
60 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.20.
61 Wight refers to ‘positivist jurisprudence’ as coming ‘as near to codifying Realpolitik as any work of 
international law can do’, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.29. See also International Theory, 
pp.234-5.
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involved a shift both from the analysis of foreign policy to the treatment of the nature of 
international society, and from legal positivism to older legal and political traditions. 
Therefore, when Wight uses expressions such as the poverty of international theory and 
the prejudice of the sovereign state, he is in fact criticising the realist theory and not 
referring to an intellectual and political condition that cannot be transcended. Indeed, 
reacting against realism involved precisely to abandon the limits imposed by 
conventional conceptions of the sovereign state, and to focus on international society as 
a whole. In this regard, it is not surprising to see one of the founding members of the 
British Committee, Watson, to write more than three decades later that ‘Wight rejected 
and helped the Committee to free itself from what he called the intellectual bias 
imposed by the sovereign state’.
The argument developed here suggests, therefore, that Wight’s inaugural 
presentation before the British Committee is fundamental to understand the English 
School’s attempt to escape realism. Contrary to the views of Linklater, Jackson and 
others, I believe that ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ should be seen not as an 
example of Wight’s early realist position, but as the beginning of the challenge to 
realism. Wight is repeating to a group of colleagues, who wanted to develop a specific 
approach to the study of international relations, the same criticisms made to the 
discipline, and its division between realism and idealism, in his lectures. When Wight 
asks ‘why there is no international theory?’, what he really means is why there is no 
rationalist tradition in contemporary International Relations? In other words, Wight is 
now using the second meaning of ‘international theory’, as identical to rationalism. 
From this initial moment of reacting against realism, to study the nature of international 
society became the business of the English school. Such a project required first of all the 
recovery of the thought of past political thinkers; in other words, it was necessary to 
create a body of rationalist ‘international theory’63. In this regard, the way I read 
Wight’s essay is that he was asking the same question that Linklater asked almost 
twenty years later, ‘on what basis might we construct a political theory of international 
relations?’.64 As Linklater, Wight was also engaged in ‘defending’ and ‘reconstructing 
the assumptions associated with much international theory in the past’.65
62 Adam Watson, ‘Forward’, in Der Derian (ed.), International Theory, p.xv.
63 Revealingly, the title of an early draft of ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ was ‘Why Is There 
No Body of International Theory?’. See Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p.xxi. Dunne also notes that ‘[t]he 
intention behind Wight’s paper was to shape the Committee’s theoretical investigations in the direction of 
discovering patterns of theory and practice in international relations’. Inventing International Society,
P 95-4 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p.8. What distinguishes Linklater from Wight is that whereas for the 
second the fundamental question for a political theory of international relations was ‘what is the nature of
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Building the rationalist tradition
Building rationalism by returning to history
It is important to note a remark by Butterfield in one of the meetings of the British 
Committee. During the presentation of his own paper on ‘Notes for a Discussion on the 
Theory of International Politics’, he referred to a comment that he had made during the 
discussion of Wight’s inaugural presentation, in which Butterfield himself said that 
‘political theory is the enemy’. It is worth to consider how Butterfield elaborated, four 
years later, on that comment.
Political Theory takes hold of man’s duties to his fellows or to mankind and comprehends them in his 
duty to Society or the State. It may not explicitly assert that there is one Society or State, but it often 
argues as though only one existed. And the result is that thought tends to stop there. Even if something is 
added concerning the relations between states or between the citizens of various states, it seems to come 
as an unconvincing appendix, because thought has reached its apex in the highly-refined concept of the 
State66
This observation gains relevance if we remember that it was part of a presentation 
offered by Butterfield as Chairman of the Committee, with the purpose of summing up 
the general conclusions of the group after the first five years of activity. Moreover, the 
argument seems to have been inspired by Wight’s initial remarks before the Committee. 
This suggests that the members of the Committee, or at least Wight and Butterfield, 
believed that in order to build the rationalist tradition of international theory, it was 
necessary to challenge the way twentieth century political theory had appropriated 
classical political thought.
Such a challenge could be done in two different but complementary ways. Either 
by reinterpreting classical political thought in order to emphasise its relevance to the 
study of international relations. Or to recover those past traditions that focused on the 
international states-system as a whole, and not as resting on a separation between 
domestic and international politics. Implicitly, we see here the beginning of a strong
international society’, for the first the history of modem political theory ‘has consisted to a significant 
degree of the erosion of the classical foundations of thinking about the structure of international society’,
p8.
6 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 10.
66 Herbert Butterfield, ‘Notes for a Discussion on the Theory of International Politics’, British Committee 
paper (January 1964), p.2.
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criticism against the discipline of political theory, and not, it has to be stressed, to 
political theory as such. Again, in the words of Butterfield,
I would still ask...if...one can have a theory of international politics, capable of driving the mind to any 
great height, without wrecking...the framework of traditional Political Theory. In other words, it would 
not be sufficient to make merely a few banal transpositions, with the idea of adopting such theory to a 
world conceived as international.67
‘Wrecking the framework of traditional political theory’ meant for the Committee 
returning to classical political and historical thought and to demonstrate that some of its 
main traditions were engaged in studying international society as a whole and not 
merely the state. The attack on the discipline of political theory was not further 
developed because it was done in the context of a reaction against the dominant theory 
of International Relations, realism. Yet, ‘wrecking the framework of realism’ was just 
the complementary task to ‘wrecking the framework of political theory’, for the sins 
committed by the two traditions are indeed complementary. While political theorists 
tend to concentrate on domestic politics, realists focus on relations between states. So to 
claim that international theory should go beyond the treatment of inter-state relations 
implies that political theory could not be reduced to the study of domestic politics. 
These views are significant in the sense that they reveal that for the members of the 
English school the recovery of past political thought was a vital endeavour to challenge 
realism.
The development of the concept of international society, as in opposition to the 
realist idea of state of war, involved first a reinterpretation of Hobbes’s view on the 
nature of international anarchy. For Morgenthau, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
international anarchy corresponded to the Hobbesian state of war. In another influential 
realist work, published in the end of the 1950s, Kenneth Waltz also defended the 
analogy between the international system and the Hobbesian state of war. Since the 
1950s, the belief that Hobbes’s notion of the state of war characterises the international 
system has dominated American realist thinking.69 More than any other member of the
67 ‘Notes for a Discussion’, p.3.
68 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), pp. 166-7.
69 Here, the most important example is of course Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics (New 
York: Random House, 1979), pp. 102-3. For a recent realist reading of Hobbes’s thought, see Michael W. 
Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), chapter 3. For an 
important exception to this dominant view, see Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Rousseau on War and Peace’, initially 
published in 1965, where he affirms that ‘We can see in Hobbes the father of utilitarian theories of 
international law’. See Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice o f International Politics
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British Committee, it was Bull who developed the critique of the way realist authors had 
appropriated Hobbes’s thought. Indeed, one of Bull’s central arguments is that the state 
of nature between sovereign states should not be compared to the state of war between 
individuals.70 This leads Bull to argue that there are two conceptions of international 
anarchy, and not one, and that they should be clearly distinguished. In a first sense, 
anarchy refers to the absence of an international sovereign government; this can be 
called ‘juridical anarchy’.71 In the sense number two, anarchy means that ‘states do not 
form together any kind of society’ and thereby international politics is defined in terms 
of state of war; this is ‘political anarchy’.72 Now Bull says that there are two possible 
approaches to the problem of anarchy. Either, it is assumed that the absence of 
government (‘juridical anarchy’) entails state of war (‘political anarchy’), or this 
assumption is rejected and then it is possible to argue that a political system with 
common rules and institutions does not necessarily demand the existence of a sovereign 
government.
Bull admits that Hobbes himself describes international anarchy in terms of a 
state of nature.73 However, such a description of international politics has a clear 
purpose. By recurring to the international example, Hobbes is able to contrast a society 
with government, which lives in a condition of civil peace, to a society without a 
government, existing in a state of nature. Yet, this is not the same as saying that the two 
anarchical conditions, the one prior to the establishment of a sovereign authority and the 
international one, are identical. Bull arrives at this conclusion by comparing the 
Hobbesian conception of the state of nature among individuals with international 
politics. The three central characteristics of the Hobbesian state of nature, the lack of 
economic activities beyond the ones that allow merely for human survival, the lack of 
legal rules of coexistence and notions of right and wrong, and the permanent state of 
war, do not apply to relations between sovereign states. Despite international anarchy, 
states engage in rather advanced economic activities, not only internally, but also 
externally. Even if it is minimal, there is clearly a body of international law which 
regulates interstate relations.74 Finally, the case of the state of war provokes an
(London: Westview Press, 1987), p.29. For a development of this view, by a former student of Hoffmann, 
see Donald W. Hanson, ‘Thomas Hobbes’s “Highway to Peace”’, International Organization, 38 (1984), 
pp.329-54.
0 Wight has also noted this difference, see ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p.30.
71 Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in James Der Derian (ed.), International 
Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.75.
72 ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.75. For a discussion of this distinction in Bull’s thought, see Suganami, ‘The 
Structure of Institutionalism’, pp.2363-81.
73 Cited by Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.81.
74 Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, pp.81-3.
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extensive discussion from Bull. He recognises that the fact of war ‘appears to provide 
the chief evidence for the view that states do not form a society’.75 Yet, despite this 
apparent concession to the domestic analogy argument, Bull also finds this last 
comparison between the domestic and the international states of nature wanting. To 
show this, he uses two arguments. First, contrary to the common view, the fact of ‘war 
does not indicate the absence of international society, or its breakdown, but can occur as 
a part of its functioning’.76 Warfare should be understood as a necessary institution for 
the working of international society, particularly because the enforcement of
• • 77international law is often carried on through war.
Further, Bull argues that Hobbes himself says that the international state of war 
is different from the domestic one. For Hobbes, there is an important exception that 
makes interstate anarchy more tolerable than anarchy among individuals. The exception 
is that ‘a commonwealth can guard itself against being subjugated by another, as a man 
in the state of nature cannot do’.78 This suggests that states are more apt than individuals 
to guarantee their survival, and thus less vulnerable to the state of war. As Bull says
• • • •  • 7Q‘anarchy among states is tolerable to a degree to which among individuals it is not’. 
From this discussion, Bull concludes that Hobbes himself rejects the domestic analogy. 
‘The analogy between the condition of states in the international anarchy and the 
condition of individual persons living without government is not taken by Hobbes to 
what, on some views at least, is its logical conclusion’80. In other words, Hobbes’s 
thought does not quite correspond to what it is generally taken as ‘the Hobbesian view’. 
By dissociating Hobbes from the so-called ‘Hobbesian tradition’, Bull is able to criticise 
the analogy between the state of war and international politics.81 More importantly, the 
rejection of such an analogy, shows that, even if rudimentary, there is an element of
75 ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.84.
76 Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.84.
77 Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.85.
78 Cited by Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.87.
79 Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.86.
80 Hedley Bull, ‘Hobbes and the International Anarchy’, Social Research, (1981), p.725.
81 According to Stanley Hoffmann, Bull rejects ‘a purely Hobbesian view of international affairs as a state 
of war...by using some of Hobbes’s own arguments’, ‘International Society’, in J. D. B. Miller, R. J. 
Vincent (eds.), Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), p.23. It should be noted that English school’s treatment of Hobbes is somehow confusing. In ‘Why 
Is There No International Theory?’, Wight started to dissociate Hobbes from the realist tradition. Yet, in 
International Theory, he consistently sees Hobbes as a realist. In his article on Hobbes, Bull does not 
pursue the argument put forward in ‘Society and Anarchy’. On the one hand, he claims that Hobbes ‘was
a true philosopher of peace’ (p.738, and p.729), but on the other hand includes Hobbes ‘within the broad
tradition of Machiavellism’ (p.724). See Hedley Bull, ‘Hobbes and the International Anarchy’. Vincent 
seems to be clearer and places Hobbes firmly in the rationalist tradition. See R. J. Vincent, ‘The 
Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought’, Millennium: Journal o f  International 
Studies, 10 (1981), pp.91-101.
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society at the international level. Despite the condition of juridical anarchy, states 
‘constitute a society without a government’, which is able to maintain a minimum level 
of political order.82 Thus, with Bull’s discussion of Hobbes, we have one of the first 
examples of criticising realism by rethinking the assumptions associated with a past 
thinker.83
The second, and vital, step of the English school’s challenge against realism was 
to recover the thought of those past political thinkers whose views would permit the 
construction of the concept of international society in a much more satisfactory way 
than those of Hobbes himself. From the very beginning of the meetings of the British 
Committee, there existed three different possibilities to develop the idea of international 
society. The first was offered by the natural law tradition, which was favoured by 
Wight, and where Grotius and, to a less extent, Locke were the central figures. Wight’s 
recovery of the natural law tradition began in ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’. 
In the very beginning of the essay, Wight raised two crucial questions: ‘What 
international theory, then, was there before 1914? And if there was any, is it worth 
rediscovering?’84. To the first question, Wight answers by quoting Tocqueville: ‘It 
is...to the classical international lawyers that we must look in the first place for any 
body of international theory before the twentieth century’.85 The second question is 
implicitly answered when he says that ‘it is necessary to see the domain of international 
theory stretching all the way from the noble attempt of Grotius and his successors to 
establish the laws of war’86. Following Wight, in his first paper presented to the British 
Committee, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’,87 Bull also refers to the 
significance of that ‘body of theory to which modern international law is the heir’. It 
should be noted that Bull refers to the ‘body of theory’, and not to international law 
itself. This suggests, first of all, that it is a tradition of political thought that Bull has in 
mind. Second, it shows that at this stage, Bull did not distinguish between the naturalist 
and the positivist approaches to international law.88
82 ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.86 and pp.89-90.
83 Since Bull, it lias been usual in Britain to dissociate Hobbes’s thought from realism. See Murray 
Forsyth, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the External Relations of States’, British Journal o f International Studies, 
5 (1979), pp. 196-209; Vincent, ‘The Hobbesian Tradition’; and Cornelia Navari, ‘Hobbes and the 
“Hobbesian Tradition” in International Relations’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 11 
(1982), pp.203-22.
84 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 16.
85 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 17.
86 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 18.
87 Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in Der Derian (ed.), International 
Theory, pp.75-93.
88 ‘Society and Anarchy’, pp.79-80.
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Crucially, the exercise of recovering the political thought of the classical liberal 
thinkers involved a challenge to the realist interpretation. For realists, the thought of 
Grotius and Locke belong undoubtedly to the ‘idealist’ tradition of modern political 
thought. For instance, Morgenthau saw Grotius as one of the founders of the rationalist 
liberal ideology that seeks to overcome international power politics with idealist 
schemes for peace.89 For Waltz, the liberal belief that political and economic 
interdependence between states might produce a more peaceful international system has 
its roots in the thought of Locke.90 These views were of course part of a broader critique 
of Western liberalism, as providing deficient foundations for a theory of international 
relations. In contrast to both Morgenthau and Waltz, Wight and Bull believed that some 
ideas of the classical liberal tradition were helpful to develop a satisfactory approach to 
the study of international politics. Grotius’s thought is the most important case 
regarding the differences of treatment of past political thinkers between realism and the 
English school. Contrary to Morgenthau’s assessment of the Dutch thinker as an 
idealist, Wight and Bull considered him to be the founding father of the rationalist 
tradition of international theory.91
The second possibility to reconceptualise international society was offered by 
the idea of the states system, as it had been developed at the end of the eighteenth 
century and in the early nineteenth century mainly by the German historian, Heeren. In 
this thesis, this approach will be called the constitutional statist tradition, given its focus 
on the constitutional principles of the states system. Although Butterfield was the 
member who strongest advocated international statist constitutionalism, Wight and Bull 
also accepted, from the very beginning, the merits of Heeren’s legacy. For Wight, a 
fundamental task of international theory is to elevate its object of study to something 
broader than states’ foreign policies. In what is probably the strongest criticism to his 
contemporaries, in particular realists, Wight observes that ‘[f]ew political thinkers have 
made it their business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community itself92. As 
Wight argued later in the Systems o f States, Heeren’s work constitutes an adequate 
starting point to study the modern states system.93 Likewise, Bull has Heeren in mind 
when he refers to those thinkers that see international society as a ‘political system’ in
89 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1946), pp. 12, and 41 -2.
90 Theory o f International Politics, p. 141.
91 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.24-7; and Wight, International Theory, pp. 14-5, and 38.
92 ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 19, emphasis in the original.
93 Martin Wight, Systems o f States (edited by Hedley Bull, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).
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its own right, and not as mere collection of states.94 Finally, in 1962, Bull added a third 
possibility to study the concept of international society. In his second contribution to the 
Committee, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, Bull argued that a 
satisfactory conception of international society should rest on the tradition of 
international legal positivism.95 We shall see now how Wight explored the rationalist 
tradition.
Wight and the category o f rationalism
Wight’s most significant exploration of rationalism appeared in his paper on ‘Western 
Values in International Relations’, presented before the British Committee, in October 
1961, and in this sense it pursued the research agenda put forward in ‘Why Is There No 
International Theory?’.96 In this regard, the paper undoubtedly ‘signifies a growing 
alignment with rationalism’.97 According to Wight himself ‘Western Values’ developed 
the ‘most substantial argument’ he had offered during the first period of the 
Committee.98 The method was similar to the one used by Wight in International 
Theory: to discern the concept of international society in the history of ideas. As Wight 
puts it, ‘international society...can be properly described only in historical...depth’.99 
There are three themes in ‘Western Values’ relevant for this thesis. The first, normally 
overlooked, but quite significant, is Wight’s defence of the idea of international society 
against realists. He does so by addressing two processes that according to realist 
thinkers had destroyed the European international society: the growth of nationalism 
and the ideological conflict of the Cold War. The second theme is the clear liberal 
tendency of Wight’s rationalism, where evident solidarist elements can be discerned. 
The third and final theme is the inclusion of the republican political tradition within 
rationalism. Although their thought is not conveniently explored, and sometimes it is 
even misunderstood, we should remind ourselves that Wight’s rationalism includes 
thinkers, such as Hume, Montesquieu, Vattel, and the American Founding Fathers, who 
were chief figures of the early modem republican tradition.
94 ‘Society and Anarchy’, p.80.
95 Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’.
96 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Butterfield, Wight (eds.), Diplomatic 
Investigations.
97 Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.61.
98 Cited in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.99. According to Bull, ‘Western Values’ is Wight’s 
‘single most important paper’. See Bull, ‘Martin Wight and the Study of International Relations’, p.7.
99 ‘Western Values’, p.96.
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Wight’s defence of the idea of international society against realist arguments is 
visible in his discussion of the relation between order and justice, or between political 
order, legal order, and moral order. Wight starts his narrative in the seventeenth century. 
For Grotius, says Wight, the legal and the moral orders were the same, in the sense that 
natural law was simultaneously a moral notion and the basis of the Law of Nations. 
Thus, a criminal state commits a crime against both the moral and the legal orders. 
During the nineteenth century, the emergence of the principle of nationality separated 
the moral order, on the one hand, from the political and the legal orders, on the other 
hand. The gradual triumph of the national idea disrupted the political - the balance of 
power - and the legal - respect for dynastic sovereignty - orders of the Vienna system.100 
According to Wight, the great political challenge of the nineteenth century was to 
achieve a compromise between political order, or the general balance of power, legal 
order, the respect for the principle of state sovereignty as the foundation of the 
international legal system, and moral order, respect for the just principle of national 
self-determination. Part of the answer was to elevate the principle of ‘the consent of the 
governed’ to the basis of state sovereignty.101 Closer to the contemporary age, the 
League of Nations attempted to pursue the nineteenth century compromise between the 
political, the legal and the moral orders. ‘The majority of the inhabitants of Europe 
enjoyed the right of self-determination on which the existing order claimed to be based. 
The exceptions were marginal and explicable by reference to the needs of the balance of 
power’.102
Wight extends this historical analysis to the Cold War international order. Since 
World War Two, ‘the relationship between order and justice’, says Wight, ‘has 
undergone a new transformation’. In the case of the anti-colonial struggles
[i]t has now seemed that there is a direct and positive relation between national justice and the 
maintenance of order: that if the Western Powers could not free their colonies quickly enough the 
colonies would secede morally to the opposing camp, that the West must run at top speed in order to 
remain in its existing position, that peaceful change is no longer the antithesis of security but its 
condition. Order now requires justice.103
100 ‘Western Values’, p. 106.
101 ‘Western Values’, p. 106.
102 ‘Western Values’, p. 107. Comparing with realism, we note already an important difference in Wight’s 
treatment of the League of Nations. By achieving a compromise between the balance of power and liberal 
principles, the political order established by the League was not as idealist as Morgenthau claimed.
103 ‘Western Values’, p. 108.
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The balance of power between the West and the East, and the maintenance of the 
principle of state sovereignty as the basis of international legal order depended on the 
independence of the European colonies. In other words, the maintenance of 
international order was linked to the fulfilment of principles of international justice; and 
again in the form of political self-determination. We can already draw an important 
conclusion from Wight’s analysis. The present validity of the concept of international 
society is the result of its historical resilience, which derives from its capacity to 
accommodate ideological conflicts. In contrast to Morgenthau’s belief in the triumph of 
the national idea, and the consequent defeat of the notion of international society, Wight 
shows how the principle of national self-determination was integrated into the 
normative structure of modern international society.104
The accommodation of nationalism and of the ideological differences was 
allowed by the principle of political toleration, what Wight calls ‘via media’ or ‘the just 
milieu between definable extremes’.105 Given the deep ideological conflict that 
characterised the international context in the 1960s, an adequate notion of international 
society had to rest on respect for radical different political ideologies. It is interesting to 
note that Wight recovers a set of Western values as the most appropriate to establish a 
political coexistence between the Marxist Soviet Union and the Western-liberal United 
States. To a certain extent, this is linked to the similarities that Wight found between the 
ideological confrontation of the twentieth century and the religious conflicts of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Protestant and Catholic states had to find a 
modus vivendi between them, the respect for international pluralism in the twentieth 
century demanded Western powers, on the one hand, and states with radical different 
ideological principles, such as socialist and post-colonial states, on the other hand, to 
create and maintain rules of coexistence. In the light of this historical comparison, it is 
not surprising that the intellectual fathers of Wight’s notion of rationalism are also the 
fathers of the modem idea of international society, in particular Grotius. For the early- 
modern theorists of international society, one of its chief functions was precisely to 
accommodate religious conflicts and political and ideological pluralism.106 In this way,
104 See also ‘International Legitimacy’ in Systems of States, pp. 153-73. This point was later developed by 
James Mayall in Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
105 ‘Western Values’, p.91.
106 The work of contemporary historians of early-modern political thought seem to agree with Wight’s 
view. See, as an example, Richard Tuck, ‘Rights and Pluralism’, in James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in an 
Age o f  Pluralism: The Philosophy o f Charles Taylor in Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 159-70. For a more extensive discussion of this point in the thought of Grotius, see also 
Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
chapter 5. Tuck’s example is quite significant given that he is a Grotian scholar.
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Wight’s ‘Western Values’ may be seen as an attempt to build a notion of international 
society around the idea of political pluralism. Only the creation of an international 
political society, founded on the rights of states, would respect moral diversity that
107resulted from the ideological pluralism of the Cold War.
Wight’s solidarism in ‘Western Values’ is manifest in the way he discusses the 
notion of international legal personality, where he includes minorities and individuals 
rights, and in his treatment of the doctrine of just causes of war.108 Solidarist thinkers 
emphasise the fundamental rights of individuals, who are thus treated in specific cases 
as subjects of international law, and the solidarism among states in the enforcement of 
international legal rules, particularly in the case of just wars.109 The doctrine of just 
causes of war appears implicitly in Wight’s argument, when he observes that 
‘international society has a right of self-defence and of coercion’.110 Yet, it is in his 
considerations on aggression and on war as an instrument of law enforcement that 
Wight most clearly reveals his adoption of the solidarist doctrine of the just war.111 The 
second sign of Wight’s solidarism is his belief that international society should include 
certain basic universal rights. Such a belief is connected to Wight’s view that 
individuals, and not only states, are members of international society and as such 
subjects of international law.112 Believing that individuals are the ultimate members of 
international society, Wight affirms that states, the immediate members, ought to 
respect fundamental humanitarian values in their domestic politics.113 He even refers to 
the existence of an ‘international social consciousness’, which is expressed for instance 
in the case of ‘the minorities treatises’.114 Given these solidarist views, it is not 
surprising to see Wight including the principle of humanitarian intervention in his 
rationalist tradition of international theory.115 The significance of Wight’s solidarism in 
the context of this chapter lies in two points. First, it was associated with the neo- 
Grotian reaction against the tradition of realpolitik, after World War I. The second 
significant point of Wight’s solidarism is that it shows that the category of rationalism,
107 It has to be noted, however, that Wight’s view of political pluralism should not be confused with 
Bull’s legal pluralism, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
108 See also International Theory, pp.36-7, 206-7, and 217-9.
109 Herch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’, British Yearbook o f  International 
Law (1946), pp. 1-53.
110 ‘Western Values’, p. 103.
111 ‘Western Values’, pp. 104-5.
112 ‘Western Values’, pp. 101-2. Interesting enough, Wight identifies his views with the views of neo- 
Grotians, such as Westlake, T.J. Lawrence, and Brierly.
113 ‘Western Values’, pp.99-100.
114 ‘Western Values’, p.97.
1,5 ‘Western Values’, p. 119.
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as it was developed from the early days of the English school, permits the formulation 
of different conceptions of international society. Quite strikingly, we still find in 
Wight’s early contributions to the Committee an implicit defence of yet another 
conception of international society. This point takes us to the third theme of ‘Western 
Values’.
The first sign that Wight includes the republican tradition within the category of 
rationalism is, as it was already noted, the reference to distinct republican figures. 
Montesquieu and the American Founding Fathers are seen as representative figures of 
‘Western Values’.116 Elsewhere, Vattel is associated with the republican view that the 
balance of power is a ‘constituent principle of international society’,117 and with the idea 
of European international republic.118 Likewise, Hume is among those who developed 
the rationalist conception of the balance of power.119 It is worth noting, in this regard, 
that Vattel is a central figure, and Hume and Montesquieu deserve a great deal of 
attention, in Nicholas Onufs study of international republicanism.120 The second 
indication of the impact of republicanism is given by the defining ideas of the ‘Western 
Values’, namely ‘individual freedom’ and the political ‘organisation of liberty...in the 
form of... constitutional government’.121 In this regard, the tradition of Western values is 
identified by Wight as ‘the Whig or constitutional tradition in diplomacy’.122 Although 
it is common to associate the term ‘Whig’ and the political theory of constitutionalism 
with the liberal tradition, in historical terms they have very strong connections with 
republicanism.123 The final evidence for the appearance of republicanism in Wight’s 
contributions is found in the terms of his attempt to conceptualise international society. 
As it was observed in the introduction of the thesis, in the beginning of ‘Western 
Values’, Wight affirms that international society must be conceptualised as a political 
society greater that the sum of the states, or in other words, as the society above national
116 ‘Western Values’, p.90.
117 Martin Wight, ‘The Balance of Power’, in Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 153-4.
1,8 Martin Wight, ‘The Balance of Power and International Order’, in Alan Janies (ed.), The Bases o f  
International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 101.
119 International Theory, p. 165. Yet, Wight is confusing and, quite strangely, also includes Hume in the 
realist tradition, see pp. 171 and 267.
120 See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
121 Wight, ‘Western Values’, p.89.
122 ‘Western Values’, p.90.
123 For the relation between Whiggism and republicanism, see J.G. A. Pocock, ‘The Varieties of 
Whiggism from Exclusion to Refonn: A History of Ideology and Discourse’, in Virtue, Commerce, and 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.215-310; for the relation between 
constitutionalism and republicanism, see J.G. A. Pocock, The Politics o f  Extent and the Problems o f  
Freedom (Colorado Springs: The Colorado College Press, 1987), and Richard Bellamy, ‘The Political 
Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights, and Representative Democracy’, Political 
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societies. This purpose corresponds precisely to Wight’s argument in ‘Why Is There No 
International Theory?’, where he urged his colleagues to abandon the prejudice imposed 
by the sovereign state. Now the development of such a conception of international 
society would require a challenge to statist approaches, as indeed Wight’s criticism of 
realism and international legal positivism demonstrates. In addition, not only Wight, but 
also Butterfield, quite consistently referred to the importance of the eighteenth century 
intellectual tradition, which saw international society as a political system ‘and not 
merely a congeries of states’.124 This seems to suggest that the exploration of the 
republican tradition is one way of conceptualising international society as a political 
society greater than a mere collection of states. One of the problems that occurred with 
Wight and Butterfield was that the characterisation of such a tradition, during this early 
period, was never clear. Indeed, the references to the eighteenth century intellectual 
tradition denote a confluence between the republican and the constitutional statist 
traditions, where thinkers such Burke, Hume, and Vattel, on the one hand, and Gentz 
and Heeren, on the other, often appear as belonging to the same tradition. Such a 
classification is evident in Butterfield’s and Wight’s discussion of the concept of the 
balance of power. Its development is sometimes attributed to republican thinkers such 
as Hume or Vattel, and other times to writers of the constitutional statist tradition, such 
as Gentz and Heeren, without distinguishing the two.125 In addition, given the 
cosmopolitan elements of republican thought, Wight often includes distinct republican 
notions and indeed republican thinkers within the tradition of revolutionism.
Despite these confusions, in the early contributions of Wight and Butterfield to 
the British Committee, and also in Wight’s later essay on the ‘Balance of Power and 
International Order’, we find the ‘republican moment’ within the English school. For 
instance, Wight gives an accurate interpretation of the historical context of 
republicanism. He places the origins of the practice of the balance of power in the 
Italian Renaissance, more precisely in the republican struggles for political freedom 
against the Emperor. Likewise, he recognises the process through which the doctrine of 
the mixed constitution converged with the concept of the balance of power.126 
Furthermore, the statement with which Wight finishes his essay on the ‘Balance of
124 ‘Notes for a Discussion’, p.5.
125 See Wight, ‘The Balance of Power’, p. 154 and p. 157. See also Wight, ‘The Balance of Power and 
International Order’, pp.99-101. As for Butterfield’s inclusion of all those thinkers in the same tradition, 
see Herbert Butterfield ‘The Balance of Power’, in Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 140-7.
126 ‘The Balance of Power and International Order’, pp.86-7, and pp.96-7.
92
Power’ admirably sums up the eighteenth century republican view of the merits of a 
system of general political equilibrium.
And where conflicts of interest between organized groups are insurmountable, the only principle of order 
is to try to maintain...an even distribution of power. The alternatives are either universal anarchy, or 
universal dominion. The balance of power is generally regarded as preferable to the first, and most people 
have not yet been persuaded that the second is so preferable to the balance of power that they will easily 
submit to it.127
However, after the early days of the British Committee, Wight abandoned the 
republican possibility opened up by his formulation of rationalism. Moreover, such an 
opening was not pursued by other members of the English school either. This is, in part, 
explained by the clarification of the orientation of the school after the first period of the 
British Committee. On the one hand, Heeren’s idea of the states system finally prevailed 
in the school’s approach, and came finally to be distinguished from eighteenth century 
republicanism. The moment at which the Committee’s chooses to develop Heeren’s 
notion of the states system is clearly visible in 1967. In the very same year, Wight 
presented the paper that later became the first chapter of Systems o f  States, and Bull 
gave a paper entitled ‘Notes on the Modern International System’. They both used as 
their starting point Heeren’s conception of the states system. In addition, Bull translated 
it into the term international society. The subsequent central work of the school up to 
Watson’s The Evolution o f International Society, which includes Systems o f States, The 
Anarchical Society, and The Expansion o f International Society, received a great deal of 
inspiration from Heeren’s thought. On the other hand, Bull went further than all his 
colleagues in exploring the notion of international society. In fact, he was the only one 
that fully developed a conception of international society: the pluralist notion of 
‘anarchical society’. This of course demonstrates the great significance of Bull’s work, 
but it also shows that the process of defining inevitably brings with it the narrowing 
down of a tradition, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Conclusion
In his assessment of the work of the British Committee, after the first period of the 
meetings, Butterfield referred to their attempt to find ‘alternative ways of construing our
127 ‘The Balance of Power’, pp. 174-5.
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subject’.128 This suggests a picture of a group of scholars fighting against the state of 
International Relations, who were trying to build an alternative project for the 
discipline. Indeed, as I argued here, from the very beginning, when Wight presented 
‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, the dissatisfaction of the members of the 
school with most of International Relations, particularly with realism, is quite clear. To 
fully understand the significance of the English school’s challenge to realism, the 
chapter adopted a historical perspective. As I tried to show, it was by reinterpreting the 
significance of past political thought that the English school disputed the realist 
position. The results of this reinterpretation were the category of rationalism, which 
includes those internationalist approaches attacked by the tradition of realpolitik, and 
the concept of international society.
If we see the emergence of the English school in these terms, we can grasp that 
rationalism is not simply a via media between two other approaches, but that it rather 
transcends the realist/idealist divide that has defined the discipline since its beginning. 
In this regard, rationalism constitutes one of the most important alternatives to the 
realist theory, involving an attempt to set the discipline of International Relations on 
different theoretical foundations. Indeed, a central claim of this chapter is that, by 
rethinking our intellectual legacy in the domain of political thought, one of the major 
contributions of the English school was to provide alternative conceptual languages to 
the study of international relations. The third part of the chapter sought to demonstrate 
that by seeking to place the study of international relations within the context of broader 
modern political traditions, the category of rationalism, as it was initially formulated, 
offers distinct ways of defining the concept of international society.
Given the topic of this thesis, it seems to be appropriate to finish the chapter 
with the most significant definition of international society offered in the early period of 
the British Committee, which appears in ‘Western Values’. For Wight, sovereign states 
are not absolutely independent, but ‘parts of a greater whole’, an international political 
society. Besides sovereign states, its members are individuals, minorities, and political 
organisations other than states. Such a political society presupposes ‘an international 
social consciousness’, or ‘a world-wide community-sentiment’. In sum, international 
political society ‘is the most comprehensive form of society among men’.129 In other 
words, and in accordance with the argument presented in ‘Why Is There No 
International Theory?’, this conception of international political society manages to
128 ‘Notes for a Discussion’, p.2.
129 ‘Western Values’, pp.95-105.
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escape the prejudice imposed by the sovereign state. For the moment, it suffices to make 
three brief points regarding the nature of this notion of international political society. 
First, as Wight believes, it can only be understood in ‘historical depth’.130 Secondly, it 
has a strong normative content. Finally, given that this conception sees international 
society as a truly political society, abandoning the idea of the state of nature altogether, 
its conceptual development is crucial to overcome the undersocialized view of world 
politics and the ontological separation between domestic and international politics. In 
this regard, to define the conception of international society put forward by Wight in 
‘Western Values’, I shall use the term international political society, as in opposition to 
international society understood as the society o f states. The next chapter will tell the 
story of how the former conception was gradually replaced by the latter in the work of 
the English school, and how in the process rationalism was narrowed down to the notion 
of the states system and the pluralist conception of international society. The rest of the 
thesis, chapters 4, 5, and 6, will return to the broad category of rationalism and then 
reformulate the concept of international society, building on the early contribution of 
the school, in particular by exploring the republican arm of the rationalist tradition.
130 ‘Western Values’, p.96.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LIMITS OF ‘INTERNATIONAL THEORY’: FROM 
RATIONALISM TO THE PLURALIST CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY
As I affirmed in the end of the last chapter, this chapter will tell how the English 
school’s early rationalism gradually transformed into the pluralist conception of 
international society. The shift from Martin Wight’s original, and non-statist, 
conception of international society to a statist approach to the study of modem 
international society was the result of such a process. The analysis of this shift will be 
divided into three parts. In the first part, I start by looking at the historical interpretation 
offered by both Wight and Hedley Bull concerning the origins and development of 
modern international society. Despite some apparent differences in Wight’s and Bull’s 
historical interpretations, it will be argued that their views are in the end quite similar. 
In particular, for both of them, the sovereign state has ontological priority over 
international society. In this way, I attempt to show the connection between the English 
school’s notion of society of states and the historical account of modern world politics 
adopted by the school. Then, the focus of the chapter will turn to Bull’s pluralist 
conception of the society of states. In the third and last part, the chapter discusses some 
problems that result from the statist conception of international society. In particular, 
this part of the chapter critically assesses the distinction between the concepts of 
international society and, on the one hand, international system and, on the other hand, 
world society.
The chapter concludes by suggesting in which way the concept of international 
society can be reformulated. Here, to prepare the grounds for the rest of the thesis, I 
explicitly associate the terms of my reformulation of the concept of international society 
with the republican political tradition. Yet, and this point needs to be emphasised, my 
alternative conception of international society builds on some views put forward by 
Wight. As we saw in the last chapter, I believe that we find ideas which point towards a 
republican conception of international society in some of the writings of this member of 
the English school. Those ideas, however, have not been sufficiently explored. In this 
sense, my purpose is to recover some of those views and to further develop them in the 
light of the republican political tradition, which was almost ignored by the school. But,
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first, it is necessary to show the problems with Wight’s notion o f ‘system of states’ and 
Bull’s conception o f ‘anarchical international society’.
Creating the notion of the ‘modern Westphalian states system’
The historical origins o f the modern states system: the break with medieval imperialism
Within the English school, the classic study on the origins of modern international 
society is Wight’s Systems o f States. Four our purposes, it is necessary to note three 
points of Wight’s analysis. The first element is Wight’s emphasis on the institutional 
unity of medieval politics. He recognises a strong cultural unity which was associated 
with the Christian religion. The term societas Christiana characterises precisely such a 
religious unity. This sense of spiritual unity was the basis of the Holy See political 
power, which was confirmed by the doctrine of the Pope as dominus mundi, or ‘lord of 
all mankind’.1 In addition to the Christian unity, the ideology of empire was the other 
element that gave unity to medieval politics. Wight accepts the conventional argument 
that sees a continuity between the authority of the Roman Emperor and the authority of 
the medieval Holy Roman Emperor.2 The crucial episode in the connection between 
Rome and the medieval Empire was the coronation of Charlesmagne as Emperor in the 
Christmas Day of the eighth century. From this moment, the Holy Roman.Emperor 
claimed universal jurisdiction in temporal matters.3 Therefore, despite, Wight’s 
recognition of the existence of ‘an innumerable multitude of governmental units’, for 
instance he refers to the distribution of power among many political units, with some of 
them developing ‘the internal organisation and external claims which in due course gave 
birth to the conceptions of ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘state” , he clearly emphasises the 
‘unity rather than separateness’, ‘hierarchy rather than equality’, the Empire’s claim to 
universal jurisdiction in temporal matters, and ‘[t]he universal government of the 
papacy’.4 Wight even calls the Church ‘the real state of the Middle Ages’.5 It is in this 
sense that he quotes a medieval historian.
1 Martin Wight, Systems o f States, (edited by Hedley Bull, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977) 
pp.26-9.
2 The Papacy also claimed to be the successor of the Roman Emperors, which led to continuous struggles 
between the Holy See and the Holy Roman Emperor during the medieval period. See Wight, Systems of 
States, p.28.
3 Wight, Systems o f States, p. 27.
4 Systems o f States, pp.27-8.
5 Systems o f States, p.28.
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papacy’.4 Wight even calls the Church ‘the real state of the Middle Ages’.5 It is in this 
sense that he quotes a medieval historian.
This papal world monarchy was...the bridge builder between Roman and modem times. All the 
characteristic Roman features had impressed themselves upon the physiognomy of the papacy, the Roman 
Church. Not only the law; also the conception of the universality of government. It was as universal 
monarchs that the popes applied Roman principles, partly developed them, and partly created new ones, 
which have since gained universal recognition in international law.6
This suggests that Wight’s account of the medieval international society may be defined 
as a pluralist political society under the sovereign authority of both the Emperor and the 
Pope. In Wight’s terms, a ‘dualistic or double-headed suzerain states-system’.7 Thus, the 
emergence of the modern system of sovereign states had to wait for the collapse of both 
the papal and the imperial sovereign authority.
The second element in Wight’s argument is the emphasis on the replacement of 
a ‘single undivided societas Christiana’ by ‘international anarchy’ between secular 
states. This indicates that, as many others, Wight also underlines the stark discontinuity 
between an hierarchical medieval political society and the anarchical modern 
international society. There are, however, two points in Wight’s discussion on the 
transition from medieval to modem politics that could suggest a degree of continuity 
between the medieval and the modern international society. First of all, Wight sees the 
Council of Constance as marking the end of the medieval international society and the 
beginning of the process that will culminate in the emergence of secular sovereign 
powers. As he says, the Council of Constance
is the last Ecumenical Council of undivided Latin Christendom, whose failure to effect reform of the 
Church makes revolution inevitable. It attempts to reform the international system of Christendom, which 
is the papally-centralized Church. Its failure leads directly to the breakdown of the system and to rebellion 
within the Church.8
Although Wight associates the Council to the emergence of both secular authority and 
national states, he also refers to the international significance of Constance. More 
specifically, the Conciliar Movement is associated with a particular conception of
A Systems o f States, pp. 27-8.
5 Systems o f States, p.28.
6 Systems o f States, p.28.
7 Systems o f States, p.29.
8 Systems o f States, p. 132.
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international society. The Council of Constance attempted, in Wight’s words, ‘to 
provide a legal and regular constitution for the international system, a constitution on 
constitutionalist principles’.9 The term ‘constitutional’ clearly refers to the ‘Whig or 
constitutional tradition’ of international relations,10 which in turn suggests a continuity 
between some medieval ideas and practices and the modern international society. In this 
regard, the constitutional movement associated with the Council of Constance could 
have provided Wight with a chance to investigate the historical influence of the 
medieval constitutional tradition on the origins of modern international society. This 
would be particularly relevant given his attempt to define international society as a 
constitutional entity greater than the sum of its parts. Yet, Wight does not pursue this 
line of reasoning and in the end affirms that those early constitutionalist ideas only 
found recognition later in the domestic doctrine of constitutional sovereignty, which 
was adopted by Western European countries such as Holland and England. As he 
admits, those constitutional principles ‘have never yet transformed international life’.11
In addition, and contrary to other approaches that emphasise the discontinuity 
thesis, Wight locates the origins of modern international society, or states system in his 
terms, in the fifteenth century, more specifically in ‘the French invasion of Italy in 
1494’.12 Wight himself admits that, in opposition to his argument, there is an 
‘alternative starting-point’: ‘the Peace of Westphalia in 1648’.
In retrospect, Westphalia was believed to mark the transition from religious to secular politics, from 
‘Christendom’ to ‘Europe’, the exclusion from international politics of the Holy See, the effective end of 
the Holy Roman Empire by the virtual recognition of the sovereignty of its members...the beginning of 
the system of the balance of power. The prestige of Westphalia was buttressed by that of Grotius, whose 
reputation as father of international law was due to a work prompted by the same general war that 
Westphalia ended.13
Although implicitly Wight had probably many people in mind, explicitly this 
observation was directed at Bull.14 As he observes, ‘Hedley Bull made the existence of a 
body of international law a criterion of the states-system, and argued that the absence of
9 Systems o f States, p. 132.
10 See Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 89-131. See also the 
discussion above in chapter 2.
11 Systems o f States, p. 133.
12 Systems o f States, p. 151.
13 Systems o f States, p. 113.
14 In addition to the ‘Westphalian interpretation’, Wight also criticises a third answer, offered by F.H. 
Hinsley, which places the beginning of the modem states-system in the eighteenth century, pp. 150-2. See 
F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
99
such a body of law before the seventeenth century supported the Westphalian doctrine 
about the origin of the states-system’. However, according to Wight, Bull fails to see 
that ‘the states of Italy and Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not 
consider themselves as exempt from rules of law’.15
The disagreement concerning the chronological origins of modern international 
society could lead one to think that Wight’s conception of international society is 
significantly different from Bull’s. Indeed, Wight himself notes an important 
distinction. In terms of international political history, Wight’s alternative permits to 
identify the origins of modern international law in the medieval law. Thus, we find 
again the hypothesis of continuity between the medieval and the modern international 
society. However, in the end these two points are not sufficient to distinguish Wight’s 
from the conventional Westphalian interpretation. First of all, as we saw, Wight accepts 
the thesis of the break between the medieval and the modern political systems. 
Secondly, in opposition to the hierarchical medieval international society, he defines 
modern international society as an anarchical states system. It is in this sense that his 
alternative in the end is nothing more than yet another variant of the Westphalian 
interpretation. The chronological moment of the break is different; but otherwise, the 
definition of the political system of sovereign states is essentially the same, as it is the 
stress on an absolute break between medieval and modern international society. In the 
words of Wight, modern ‘international anarchy’16 arose from the ruins of the medieval 
international monarchy.17
The emphasis on the unitary sovereign state is the third point of Wight’s 
historical account. The statist approach appears in a clear way in Wight’s discussion of 
Pufendorf s notion of states system, which opens the first chapter of his Systems o f 
States. Interesting enough, Wight recognises that Pufendorf used the term ‘states 
system’ in a double way. In a broad way, ‘states system’ is equated with the inclusive 
notion of ‘the family of nations’; and in a narrow way, it refers to ‘unions’ and 
‘confederations’ of states. The relevant point here is the fact that Wight chooses to study 
the historical evolution of the first, and never considers the historical relevance of the 
second meaning of the term ‘states system’. I shall not be concerned at this point to 
explain the significance of this second meaning of the term for our understanding of 
modern international society, for this will be the focus of chapter 5 of this thesis. For the
15 Systems o f States, p. 147.
16 Wight, Systems o f States, p. 133.
17 Systems o f States, p. 131.
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moment, I merely wish to stress the statist option taken by Wight, which deeply 
influenced the subsequent work of the English school.
Wight’s choice is obvious when a few paragraphs below he refers to Heeren’s 
work on the historical evolution of the ‘political system of Europe’.18 Indeed, Wight 
adopts Heeren’s definition of a states system: ’The union of several contiguous states, 
resembling each other in their manners, religion, and degree of social improvement, and 
cemented together by a reciprocity of interests’.19 We see in this definition a central idea 
that strongly marked the work of the English school: modern international society is the 
result of the emergence of the modem states system. As a consequence, the central 
institutions of the English school’s conception of international society are 
characteristically statist, such as balance of power, great powers, diplomacy, and 
international law, defined in a very positivist way. This is clear not only in the most 
comprehensive work on the notion of international society published by any member of 
the English school, Bull’s The Anarchical Society, but also in Wight’s further 
discussion on the nature of the modern system of states.20 For instance, whereas in 
‘Western Values’, besides the sovereign state, the members of international society are 
also individuals, minorities, and other types of political organisations, in the Systems o f  
States, sovereign states are the only members of modern international society. 
Comparing with the argument that he put forward in ‘Western Values’, there is thus a 
clear statist turn in Wight’s thought. After Wight’s work on the emergence of the 
modern states system, it was Bull who mostly developed the statist conception of 
international society.
The creation o f modern international society: civilising the states system
As in Wight’s case, in Bull’s account of the origins of modern international society, the 
emergence of the states system results from the collapse of the hierarchical medieval 
political system. Such a historical account has two defining moments. The first is the
18 A.H.L. Heeren, A Manual o f the History o f the Political System o f Europe and Its Colonies (London: 
1833).
19 Systems o f States, p.22. For Heeren’s definition, see ^ 4 Manual o f the History, p.vii. The impact of 
Heeren’s work on Bull’s definition of international society is clear and acknowledged by Bull himself.
See The Anarchical Society, pp. 12-3. For the general influence of Heeren on the work of the English 
school, see also Adam Watson, ‘Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies’, Review o f  
International Studies, 13 (1987), pp. 147-53; and Adam Watson, The Evolution o f International Society, 
p.7.
20 In chapter 5 of the Systems of States, Wight identifies as the institutions of the modem system of states, 
sovereign states themselves, the great powers, diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power.
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• 21creation of the basic element of modern politics, the sovereign state. The second 
moment is the consequence of the first: sovereign states, by consenting to common 
institutions, give origin to a society of states. In these two moments, we notice the 
ontological priority given to the sovereign state by Bull’s historical narrative. The 
subsequent story is basically the consolidation of this statist international society. 
During the time of Grotius, there was still a solidarist society where the distinction 
between domestic and international politics was not entirely clear; but later, during the 
eighteenth and particularly the nineteenth centuries, the pluralist international society 
was consolidated, and a positivist conception of international law replaced a more 
naturalist one.
Bull’s historical narrative starts with the transition from the medieval to the 
modern politics, which corresponds to the period that Bull calls the ‘Christian 
international society’.22 Such a society is characterised by the following features. It 
rests, first, on Christian values. Second, there is ‘[n]o clear guidance’ regarding the 
members of international society. Third, natural law was considered to be the central 
source of international law. Finally, the doctrine of the just war, specifically in the case 
of ju s  ad bellum, denoted a solidarist approach to the use of force in international 
relations. In intellectual terms, Bull identifies the Christian political society with the 
‘tradition of natural law’23, in which the central figure was Grotius. This explains in part 
why the Dutch thinker emerges from this narrative as an ambivalent thinker. On the one 
hand, there is the ‘modern’ Grotius, one of the founding fathers of modern international 
law, who, as we will see below, is identified with the ‘Westphalian moment’ in modem 
international politics.24 On the other hand, there is the ‘medieval’ Grotius, who could 
not escape the influence of Christian values, and whose views concerning the members 
of international society were unclear.25
Between the Christian international society and the European international 
society, there was, in Bull’s view, a period characterised by power politics, which was 
marked by the religious and dynastic wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
This is the period that Wight calls ‘the interval of political realism’.26 For Bull, there 
was already a states-system, ‘which must be dated from the appearance of sovereign
21 The Anarchical Society, p.31.
22 The Anarchical Society, pp.27-32.
23 The Anarchical Society, p.28.
24 This view is clear in Hedley Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations’, 
in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992).
25 Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.66.
26 Systems o f States, p. 148.
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states whose behaviour impinged on one another’, and which ‘began at least as early as 
the late fifteenth century’.27 Yet, there was not an international society in the sense of 
states following legal rules in their mutual relations. The modern society of states only 
emerged in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia.
In Bull’s historical account, the Peace of Westphalia occupies a privileged place 
in the sense that it marks the beginning of the modern international society. Two 
elements should be stressed: on the one hand, the modernity of the society of states, in 
opposition to medieval political society; and, on the other hand, the societal nature, in 
opposition to the ‘interval of realism’ of the early modern states system. The modernity 
of the Peace lies in its crucial role in the development of a statist international society, 
in the recognition of the emergence of secular principles to manage international 
politics, and lastly in the establishment of a body of rules to be applied to the states 
system as a whole.28 Moreover, the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck also marked the 
historical transition from an international system of power politics to an international 
society of common norms and institutions. ‘What the Peace of Westphalia did 
mark...was the emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere 
international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them 
in their relations with one another’.29 Therefore, the historical significance of the Peace 
of Westphalia derives from its recognition of the emergence of the modern international 
society.30 The central consequences of such a historical triumph were the establishment 
of ‘the rule of non-intervention, the rule of the equality of states in respect of their basic 
rights, and the rights of states to domestic jurisdiction’;31 the emergence of a positivist 
approach to the sources of international law, based on the practice of the states, which 
replaced the older naturalism; and the abandonment of the ‘solidarist assumptions 
inherited from medieval times’, with the consequent recognition of ‘the unique 
characteristics of the anarchical society’.32
In Bull’s view, at the level of political thought, there was a related process of 
clarification concerning the nature of modern international society. Bull adopts an 
intellectual historical narrative, borrowed from the discipline of International Law, 
which is built around the evolution from legal naturalism towards legal positivism. It is
27 ‘The Importance of Grotius’, p.75.
28 Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius’, pp.75-8.
29 ‘The Importance of Grotius’, pp.75-6.
30 According to Bull, ‘the idea of international society... was given concrete expression in the Peace of 
Westphalia’, ‘The Importance of Grotius’, p.75.
31 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.37.
32 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.35.
103
in this context that the lineage Grotius-Vattel-Oppenheim is highlighted. After the 
association between the Peace of Westphalia and international law, Bull brings the third
• * • 33central element into his account of the origins of modern international society: 
Grotius, the international lawyer (this time the ‘modern’ and not the ‘medieval’ 
Grotius).
The idea of international society which Grotius propounded was given concrete expression in the Peace of 
Westphalia, and Grotius may be considered the intellectual father of this first general peace settlement of 
modem times.34
The concepts of international society and international law were initially given a distinct 
and fundamental treatment by Grotius, albeit firmly within the natural law tradition. 
Later, Vattel elucidates a number of conceptual confusions found in Grotius’s thought, 
in particular concerning the membership of international society. Whereas Grotius did 
not develop clear criteria regarding the membership of international society, Vattel 
defined it as being composed by sovereign states. In a certain sense, Vattel makes 
Grotius’s work to be simultaneously modern and medieval. ‘Modem’ in the sense that 
Vattel develops ideas initially discussed by Grotius; and ‘medieval’ for Vattel clarified 
the concept of modern international society in ways that Grotius was not able to do. Yet, 
this does mean that the work of Grotius is to be dismissed. For Bull, Grotius remains
• • • 35one of the founding figures of the ideas of international law and international society.
Moreover, Vattel’s contribution was also insufficient, particularly in the sense 
that his thinking was also firmly placed within the naturalist tradition. Thus, the second 
stage in the development towards a pluralist conception of international society 
occurred during the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, 
when international legal positivists, such as J. J. Mozer and Von Martens, replaced 
natural law by the authoritative practices of states, like custom and treaties, as the 
source of international law. The idea of natural law was definitely abandoned and both
33 The three elements are clearly linked by Bull: ‘the Westphalia treaties demonstrated in practice, just as 
Grotius has done in theory, that the independence or sovereignty of states was not incompatible with their 
subjection to law’, ‘The Importance of Grotius’, pp.77-8.
34 ‘The Importance of Grotius’, p.75. Bull also recognises that there are elements in the Treaties that are 
not ‘consonant with the doctrines of Grotius’, such as the balance of power, the idea of diplomatic 
conferences, and the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio, p.76.
35 Bull refers to Grotius’s work as ‘one of the classical paradigms’ of international relations, characterised 
by ‘the idea of international society’ and ‘the notion that states and rulers of states are bound by rules’, 
‘The Importance of Grotius’, p.71. Positivist international lawyers also share this view. For instance, 
Lassa Oppenheim calls Grotius ‘the father of international law’ and considers De Jure Belli Ac Pads to 
be an ‘immortal work’, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’, The American Journal 
o f International Law, 2, (1908), p.316.
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the positivist nature of international law and the pluralist character of international 
society were accentuated.36 At this point, the modern conception of international society 
was recognised by early twentieth century international legal positivists, such as 
Oppenheim, from whose work Bull derived the inspiration to build his pluralist 
conception of international society. We shall see now that, according to Bull, it was this 
idea of the society of states that expanded throughout the world.
The expansion o f modern international society: extending the states system
‘Was the states-system...world-wide from the beginning? Did it include all mankind? 
Was Prester John... a member of the society of princes?’37 These are the questions that 
Wight raises to address the question of the geographical boundaries of the modern states 
system. What is quite interesting in Wight’s argument is that it tries to escape the 
‘orthodox answer’, developed mostly by positivist international lawyers during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Wight does this by considering a radical critique to 
the orthodox thesis, put forward in the 1960s by C.H. Alexandrowicz.38 Although Wight 
qualifies Alexandrowicz’s argument, in the end he is quite sympathetic to it. For the 
twentieth century orthodox thesis, the expansion of international society only started 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, after the consolidation of the modern 
states system in Europe. The ‘orthodox answer’ will be further discussed below, for the 
moment it is enough to stress two points of that answer. First, despite political, 
diplomatic and commercial contacts since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries between 
Europeans and non-European rulers, it is not possible to identify a global international 
society until the twentieth century, and the post-colonial age. Secondly, the expansion
36 It should be noted that I am only summing up Bull’s account of the evolution of the thinking about the 
idea of international society. This does not mean that I agree with it. There are some points that must 
indeed be disputed. I would point to the interpretation of Vattel’s thought, which seems to be highly 
disputable. Yet, given that Vattel does not have a central role in my subsequent reformulation of the 
concept of international society, this point shall not concern me here. Two works that have recently 
suggested a different interpretation of Vattel are Andrew Hurrell, ‘Vattel: Pluralism and Its Limits’, in Ian 
Clark and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), Classical Theories o f International Relations (London: Macmillan, 
1996), pp.233-55; and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For the intellectual narrative adopted by Bull, which is 
summarised here, see, among international lawyers, John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles o f 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894), pp.30-77; and J.L. Brierly, The Law 
o f Nations: An Introduction to the International Law o f Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), pp.25-41. 
Among International Relations scholars, see Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations o f States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). For Bull’s own account, see The Anarchical Society, 
pp.27-40.
7 Wight, Systems o f States, p. 115.
38 See C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations in the East Indies 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
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of international society followed the extension of the modern states system. In 
accordance with the ontological priority given to the sovereign state, the acquisition of 
sovereign statehood by former colonies is the fundamental condition for the expansion 
of the modern society of states. Alexandrowicz disputes this view, and although his 
explicit goal is to reject the thesis of the ‘late expansion’, in the end his argument, albeit 
implicitly, also counters the ‘statist argument’.
Alexandrowicz starts by noting that ‘European-Asian relations developed to a
• • • • 39considerable extent on a footing of equality’; in particular, legal equality. When the 
Portuguese first arrived in East Indies, they realised that it would not be possible to deal 
with local rulers on the basis of ‘legal titles such as discovery, occupation or...Papal 
donation of overseas territories’.40 Local communities were politically and legally 
organised according to the sovereign rule, and had their own legal systems, both 
domestic and international. This state of affairs obliged the Portuguese, and 
subsequently the Dutch, the English and the French, to enter into bilateral dealings and 
to conclude legal treaties with local sovereign rulers. In this regard, according to 
Alexandrowicz’s analysis, early writers such as Bodin, Grotius, Serafim de Freitas and 
Vattel recognised the sovereignty of the Asian political communities and the need to 
regulate relations between Europeans and Asians in the framework of the law of 
nations.41 For instance, despite their many disagreements, both Grotius and Freitas 
emphasised the sovereign status of the East Indian political communities in the law of 
nations.42 Such a recognition by these early writers, argues Alexandrowicz, shows that 
the political encounter between Europeans and Asians deeply influenced the 
development of the discipline of the ‘law of nations’. Crucially, the establishment of 
diplomatic and legal relations between European and Asian political communities gave 
a character of universality to the classical works on the law of nations.43 According to 
Alexandrowicz, the existence of legal treaties between European and Eastern rulers 
demonstrates the universal character of the law of nations and that a global international 
society, working on the basis of common legal rules, existed before the nineteenth 
century, more precisely since the early expansion during the sixteenth century. To 
consider that the political communities of East Indies were not part of international 
society is to view the origins of the society of states ‘in the light of positivist
39 An Introduction to the History o f the Law of Nations, p. 1.
40 Alexandrowicz, j 4/? Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations, p. 14.
41 An Introduction to the History o f the Law of Nations, chapters 2 and 3.
42 An Introduction to the History o f the Law of Nations, p.229. See the discussion in chapter 3.
43 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the Law o f Nations, p. 9. Moreover, according to Alexandrowicz, the 
cultural encounter also contributed to the secularization of the law of nations, see p.231.
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conceptions which were only bom at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries’.44 The consequence was that those non-European political communities 
which ‘had enjoyed a full legal status’ within pre-nineteenth century law of nations 
became in the nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries ‘candidates for admission’ to 
membership in international society.45
Alexandrowicz’s thesis is significant still in a further point, which is made in an 
implicit way. Although Alexandrowicz is clear that he is discussing ‘principles of inter­
state relations’,46 his analysis of the development of the law of nations also questions 
the conventional treatment of sovereign statehood as an absolutist and unitary political 
institution. Given the complex network of legal and political relations between local 
communities in East Indies, the first challenge faced by Europeans at their arrival in 
Asia concerned the classification of sovereignty in the region. The need to negotiate and 
to conclude treaties with local rulers made such a task still more important. Applying 
the category o f ‘suzerain-vassal relations’, Europeans found three classes of sovereignty 
between absolute unitary sovereignty and non-sovereign status 47 Quite significantly, 
these intermediate types of sovereignty were included in some of the more notable 
classical treatments of the law of nations. For instance, in his classification of sovereign 
authority, Bodin includes the vassal rulers, distinguishing between ‘tributary princes’, 
‘princes under protection’, and ‘vassals of various degrees of dependence’.48 Likewise, 
Vattel addressed in his work on the law of nations treaties of protection between 
sovereign political communities, through which there is a temporary shift of sovereign 
powers, most of the times in the area of military defence.49 As Alexandrowicz observes,
Vattel in his Droit des Gens refers to the duties of a superior or protecting State vis-a-vis a dependent 
State and emphasizes that should the superior ‘assume greater authority over the weaker one than the 
treaty of protection or submission allows, the latter may consider the treaty as broken and provide for its 
safety according to its discretion’.50
44 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law o f Nations, p .ll.
45 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law o f Nations, p. 10 and p.235.
46 An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations, p.2.
47 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law o f Nations, pp. 15-6.
48 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law o f Nations, p.31.
49 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the Law o f Nations, p.22. It is important to use the expression 
‘temporary’, for Vattel believed that ultimately sovereignty remains in the people. Thus, we have here a 
case where a popular conception of sovereignty, hence undivided, may result in practices, through legal 
agreements, where the marks of sovereignty are shared by different institutions. As in many other similar 
cases, although this may sound strange to the late modem hear, we should probably take this treatment 
seriously, and modify our view of modem international political history, instead of condemning Vattel’s 
view as yet another example of the medieval hangover that has not passed the test of ‘modem history’.
50 An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations, p.22.
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This observation is directly concerned with the degree of equality that exists 
even among different classes of sovereign communities and how the law of nations 
protects the weaker part.51 Yet, for our discussion the point that has to be stressed is the 
idea that sovereign authority may be shared by different political institutions, as a result 
of the conclusion of treaties of protection. Normally, those treaties covered situations 
where a given political community abdicated of a mark of sovereignty, such as for 
instance the right to make war, to other sovereign community (which in turn had to 
protect the first community from external threats) but at the same time kept other 
sovereign attributes such as the legislative activity, the administration of justice, the 
exercise of financial authority, the capacity to treaty making, and the right to send and 
receive diplomatic envoys.52 The inclusion of these cases in the law of nations is 
significant for it demonstrates that the existence of different types of sovereignty, and of 
cases of divided sovereignty, was not considered by classical writers as medieval 
anomalies but as an integral part of modern international society. Thus, we have an 
image with different types of states and various constitutional organisations of 
sovereign authority. A picture with absolute monarchies, republics, confederations, 
suzerain and vassal states living together is considerably different from the conventional 
one of an anarchical political system composed of absolutist and autonomous sovereign 
states. Interesting enough, such a view was accepted by authors often identified with 
absolutism and a statist approach to international politics, such as Bodin and Vattel. The 
point that it is essential to make now is that the idea of divided sovereignty, which, as it 
will be shown in chapter 5, occupies a central place in a republican conception of 
international society, was a central element in the law of nations at least until the 
nineteenth century. Moreover, this also shows that international society does not have to 
be anticipated by the emergence of a states system of like-units, as it is conventionally 
believed.
Although Wight partly accepts Alexandrowicz’s argument, he also thinks that it 
needs a qualification. In order to qualify Alexandrowicz’s radical answer, Wight refers 
to cases where the practice among European rulers was considerably different from the 
practice between European and non-European rulers.53 This observation leads Wight to 
adopt the thesis of the ‘dual nature’ of modern international society, with ‘two
51 See the discussion in Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations, pp. 151-3, 
and p.231.
52 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations, p.24, p.37, and p.231.
53 Systems o f States, p. 123.
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concentric circles, European and universal’.54 Wight sees his thesis as following 
Grotius’s idea of the ‘dual states-system’: a Respublica Christiana on the one hand, and 
the natural society of human race on the other. The former rested on deeper common 
interests which derived from both a common religion and a common culture, and has 
developed a more comprehensive legal system. The latter has less common interests and 
is ruled by natural law, which may in some occasions give origin to positive law, such 
as ‘treaty relations’.55 Wight’s treatment of Alexandrowicz’s thesis shows that, first, he 
accepts the early expansion of modern international society. Secondly, it also proves 
that, for Wight, such an expansion was not preceded by the formation of a European 
states system, as it is believed by positivist legal thinkers. On the contrary, the early 
development of international society was associated with ideas such as universalism and 
natural law. However, such an argument was abandoned by the British Committee in its 
later period, when its members, under the leadership of Bull and Adam Watson, 
discussed the ‘expansion of international society’. Again, a less conventional approach, 
embraced by Wight, was abandoned in favour of a more statist approach.
During the 1970s, Wight’s colleagues embraced and developed the ‘orthodox 
answer’. Indeed, the opening sentence of The Expansion o f International Society leaves 
no doubts. ‘The purpose of this book is to explore the expansion of the international 
society of European states across the rest of the globe’.56 This sentence reveals the 
central ideas of the ‘orthodox thesis’: first, the European origins of international society, 
in the sense that the institutions and practices of modem international society were 
historically established in the context of relations among European political 
communities; secondly, the late expansion of modern international society, which 
became universal only after the second half of the nineteenth century; thirdly, the statist 
nature of international society, in the sense that the expansion of the modern society of 
states followed the universalisation of the modern states system. Reflecting the strong 
link between theory and history in the work of the English school, this orthodox thesis 
rests on three historical claims. First, the establishment of the modern states system is 
historically located in early-modern Europe, after the collapse of the medieval political 
system. This historical event was followed by two developments. On the one hand, the 
creation in Europe of a society of states, based on common institutions and practices, 
after the Peace of Westphalia, as we saw; and on the other hand, the formation of
54 Systems o f States, p. 118.
55 Systems o f States, pp. 125-7.
56 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’, in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion 
o f International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.l.
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colonial empires as a result of the European expansion to the outside world. People such 
as Alexandrowicz, and to a certain extent Wight, would also agree that the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries witnessed both the formation of modern international society and 
the establishment of colonial empires, but they believe that these two processes deeply 
influenced each other.
What is striking in Bull’s and Watson’s analysis, and what distinguishes it 
specially from Alexandrowicz’s, is that they managed, to a great extent, to keep the 
formation of modern international society and the European expansion on separate 
tracks. It is true that they briefly note that the development of the European state system 
and the European expansion ‘were simultaneous processes, which influenced and 
affected each other’.57 Yet, this mutual influence is limited to European politics. For 
Bull and Watson, the European maritime expansion, which started still under the 
shadow of the medieval imperial threat, helped to consolidate the states system and to 
defeat the hegemonial principle in Europe.58 As for any impact on the early formation of 
international society as a whole, Bull and Watson remain silent, and this is indeed a 
disturbing silence. We actually find in Bull’s and Watson’s account of the European 
expansion the same ontological separation that for some separate domestic from 
international politics. Whereas the establishment of colonial empires was a matter that 
concerned only the relations between each imperial power and its colonies, and not the 
development of international society as a whole, the formation of the society of states 
occurred exclusively in the relations between European powers, and left the colonies out 
of it. In a certain way, one can conclude that, for the orthodox thesis, the process of 
colonisation was mainly the continuation of domestic politics.59 At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, European expansion had, in Bull’s and Watson’s words, ‘established 
the domination of one of the several regional international systems that existed in the 
fifteenth century over the others...a domination that united the whole world into a 
single economic, strategic, and political system for the first time’;60 and at the core of
57 Bull and Watson, ‘Introduction’, p.6.
58 Bull and Watson, ‘Introduction’, p.6, and Adam Watson, ‘European International Society and Its 
Expansion’, p. 16.
59 For instance, Watson is quite clear regarding both the separation between European expansion and the 
formation of a society of states and the view that colonization was a continuation of domestic politics of 
the European colonial powers. He refers to the ‘three centuries of competitive maritime exploration and 
expansion and the parallel evolution of a European international society’ (my emphasis). He also notes 
that the Europeans ‘incorporated the New World from the beginning into their system of administration 
and government. It became an extension of Christendom’. See ‘European International Society and Its 
Expansion’, respectively, p.32 and p. 18.
60 Bull and Watson, ‘Introduction’, p.7.
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this system, there was a group of European sovereigns that constituted a society of 
states.
We arrive here at the second and the third ideas of the orthodox thesis: the late 
expansion, and the statist nature of such a process. The transformation of ‘domestic’ 
colonial relations into international relations only occurred during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries with the processes of decolonisation. Moreover, the acquisition of 
absolute unitary sovereign statehood, through political independence, was the essential 
condition to enter into a society of states. Indeed, we can distinguish two different 
moments in Bull’s and Watson’s account of the ‘entry of non-European states into 
international society’ First, before becoming members of international society, the new 
states had to enter into the modern states system.
The expansion of Europe, from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth...gradually brought into being an 
international system linking the various regional systems together...This did not mean, however, that 
there yet existed a universal international society.61
Thus, according to Bull, between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, modern 
history witnessed the emergence of an ‘expanding international system’, but not the 
creation of a universal ‘international society’.62
The second moment regards the entry of non-European states into international 
society through legal and diplomatic recognition. Here, the English school relies on the 
idea of standards of civilisation, developed in the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth centuries by international legal positivists. According to such a criterion, 
‘non-European states entered an originally club of states as and when they measured up 
to criteria of admission laid down by the founder members’.63 Thus, by accepting its 
rules and institutions in the second half of the twentieth century, non-European states 
became members of the society of states established by European states.64 This is, then, 
the account of the expansion of modern international society provided by the English 
school. The society of states ‘was originally confined to Western Christendom out of 
which it grew’. Its global expansion had to wait for two necessary conditions: first, the 
creation and consolidation of its institutions in Europe; secondly, the acquisition of 
sovereign statehood by its non-European members.
61 ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, in Bull and Watson (eds.), The Expansion o f  
International Society, p. 117. My emphasis.
62 ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, p. 117.
63 Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, p. 123.
64 As Bull says in The Anarchical Society: ‘In the twentieth century international society ceased to be 
regarded as specifically European and came to be considered as global or world wide’, p.38.
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What is quite odd is that, even without having carefully considered 
Alexandrowicz’s arguments, Bull simply dismisses his thesis, which defends the early 
emergence of a universal international society. This is still more surprising given that 
Alexandrowicz’s starting-point is precisely a decision of the International Court 
confirming the legal validity of a Treaty signed between the Portuguese monarch and 
the Maratha ruler in 1779.65 It is based on this juridical decision that Alexandrowicz 
elaborates his view that the encounter between Europeans and Asians gave origin to a 
set of mutual treaties and common rules to regulate their relations, in accordance with 
the law of nations. By rejecting Alexandrowicz’s account of the expansion of modern 
international society, Bull and Watson show that their conception of international 
society is statist in a double sense. First, it rests on the view that the emergence of the 
states system anticipates the formation of international society. As it is clear in Bull and 
Watson, the world wide extension of the states system occurs in a previous moment to 
the expansion of international society. Secondly, by ignoring how the early modern Law 
of Nations incorporated the relations between Europeans and non-Europeans during the 
early period of European expansion, Bull’s and Watson’s conception of international 
society ignores the idea of divided sovereignty and treats sovereign statehood 
exclusively in unitary and absolutist terms.
This first part of the chapter discussed, therefore, how the account of the 
historical evolution of modem international society reflects a statist conception of 
international society. The sovereign state and the states system emerged out of the 
disintegration of imperial medievalism. A group of states, originally in the state of 
nature, given the collapse of medieval political society, established an international 
society among them; and this society of states only expanded after non-European 
communities became sovereign states. In other words, the universalisation of the states 
system preceded the expansion of the society of states. It is now time to discuss, first, in 
more detail Bull’s pluralist conception of the society of states, and then the most serious 
theoretical problems of the English school’s statist approach to the study of international 
society.
Bull’s pluralist conception of international society
Bull’s pluralism was initially developed in ‘The Grotian Conception o f ‘International
65 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the Law o f Nations, pp.4-5.
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Society’, presented in April 1962 to the British Committee66 He starts by saying that 
his aim is to contrast ‘the doctrine of Grotius himself with that of Lassa Oppenheim, a 
‘representative’ of the international legal positivist school.67 Bull discusses the 
contribution of the Dutch thinker through the work of twentieth century ‘neo-Grotians’, 
in particular Lauterpacht’s article on ‘the Grotian tradition in international law’.68 This 
demonstrates that Bull’s intention was, as he himself said, ‘to consider the adequacy’ of 
the ‘prescriptions’ of the ‘twentieth century neo-Grotians’.69 In this regard, it may be 
helpful to briefly discuss Lauterpacht’s article on the ‘Grotian legal tradition’.
According to Lauterpacht’s historical interpretation, the Grotian tradition of 
international law, to which Grotius’s work, mainly De Jure Belli ac Pads , has crucially 
contributed, emerged during the seventeenth century. Lauterpacht develops an 
interesting and revealing reading of the double role of the Dutch thinker. Grotius was 
not only the interpreter of the modern states-system, but he also formulated a legal and 
an ethical system that has served as a standard of progress for world politics. On the one 
hand, responding to the collapse of the medieval political system and the rise of the 
modern territorial state, Grotius put forward a notion of international society defined by 
the rule of law. In Lauterpacht’s words, ‘a system of law governing the relations of the 
independent states’.70 De Jure Belli ac Pads ‘was the first comprehensive and 
systematic treatise on international law’.71 According to Lauterpacht, Grotius went 
further and built a programme, or a paradigm, about the application of the rule of law to 
international politics, which, if applied, can bring a considerable measure of progress to 
world politics. This shows not only the achievement of Grotius’s intellectual 
contribution but also the reformist nature of his work.
[T]he principal and characteristic features of De Jure Belli ac Pads are identical with the fundamental 
and persistent problems of international law and that in nearly all of them the teaching of Grotius has 
become identified with the progression of international law to a true system of law both in its legal and in 
its ethical content.72
66 Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp.51-73.
67 Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.52.
68 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’.
69 ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.51.
70 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 17. This would of course correspond to the broad notion of ‘Grotianism’ 
used by the English school. See, for instance, Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.53; and Wight, 
International Theory, pp.233-4.
71 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 17.
72 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 19.
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It was the ‘reformist Grotius’ that gave origin to what Lauterpacht calls the ‘Grotian 
tradition’, and what Bull named the ‘solidarist’ conception of international society.
However, to pursue Lauterpacht’s historical narrative, the development of the 
states system between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries did not follow the 
reformist Grotian project.
Undoubtedly, the general picture of international relations in the two centuries that followed the 
publication of De Jure Belli ac Pads was not one pointing to any direct influence, in the sphere of 
practice, of the essential features of the Grotian teaching.73
Instead, that period of history saw the rise of both the doctrine of ‘reason of state’ and 
the theory of international legal positivism.74 This state of affairs considerably changed 
during the twentieth century, which has witnessed the eventual triumph of some of the 
ideas associated with the Grotian tradition through their integration into positive 
international law, most notably in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in the 
United Nations Charter. In particular, Lauterpacht emphasises, the acceptance of the 
‘distinction between just and unjust wars’, and the related recognition of the ‘doctrine of 
qualified neutrality’, ‘introduced by the Covenant of the league of Nations, the Pact of 
Paris of 1928, and the Charter of the United Nations’.75 In addition, Lauterpacht stresses 
the integration of the idea of human rights and of the principle of humanitarian 
intervention in the Charter of the United Nations.76 The legal recognition of these 
doctrines makes Grotius’ thought a relevant contribution to the study of international 
relations in the twentieth century. As Lauterpacht himself observes, the inspiration 
which for more than three centuries has emanated from Grotius’s work ‘had by no 
means become a thing of the past’ 77 To oppose Lauterpacht’s ‘Grotian tradition’, or the 
solidarist theory of international society, Bull develops his pluralist conception of 
international society.
For Bull, there are three central differences between these two conceptions of 
international society. The first concerns the treatment of the origins of wars. Whereas 
solidarists apply criteria of justice to the causes of wars, pluralists reject the doctrine jus  
ad bellum, and affirm that to recur to war is a ‘prerogative right of sovereign states’.78
73 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 16.
74 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, pp.34-6 and p.39.
75 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p.36.
76 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p.46.
77 ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 16.
78 Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.54.
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Secondly, as for the sources of international law, pluralists abandon the idea of natural 
law, stressing the role of custom and treaties.79 The final difference appears in the 
question of membership of international society. Pluralists reject the solidarist inclusive 
view, to which individuals are also members of international society, and claim that 
such a membership is restricted to sovereign states. Therefore, Bull’s definition of the 
pluralist conception of international society, as in opposition to the solidarist one, is 
based on three points. First, states are the only members of international society, which 
again shows that for Bull the society of states is anticipated by the emergence of the 
system of states. Moreover, sovereign statehood is defined in absolutist and unitary 
terms. Secondly, a positivist approach, stressing the consent of states, concerning the 
sources of international law. Thirdly, a treatment of the just causes of war that rejects 
the assumption of solidarism among states.
Before we move to the final part of the chapter, it is necessary to introduce a 
qualification. Given Bull’s strong statist position, it would seem appropriate to identify 
the pluralist conception of international society with realism. Indeed, on a number of 
occasions, Wight himself identified legal positivism with the tradition of realpolitik. 
However, a careful comparison between the two approaches shows clearly the 
difference between Bull’s pluralism and the realist theory. The distinction between 
Bull’s pluralism and realism starts to be clear when we realise that both pluralism and 
solidarism have something in common. They are both critical of the tradition of 
realpolitik, arrived at the Anglo-Saxon world during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Bull himself is quite careful in distinguishing his criticism of solidarism from 
the realist critique. Legal pluralism is, says Bull, ‘opposed to the tradition of Realpolitik, 
according to which there is no international society but rather an international state of 
nature in which states are without binding obligations in their relations with one
on #
another’. Indeed, this reminds Bull’s criticism of realists in ‘Society and Anarchy’, 
which was discussed in the last chapter.81 Moreover, Bull does not equate the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ with idealism, as for instance Hans Morgenthau does.82 What Bull tried to do 
with the category of pluralism was to rescue some elements of the Grotian legacy, such 
as for instance the importance of the rule of law in world politics and the view that 
anarchy is compatible with society, from the work of the ‘neo-Grotians’ and to place 
those elements within the legal positivist framework. Yet, and this point is crucial, such
79 Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’, pp.66-7.
80 ‘The Grotian Conception’, p.53.
81 See chapter 2 above.
82 See chapter 1 above.
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a reformulation of the Grotian tradition occurs within the broad rationalist tradition, and 
as part of a debate among members of the English school who adopted alternative 
conceptions of international society.
We can now define Bull’s pluralist conception of international society. It is 
exclusively composed by unitary sovereign states, which in historical terms are seen as 
ontologically prior to international society. In other words, states emerged within a 
condition of political anarchy, and subsequently created international society. Thus, 
international legal rules must receive the consent of states. The central institutions of 
this society of states are the balance of power, diplomacy, the great powers, 
international law, and war.83 Contrary to realists, Bull claims that there can be society in 
anarchy; in opposition to Wight’s ‘Western Values’, this society is not a truly political 
society, but only an ‘anarchical society’. Yet, such a view faces some major problems.
Problems with the English school’s statist conception of modern international 
society
The distinction between international society and international system
The distinction between international society and international system became one of 
the most distinct contributions of Bull to the study of world politics. For Bull,
A society o f  states... exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common 
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.84
On the contrary, an international system exists
Where states are in regular contact with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between 
them sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other, then 
we may speak of them forming a system.85
83 For a discussion of the role of international institutions in Bull’s thought, see R.J. Vincent, ‘Order in 
International Politics’, in J.D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent (eds.), Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.49-56.
84 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
85 The Anarchical Society, p. 10.
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From these two definitions, it is quite clear that what distinguishes the two notions is the 
normative nature of the former. While the idea of international society is characterised 
by the existence of common values, rules, norms and institutions, the notion of
international system merely expresses interactions between states based on calculations
• • • 86 of power, being indeed very similar to the realist notion of state of war.
It is interesting to note that the distinction between international system and
international society does not appear in the early work of the English school. For
instance, it is ignored by Wight in Systems o f States. Wight only uses the notion of
states-system, which has the same meaning of international society. Nor the distinction
appears in Bull’s early papers, presented in the British Committee, where the central
distinction is between a solidarist and a pluralist conceptions of international society.
The distinction only emerges as a central idea in Bull’s The Anarchical Society. It seems
to me that Bull makes this distinction for three reasons. First, to distinguish his
approach from both realism and behaviouralism.87 The distinction allowed Bull to
distance his approach from both the American realist and positivist traditions, by
stressing the elements of co-operation and collaboration, and the normative dimension
of international politics.88 Secondly, such a distinction was useful for Bull’s historical
analysis, where according to his account there are two cases that illustrate the existence
of an international system. One of the examples, as we saw above, is found in early
modern Europe, more precisely in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, when the element of society collapsed, and was only reconstituted with the
Peace of Westphalia.89 The other example, also discussed earlier, is provided by the
nature of the relations between European states and non-Christian communities, during
the expansion of European imperialism.90 In particular, the condition of international
system is clearly visible in the relations between Europeans and the Ottoman Empire.
The third and final reason, and perhaps the most important, that explains the distinction
between international system and international society is related with Bull’s concern
86 For recent discussions on the distinction between international society and international system, see 
Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory 
Meet the English School’, International Organization, 47 (1993), pp.327-52; Alan James, ‘System or 
Society?’, Review o f International Studies, 19 (1993), pp.269-88; Richard Little, ‘Neorealism and the 
English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment’, European Journal o f 
International Relations, 1 (1995), pp.9-34, and Richard Little, ‘International System, International 
Society and World Society: A Re-evaluation of the English School’, in B. A. Roberson (ed.), International 
Society and the Development o f International Relations Theory (London: Pinter, 1998), pp.59-79.
87 The Anarchical Society, p. 12.
88 See Stanley Hofmann, ‘International Society’, in Miller and Vincent (eds.), Order and Violence, pp.22- 
6 .
89 See Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius’, pp.75-8.
90 See Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, pp. 117-22.
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about the survival of modern international society in a post-colonial age.91 For Bull, 
international system, in the sense of the state of war, is a condition in which world 
politics falls if the international consensus on common normative standards collapses. 
This indicates that Bull used the concept of international system to illustrate what would 
be the condition of world politics in the case of the breakdown of the society of states. 
In this regard, for Bull, this third sense of the notion of international system constitutes 
an ideal-type to which international political reality should never correspond. At this 
point, it is important to raise two questions: why did Bull believe, in first place, in the 
possibility that international society could dissolve? And, why the result of such a 
dissolution would be a political condition characterised by the idea of international 
system? One can follow two lines of inquiry, and both are important for my argument.
The first line of inquiry leads one to ask whether it is possible to conceptualise 
international politics in non-normative terms, that is, as an international system. In 
answering this question, we realise that the distinction between international society and 
international system is a typical case that confuses more than it illuminates. This can be 
seen using an argument developed by Bull himself. When in the very beginning of The 
Anarchical Society, Bull elaborates on the elementary and primary social goals that 
define political societies, the conclusion is that any kind of social contact results into the 
emergence of those goals. In other words, it would be impossible for states to have 
‘sufficient contact between them’ without developing elementary and primary social 
goals and common institutions to deal with those goals. To a certain extent, Bull himself 
admits so when he says that the international system constitutes ‘a whole’ and that states 
are part of it, and are in ‘regular contact’.92 Regular contact necessarily results into 
social life, unless one reduces such a contact to a permanent state of warfare, which Bull 
does not do. Then, if there is social life, it has to be arranged in such a way that it 
‘promotes certain goals or values’.93 This, therefore, suggests the ‘inevitability of 
international society’ as a result of any kind of regular social or political international 
interaction. In other words, the idea of an asocial international system, without a 
normative structure, does not make sense, and this was precisely what Bull argued 
against realists in ‘Society and Anarchy’. Alan James made a similar point when he 
argued that it is not possible to define international system as a political system without 
rules, without communication among its members, and without a sense of common
91 For the threat posed by the ideological conflict of the Cold War, see The Anarchical Society, pp.257-60. 
For the challenge from die post-Colonial states, see ‘The Revolt against the West’.
92 The Anarchical Society, pp.9-10.
93 The Anarchical Society, p.4.
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interests.94 Moreover, even historically, it is not accurate to refer to an international 
system. As Watson argued, the relations between European states and the Ottoman 
Empire were regulated by a common set of rules, common institutions and diplomatic 
conventions.95 Watson’s claim suggests that, in historical terms, the idea of a minimal 
pluralist international society is more adequate than the notion of international system to 
characterise the relations between Europe and the Ottomans. Wight himself seems to 
agree with Watson and James and never distinguishes between an international system 
and an international society, but between different forms of international society. As 
James, Watson, and Wight, I believe that no distinction should be made between 
international system and international society; it is, in James’s words, a ‘distinction 
without a difference’.96 In this regard, only the term international society should be 
used.97
However, although I agree with some of James’s points, it seems to me that his 
definition of international society, in some crucial elements, is similar to Bull’s pluralist 
conception; that is, it is also quite statist. For James, international society is the 
‘collectivity of states’.98 This leads us to the second venue of investigation, which is to 
question the statist ontology behind the idea of international system. According to Barry 
Buzan, we cannot avoid the ‘boundary issue’,99 in the sense that, historically, there have 
existed different types of international societies, with some being socially and politically 
more integrated and having more societal institutions. Yet, and accepting Buzan’s point, 
even if we cannot ignore the boundary issue, one can still ask, why should we start from 
the idea of international system? I suspect there is an ultimate reason that made Bull and 
makes Buzan to start from the idea of an international system: they both conceptualise 
international society in a strong statist way. Here, the term statist means the belief that a 
pre-social and pre-normative condition necessarily anticipates the emergence of 
international society, which corresponds to the second defining element of the statist 
approach identified above in the introduction of the thesis. The problem is not so much 
the view that states create international society. It is obvious that, in practical terms, 
states, or rather their rulers and diplomats, play a vital role in establishing the normative 
structure of international society. The problem is the assumption that sovereign states
94 James, ‘System or Society?’, pp.272-6.
95 See Watson, ‘Hedley Bull’
96 James, ‘System or Society?’, p.272.
97 James, ‘System or Society?’, p.278. Bearing in mind that Wight’s ‘system of states’ means 
international society, James seems to follow Wight’s view.
98 ‘System or Society?’, pp.281-6.
99 Buzan, ‘From International System’, p.345.
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emerge and act in a pre-societal and pre-normative condition. In other words, this 
problem results from the ontological priority given to the state over international 
society; or in Alexander Wendt’s terms, the belief that states are ‘ontological primitive 
agents’.100 Now, Bull does not seem to be able to escape this problem, for he 
simultaneously assures us that, originally, states are in the state of nature, and that an 
international social and normative domain only emerges with the establishment of the 
society of states. Bull’s views can be explained by recurring to the conventional liberal 
language. Initially, states are in the original condition, and then through a form of 
international contract, they forge the international normative structure. Therefore, the 
idea of international system expresses the condition of autonomous states interacting 
without a normative structure, which ultimately reveals the view of states as ontological 
primitive agents.
Moreover, as we saw with Bull’s historical account in the first part of this 
chapter, this is not merely an hypothetical condition. Historically, the original condition 
corresponds to the period after the collapse of medieval imperialism, when until the 
creation of international society states are seen as interacting in a social and normative 
vacuum. The Peace of Westphalia marks the moment of the international contract that 
constitutes the society of states.101 This is, however, in historical terms, a mistaken 
view. For instance, during the Thirty Years’ War, which for Bull is part of the period of 
the original condition and of the state of war, one of the most important political 
practices was the conclusion of treaties. The signature of treaties normally occurred 
after long negotiations, characterised by the respect for social conventions and by 
agreements and disagreements on legal rules and political norms. This picture does not 
seem to describe a pre-social and pre-normative condition. Equally, the norms approved 
during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Westphalia were not created by states 
living in the state of nature. Those norms were the result of existent political ideas and 
beliefs, which strongly determined what was decided in Munster and Osnabruck. If we 
do not grasp this, we hardly understand not only the character of the Peace of 
Westphalia but also the nature of early modern international relations. However, Bull 
argues that states are, at least in an initial moment, insulated from any broader 
normative or social context. This explains why Bull is not able to abandon the idea of 
international system altogether, even if a substantial part of his argument, as we saw,
100 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
101 Watson refers to the multilateral conferences that preceded the Peace of Westphalia as the ‘original 
international contract’, ‘Hedley Bull’, pp. 147-8.
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would logically lead to do so. We can now give a single answer to the two questions 
raised above. Bull believed that international society could dissolve and if so that it 
would fall into an international system because his starting point is a pre-social and pre- 
normative condition, which corresponds precisely to the idea of international system, or 
state of nature.
Given that during the history of modern international society there have been 
important differences of societal integration in the domains of rules, institutions, 
interests and values, we still need to distinguish these distinct normative configurations. 
An alternative position would be to reformulate the ‘boundaries issue’ as, for instance, 
Andrew Hurrell has recently done between ‘a minimalist conception of international 
society’, ‘a pluralist conception of international society’, and ‘a solidarist conception of 
international society’102, which seems to follow the early work of the British 
Committee. This formulation of the boundaries issue, implicitly, rejects that the state of 
nature, in the sense of a pre-societal and pre-normative condition, has ever existed in 
historical terms. We need to discuss now a related problem found in the work of the 
English school: the distinction between international society and world society. As the 
distinction between international system and international society, it also ultimately 
stems from the statist conception of international society.
Clarifying the distinction between international society and world society
Before I proceed with the discussion in this section, let me briefly say what the term 
‘world society’ means here. In the work of the English school, we can find at least five 
different meanings of world society. First, the idea of world order in the sense that it 
affects ‘the great society of all mankind’. Secondly, the belief that ‘the ultimate units of 
the great society of all mankind are...individual human beings’. Thirdly, the view that 
certain universal principles of order and ‘cosmopolitan’ values of ‘right or good’ apply 
to ‘the world as a whole’. Fourthly, the notion that it is possible to envisage forms of 
‘universal political organisation’ that connect the world in institutional terms, which 
may fall short of a world government but certainly go beyond the system of sovereign
103 »states. Finally, the idea of world society is associated with an imperial political order. 
One of the central issues in this context regards the relation between international
102 See Andrew Hurrell, ‘Society and Anarchy in the 1990s’, in Roberson (ed.), International Society, 17- 
42.
103 See The Anarchical Society, pp.20-2, pp.84-6, andpp.252-4.
121
society and world society, in particular whether they are compatible or not.104 The 
English school is somehow confusing in the treatment of this issue. On the one hand, 
Wight affirms in Systems o f States that an effective international society must be 
underpinned by a common universal culture; and Bull notes that ‘If international order 
does have value, this can only be because it is instrumental to the goal of order in 
human society as a whole’.105 Thus, while for Wight the existence of a world society, 
even if it is minimal, is a condition for the existence of an international society; for Bull, 
the moral value of international society largely rests on its capacity to fulfil the goals of 
world society. In any case, in these two examples, the two ideas are compatible. 
However, on the other hand, the school sometimes argues that world society is 
ultimately opposed to international society. In an illustrative way, Bull sees, as in 
contrast to the idea of international society, forms of world society that may serve as 
‘alternatives paths to world order’;106 and in his lectures on International Theory, Wight 
consistently identifies cosmopolitan theories of world society with the tradition of 
revolutionism.
Here, I focus on the third, the fourth, and fifth meanings of the term world 
society. Respectively, the existence of universal principles of order and cosmopolitan 
values of ‘right or good’ that apply to the world as a whole, forms of ‘universal political 
organisation’ other than the states system, and the idea of an imperial political order. As 
in the case of the general idea of world society, the relation of the English school with 
universal principles and cosmopolitan values is also complex. If on some occasions, 
those principles and values seem to be compatible with the idea of international society, 
on other occasions they are presented as clashing notions. In this last case, the 
conclusion is that there are clear limits within the normative and political framework 
provided by international society to implement universal values and principles. Such a 
conclusion is associated with two points that appear in the English school’s vision of 
modern political history: the identification between medieval international society and 
political imperialism, and the view that the modern sovereign state is, in ontological 
terms, a primitive agent. One of the implications of the latter view is that the state is 
self-constituted. In this way, universal principles and cosmopolitan values, which 
supposedly originate outside those self-constituted agents, may constitute a threat to the 
identity of states. Such a belief is reinforced by the view of medieval international
104 See the discussion in Little, ‘International System, International Society and World Society’.
105 The Anarchical Society, p.22.
106 See, in particular, part 3 of The Anarchical Society.
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society as a double-headed political system, dominated by imperial institutions, such as 
the Holly Roman Empire and the Papacy. The English school tends to see the process of 
state building in early modern Europe as opposed to medieval imperialism, and quite 
rightly so. Given that both the Emperor and the Pope claimed that they were the 
symbols of universal principles and cosmopolitan values, one of the unfortunate 
consequences, in the work of the English school, is the identification, at the intellectual 
level, between medieval imperialism and cosmopolitanism and, at the political and 
normative level, between medieval imperialism and forms of universal political 
organisation other then the states system. Therefore, not only the modern sovereign state 
formed its political identity, initially, in an autonomous way, but it was also the case 
that the system of states emerged in opposition to cosmopolitan and universal principles 
and values.
The identification between medieval imperialism and cosmopolitan and 
universal principles and values, by the English school, has far-reaching implications. 
Given that the modern states system emerged as a reaction against medieval 
imperialism, cosmopolitan principles and universal values threaten the survival of the 
society of states. It is in this sense that projects of universal political order other than the 
states system are understood as forms of ‘neo-medievalism’ and cosmopolitan theories 
constitute the tradition of revolutionism. The association between cosmopolitan political 
ideas and medieval political society was initially formulated by Wight when he referred 
to the liberal internationalism of President Wilson.
When we study the origins of the states-system, we see that the Wilsonian view prescribes for the future a 
reversal of the historical development of the past. Western civilization began with an impressive system 
of ‘world government’ within the limits of Western Christendom, in the shape of papal monarchy.107
Therefore, for Wight, the break between the medieval imperial international society and 
the modern anarchical states system corresponds to the distinction between the 
traditions of revolutionism and rationalism. In this regard, the medieval empire becomes 
the historical example of the revolutionist projects that threaten the idea of a society of 
states.
A familiar aspect of the intellectual history of the modem European states-system lias been the way in 
which its theory has fallen into three main traditions. Those whose outlook has been missionary and 
messianic have emphasized the ideal unity of international society as the standard for condemning the
107 Systems o f States, p. 149.
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empirical divisions within the society and believing them to be transitory. They implicitly repudiate the 
validity of the states-system.108
Wight’s identification between cosmopolitanism and revolutionism is deeply 
problematic. The problem is not so much to associate some revolutionist theories with 
forms of universal empires. As we shall see later in the thesis, the republican political 
tradition itself largely emerged as the result of reactions against projects of universal 
monarchy. The problem lies rather in Wight’s inclusion of all political theories which 
have cosmopolitan elements within the revolutionist tradition. This provokes three 
serious shortcomings in Wight’s account of the history of political thought. Contrary to 
the argument put forward in ‘Western Values’, it leads him to oppose the idea of 
international society to cosmopolitan and universal principles and values. In this regard, 
and secondly, he is unable to fully explore the potentialities of the so-called rationalist 
authors, for all of them have clear universalist elements in their thought. Finally, it leads 
him to ignore past political traditions that offer the possibility of building a conception 
of international society able to integrate both statist and non-statist and universalist 
elements.
Conclusion
This chapter told how statist conceptions of international society, respectively Wight’s 
system of states and Bull’s pluralist society of states, replaced Wight’s conception of 
international political society during the evolution of the English school’s work. The 
statist approach was firmly established after the first period of the British Committee, 
which ended in 1962.109 Until 1962, it is possible to find two alternative approaches to 
the study of international society. As we saw in the last chapter, in ‘Western Values’, 
Wight developed the idea of international political society. To such a conception, 
international society is understood as a constitutional whole greater than the collection 
of states. Its members include states, individuals, minorities, and political organisations 
other than the sovereign state. In addition, such an international political society rests on 
‘an international social consciousness’ and ‘is the most comprehensive form of society 
among men’.110 In opposition to Wight’s conception, Bull formulated the notion of
108 Wight, Systems o f States, pp. 3 8-9.
109 For this part of the English school’s historiography, see Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A 
History o f  the English School (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.89-135.
110 See Wight, ‘Western Values’, pp.95-105.
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society of states, which was initially presented in ‘The Grotian Conception’, and 
received its full elaboration later in The Anarchical Society.
A society o f states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions.111
This statist conception of international society is related with a shift in the 
intellectual focus of the school, from a broadly defined rationalist tradition to the legacy 
of Heeren and to international legal positivism. For the German historian, the history of 
the ‘Political System of Europe’ is the history of states’ mutual relations,112 and 
international legal positivists adopt the doctrine of the exclusive state personality; in this 
sense both views reinforce the statist approach. The statist turn of the school lasted until 
the last period of the British Committee, which originated the publication of The 
Expansion o f International Society. In this volume, the notion of international society as 
a society of states remains the same.
By an international society we mean a group of states which not merely form a system, in the sense
that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established 
by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize 
their common interests in maintaining these arrangements.113
As this chapter argued, one can identify two major problems with the school’s 
statist approach to the study of international society. First, the English school starts from 
the assumption that international society is the product of a contract among a group of 
sovereign states originally in the state of nature. It is true that the spread of the 
sovereign state in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries considerably 
affected the nature of international society, but to equate modem international society 
and the modern states system is, in my view, historically inaccurate. As I briefly 
suggested, sovereign states did not emerge in a social and political vacuum, but rather in 
an already constituted international political society with a normative framework. In 
important ways, such an identification is simultaneously narrow and vague. Narrow,
111 The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
112 Heeren, The Political System of Europe, p.5. For Wight’s adoption of Heeren’s definition of the states 
system, see The Systems o f States, pp.21-2. In The Anarchical Society, Bull also identifies his conception 
of society of states with Heeren’s notion of states system, pp. 12-3.
113 ‘Introduction’, Bull, Watson (eds.), The Expansion O f International Society, p.l.
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because the idea of international society, as modem political history demonstrates, is 
more inclusive than it is suggested by the notion of state systems. Vague, because, even 
accepting the statist nature of modern international society, it is not enough to define it 
as an anarchical political system composed of sovereign states. To adequately study the 
nature of modern international society, we need to distinguish between different types 
of states, different forms of international institutions, and finally between different 
normative and political principles, values, and practices. The combination of all these 
elements certainly produces different political orders within modern international 
society, and these differences, it seems to me, do matter. Now all these distinctions are 
ultimately the product of intellectual categories and political practices embedded in an 
international political society greater than the society of states.
The incapacity to see that the states system emerged, developed and changed in 
the context of a broader international political society brings us to the second major 
problem found in the statist conception of international society adopted by the English 
school. If we are able to grasp that historically the states system is part of a greater 
international political society, we realise that cosmopolitan ideas influence the nature 
and the evolution of the states system. If, on the contrary, we equate the states system 
with international society, we end up, as the English school does, with the view that 
cosmopolitan theories are a threat to the existence of international society. As I shall 
argue in the second half of the thesis, this is a historical error for cosmopolitan ideas and 
principles have constituted, in crucial ways, the norms and practices of the society of 
states, and as such have been an integral part of modem international society.
In this way, the statist argument constitutes a hindrance to the complete 
development of the idea of international society. It seems to me that to fully explore the 
idea of international society, we need to dissociate the origins of modem international 
society from the emergence of both the idea of sovereign statehood and the notion of 
states system. To develop a satisfactory conception of international society, we can 
briefly return to Wight’s conception of international political society offered in 
‘Western Values’. Instead of a ‘society of sovereign states’, presented by legal 
positivists, and adopted by the school, in particular by Bull, after the statist turn, which 
in fact ‘denies the existence of an effective international society’, Wight refers to a 
conception of international society, where states are ‘parts of a greater whole’.114 For 
such a conception, first of all, sovereign states are not necessarily the ‘ultimate units’ of
114 Wight, ‘Western Values’, p.95.
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international society.115 In this regard, modern international society is not equated with a 
states system, but rather the modern states system is part of a wider international 
society. Secondly, in ‘Western Values’, Wight is also very critical of the legal positivist 
doctrine that considers states as ‘the only international persons, the only subjects of 
international law’. For Wight, ‘certain institutions other than states have attained a 
rudimentary international personality’, including ‘public international unions’, 
international organisations, individuals and minorities.116 Thirdly, Wight criticises the 
view that sees foreign policy as ‘essentially self-regarding, and all international action’ 
as ‘self-help’. For those who embrace the conception of an international political 
society,
It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broadened meaning: it can be 
enjoyed and pursued in common. Foreign policy will take some account of the common interest. It 
becomes possible to transfer to international politics some of the categories of constitutionalism."7
In the rest of the thesis, I will further develop these three ideas. This will be done 
in the light of how the early modern republican political tradition discussed international 
relations. In this regard, from this moment, what I have been called the conception of 
international political society will gradually become a republican conception of 
international society. As I argued, Wight never built on these suggestions, nor did any 
other member of the English school. I believe that a redefinition of the notion of 
international society along the lines of the republican political tradition allows to 
recover Wight’s goals and thus to reformulate the concept of international society. In 
chapter 4 ,1 will discuss the republican conception of reason of state, which includes the 
notion of common political good, emphasised by Wight. In chapter 5, I consider the 
importance of international institutions other than the unitary sovereign state, such as 
international confederations, which are characterised by the sharing of sovereign 
authority, challenging what Wight calls the doctrine of exclusive state-personality. In 
chapter 6, by addressing the idea of international respublica, I will try to show that for 
republicans international society is greater than ‘the sum of its parts’.
The result shall be a less statist conception of international society, which 
abandons the ontological divide between domestic and international politics. As we saw
1,5 Wight, ‘Western Values’, p.92.
116 ‘Western Values’, p.101.
117 ‘Western Values’, p. 103. It should be stressed that a political theory of international society lias to be 
distinguished from ‘theories of world government’: ‘international constitutionalism’ is to be achieved ‘not 
through the creation or imposition of an international government, but by the collective action of the 
members of international society inspired by a clearer recognition of their legal duties’, p. 105.
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so far in this thesis, the work of the English school has quite successfully challenged the 
first consequence of the ontological divide, the absence of a normative conception of 
world politics, and thereby questioned the first point of the statist approach, the 
identification between international relations and the state of war. However, the move 
towards the notion of society of states led the English school to accept the other three 
implications of the ontological separation. First, as we saw, the sovereign state, as an 
ontological primitive agent, precedes international society. Secondly, the modern 
Westphalian political system is understood as being exclusively composed of unitary 
sovereign states. Finally, although the English school never treats the idea of national 
interest as resting purely on states’ self-interests, it never explicitly develops an 
alternative conception of reason of state. Moreover, the belief that states are primitive 
agents, which emerged in the state of nature easily leads to the view that political 
interests are autonomously defined. By further exploring the idea of international 
society in the light of the republican political tradition, the task of the rest of the thesis is 
to dispute these views.
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CHAPTER 4: RAISON D ’ETAT  AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMON
GOOD
The concept of reason of state refers, first of all, to the principles that guide the 
behaviour of sovereign states in international society. In this regard, it is a question of 
statecraft that any international political theory has to address. As I affirmed in the 
introduction of the thesis, it is important to discuss the notion of reason of state as part 
of our attempt to formulate a conception of international society that escapes the 
ontological divide between domestic and international politics.1 The attempt to 
reconcile self-interest with the international common good was one of the contributions 
of the English school to the study of international relations. This is clear, as it was noted 
in the end of the last chapter, in Martin Wight’s ‘Western Values and International 
Relations’, where he makes a connection between the idea of ‘responsible statecraft’ 
and the ‘international social consciousness’. For Wight, responsible statecraft means the 
pursuit of the state interest in accordance with the common good: ‘Foreign policy will 
take some account of the common interest’.2 Such a responsible statecraft, continues 
Wight, occurs in three ways. States must act, first, in accordance with the principles of 
international society; secondly, respecting the institutions of international society; and, 
thirdly, collectively. This expresses the belief that order and security are enjoyed and 
pursued in common. It also explains why Wight defends the institution of 
multilateralism, being at the same time quite critical of unilateral and bilateral strategies 
to maintain international order.3 Such a non-realist conception of reason of state was 
never explicitly developed by subsequent work of the English school.4 The purpose of 
this chapter is to investigate how the republican political tradition may help us in 
developing such a conception. Given that the idea of reason of state is often identified 
with realism, the republican conception will be distinguished from the realist one. In
1 See the introduction above.
2 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 103.
3 Wight, ‘Western Values’, p. 103.
4 More recently, among the new generation of international society theorists we find attempts to explicitly 
develop a non-realist theory of statecraft. In particular, it is worth noting Robert Jackson’s notion of 
‘situational ethics’, and Andrew Linklater’s idea of the ‘good international citizen’. See, respectively, 
Robert H. Jackson, ‘The Political Theory of International Society’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 110-28; and Andrew Linklater, 
‘What is a Good International Citizen?’, in Paul Keal (ed.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (St. Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp.21-43.
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particular, it will be argued that the distinctiveness of the republican conception of 
reason of state results from the centrality given to the idea of international virtue, which 
rarely appears in contemporary discussions on external statecraft.
To trace such a republican conception, and specially to separate it from the 
realist conception, is not a simple task. Much of the difficulty is clear, for instance, in 
Machiavelli’s thought. The Florentine thinker was, at once, a distinct republican thinker 
and the founder of the modem idea of reason of state.5 This would not be problematic if 
the conception of reason of state formulated by Machiavelli was impeccably republican. 
Yet, things are far from being that clear, and in fact Machiavelli’s republicanism and his 
view of reason of state are often opposed. It is widely believed that there was not one 
but ‘two Machiavellis’: ‘the republican citizen and the author of The Prince’.6 
Throughout modem history, most of the attention has focused on the latter rather than 
on the former, which even gave origin to the term ‘Machiavellism’. Indeed, the fact that 
such a term was chosen as the title of the English translation of the classic analysis of 
the modem doctrine of raison d'etat, by Friedrich Meinecke, shows the ‘realist’, so to 
speak, reputation of Machiavelli.7 Although this chapter does not attempt to correct the 
prevailing view of Machiavelli, nor to clarify the relation between the ‘two 
Machiavellis’, it is nevertheless important to start our discussion by addressing the 
ambiguity of the Machiavellian legacy. This allows us to see how the republican 
conception of raison d'etat, while building on some ideas developed by Machiavelli, 
also breaks with others in a fundamental way. This historical exercise opens the 
possibility of treating the idea of reason of state in non-realist terms, which has been 
almost ignored by contemporary International Relations theory.8 Such a conception of 
raison d'etat will be developed in the light of the early modern republican political 
tradition, associated in particular with the thought of Justus Lipsius. This constitutes the 
bulk of the chapter. In the last part of the chapter, I shall argue that the normative 
principles which guided France’s conduct during the Thirty Years’ War, and the
5 In the latter point, I am of following Meinecke’s view in Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The 
Doctrine o f  Raison d ’Etat and Its Place in Modem History (Translated by Douglas Scott, London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998). For a different view, which considers that the idea of reason of state 
existed long before Machiavelli, see Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Originality of Machiavelli’, in Isaiah Berlin, 
Against the Current: Essays in the History o f Ideas (Edited by Henry Hardy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), pp.25-79.
6 See Hans Baron, ‘’Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen and the Author of “The Prince’” , The English 
Historical Review, 76 (1961), pp.217-53.
7 Meinecke, Machiavellism.
8 There are, to my knowledge, two notable exceptions, who have explicitly treated the idea of reason of 
state in non-realist terms. John Vincent, ‘Realpolitik’, in James Mayall (ed.), The Community o f States 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp.73-84; and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘On the Notion of “Interest” in 
International Relations’, International Organization, 1, (1982), pp. 1-30.
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diplomatic negotiations that led to the Peace of Westphalia, were influenced by the 
republican conception of reason of state.
Two conceptions of raison d ’etat
Meinecke’s Machiavellism is a good place to start a discussion on the concept of reason 
of state. In the very first page of the book, Meinecke defines raison d'etat as ‘the 
fundamental principle of national conduct, the State’s first Law of Motion’, which ‘tells 
the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State’ 9 To 
consider the ‘well-being of the State’ as an ultimate political value is in accordance with 
most of the ethical doctrines of statecraft. The problem starts when Meinecke develops 
his definition. Power, continues the German historian, ‘maintenance of power, 
extension of power, is the indispensable means which must -  without any qualification 
-  be procured’.10 We note at once two points that cannot be ignored, and are indeed 
crucial. First, the belief that ‘maintenance of power’ can only be achieved by an 
‘extension of power’, which gives origin to an aggressive conception of reason of state. 
Yet, it is far from being clear that the ‘well-being of the State’ requires aggressive and 
offensive strategies and the continuous expansion of power. It may well be the case that 
defensive strategies, or policies directed towards ‘the maintenance of power’ without 
extending it, are the best way to protect the ‘well-being of the State’. At this point, then, 
a question arises: have all thinkers who used the language of reason of state treated the 
concept in offensive terms, or have some of them treated it in defensive terms? The 
second point that should be noted is Meinecke’s assertion, ‘without any qualification’. 
Again, was this assertion made by all those who have discussed the idea of reason of 
state? If  the answers to these questions show that some thinkers treated reason of state 
in offensive and others in defensive terms, and some in the context of moral 
qualifications and others ‘without any qualification’, then we may indeed conclude that 
there are two distinct traditions of raison d ’etat,n However, given that such a 
distinction is not obvious, to grasp it we need first to clarify the sources of the 
confusion.
9 Machiavellism, p. 1.
10 Machiavellism, pp.2-3.
11 According to Peter Burke, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was ‘general agreement that 
a line should be drawn between.. .two kinds of reason of state’: ‘good reason of state is what serves the 
common good, bad reason of state is what serves the individual ruler’. ‘Tacitism, Scepticism, and Reason
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The Machiavellian legacy
According to Quentin Skinner, chapters XV to XXIII of The Prince, which answer the 
question how should the prince ‘conduct himself towards others especially his allies and 
his own subjects?’, constitute ‘the most sensational and Machiavellian sections’ of the 
book.12 Here, Skinner means by ‘Machiavellian’ the conceptualisation of the doctrine of 
reason of state purely according to the logic of power politics. This definition of reason 
of state was the result of Machiavelli’s break with the early Renaissance humanist 
tradition of advice-books to sovereign rulers, which were deeply influenced by the 
political thought of classical Rome.13 In those chapters, Machiavelli explicitly 
repudiates the ethical traditions associated with classical republican thinkers, in 
particular Cicero. In chapter XV, Machiavelli clearly shows the orientation of his 
argument.
One should not be troubled about becoming notorious for those vices without which it is difficult to 
preserve one’s power, because if one considers eveiything carefully, doing some things that seem 
virtuous may result in one’s ruin, whereas doing other things that seems vicious may strengthen one’s 
position and cause one to flourish.14
In other words, ‘a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act 
immorally when this becomes necessary’.15 Machiavelli thus rejects those qualities and 
defends those vices, respectively, embraced and criticised by classical Roman thinkers.
In chapter XVI, Machiavelli argues that generosity, a crucial virtue to Cicero, 
can do the ruler great harm, and claims that in order to deal with power the prince has to 
be ready to ignore such a virtue. Following such an assertion, in chapter XVII, 
Machiavelli turns to the vice of cruelty, which was denounced by another Roman 
humanist, Seneca, and affirms that cruel actions are sometimes necessary for a prince to 
maintain his government. Finally, in chapter XVIII, discussing whether a prince should 
honour his word, Machiavelli rejects the Ciceronian principle, which was to become a
of State’, in J.H.Bums (ed., with the assistance of Mark Goldie), The Cambridge History o f Political 
Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.481-2.
12 Quentin Skinner, ‘Introduction’ to Machiavelli, The Prince (Ed. by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.xv.
13 In Skinner’s words, The Prince made a ‘contribution to the genre of advice-books for princes which at 
the same time revolutionised the genre itself. See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern Political 
Thought, Volume One The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.l 18.
14 Machiavelli, The Prince, p.55.
15 Machiavelli, The Prince, p.55.
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foundational principle of the modem law of nations, that ‘the keeping of promises 
represents the foundation of justice’.16 Therefore, for Machiavelli, ‘wise princes are
• * * * I Vgoverned not by the requirements of the conventional virtues but rather by necessity’. 
This rejection of the classical political morality originated what Skinner calls ‘the 
Machiavellian revolution’, which gave rise to ‘the new morality’ of the sixteenth 
century.18 Such a moral revolution ‘embodies a new conception of how the crucial 
concept of virtu should be understood’: ‘To be a truly virtuoso prince is to be willing 
and able to do whatever is necessary for the preservation of one’s government’.19 In 
order for the prince to hold his position in power, the obedience to the dictates of 
necessity is raised to the fundamental principle of political morality. Moreover, this new 
morality often requires the prince to act ‘contrary to truth, contrary to charity, contrary 
to humanity, [and] contrary to religion’.20 It is thus obvious that Machiavelli’s political 
morality is radically flexible. We shall see later that for other theorists of the reason of 
state, the belief in moral flexibility would not mean the abandonment of all moral 
principles in name of state power. It is important to see now how Machiavelli’s ‘new 
morality’ is applied to international politics.
It was pointed out that there is a ‘republican version of power politics’, to which
2i  „ t 4
the main political goals are ‘greatness, expansion and glory’. Machiavelli is, 
undoubtedly, a key figure within it. In a consistent way, and based on the model 
provided by the expansionist Rome, he defended the ‘quest for empire’.22 In this regard, 
it is not surprising to see Machiavelli praising Ferdinand of Aragon’s policy of conquest 
during the second half of the fifteenth century.23 Indeed, for the Florentine thinker, the 
king of Aragon was the example of the ‘new Prince’: the ruler that simultaneously 
consolidates her/his domestic power and leads an external strategy of expansion.24 The 
defence of imperial expansion led Machiavelli to consider the Roman imperial policy as
16 Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 61-3.
17 Skinner, ‘Introduction’, p.xx.
18 See the discussion in Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.31-47.
19 Skinner, ‘Introduction’, p.xx. Elsewhere, Skinner defines Machiavelli’s view of virtu as the prince’s 
capacity ‘of varying his conduct from good to evil and back again as fortune and circumstances dictate’. 
The Renaissance, p. 138.
20 Machiavelli, cited in Skinner, Machiavelli, p.38.
21 See Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation o f the 
Labguage o f Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 127.
22 See Skinner, Machiavelli, pp.73-7.
23 On Ferdinand’s achievements, Machivavelli writes, ‘.. .he attacked Africa; he invaded Italy; and 
recently he has attacked France. Thus he has always plotted and achieved great things’. See The Prince, 
p.77. See also Michael W. Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace (London: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 100-1.
The Prince, Chapter XXI. Contrary to many other occasions in the early modem period, it is 
historically accurate to use also the term ‘her’ in this case for it was in fact Ferdinand of Aragon and 
Isabelle of Castille who both started the domestic unification of Spain and the expansion of the Spanish 
Empire.
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‘the model to be emulated’.25 Accordingly, Machiavelli devotes the entire Book Two of 
The Discourses to analyse ‘the growth of Rome’s empire’.26 It is important to 
emphasise two points at this moment, for they show the nature of Machiavelli’s theory 
of power politics, and also what later republican thinkers tried hard to avoid.
First, imperial strategies of conquest, as the ones praised by Machiavelli, give 
origin to an international state of war, as it is defined by the nineteenth century tradition 
of realpolitik and by contemporary realists.27 As Markus Fischer pointed out, in the 
work of Machiavelli, international politics is seen as ‘a struggle for domination which 
cannot be escaped’.28 It is this continuous and violent struggle for domination that
29obliges state not only to organise for war but also to expand externally. As a result, 
Machiavelli saw the attack as the best form of defence and placed a strong emphasis 
upon a policy of conquests and expansion. In other words, we see in Machiavelli’s 
thought the identification between preserving the state and enlarging the state, also 
found in the tradition of realpolitik, as it is noted by Meinecke. In their attempt to 
escape such a predicament, this point is always kept in mind by later republican 
thinkers, as we shall see below. Secondly, in Machiavelli’s thought, external conquest is 
associated with a warlike virtue. As Felix Gilbert put it, for Machiavelli, war is ‘the 
most essential activity of political life’, and in The Prince ‘we find nothing about the 
desirability of peace’.30 Moreover, the eagerness to engage in wars is a fundamental 
condition to maintain a republican domestic order: a virtuous republic must also be 
expansionist.31 As this suggests, the celebration of a warlike virtue is a typical attitude 
of a particular strand of republican political tradition, of which Machiavelli is a major 
figure. More than any other idea, it is this the notion o f ‘republican imperialism’, based 
on a policy of conquest and on a warlike virtue,32 that shows the intellectual connection 
between a specific republican tradition and contemporary realism. It also demonstrates 
that for some republican thinkers it is not possible to create a moderate and peaceful 
republican political order at the international level.
25 David Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
p.95.
6 See Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses (London: Penguin Books, 1970).
27 See the discussion above in chapter 1.
28 Markus Fischer, ‘Machiavelli’s Theory of Foreign Politics’, in Benjamin Franklin (ed.), Roots of 
Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p.248, see also pp.261-70.
29 See Machiavelli, The Discourses, book one, chapter 6, and book two, chapters 1-5.
30 Felix Gilbert, ‘Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers o f Modern 
Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.24.
31 See the discussion in J.G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 197-211. This belief is 
revealed in Machiavelli’s saying that a republic must have not only good laws, but also good arms.
32 See the discussion in Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace, pp. 103-5.
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In Machiavelli’s political thought, we also note a similarity between his notion 
of political morality and his views of external statecraft, as indeed it would be expected. 
‘The quest for power’ by the prince becomes ‘the quest for empire’ by the state. The 
association between the maintenance of the state and the expansion of its power, or in 
other words the incapacity to distinguish between defensive and offensive strategies, 
results in a conception of raison d'etat which does not include any concern for the 
international common good. In intellectual terms, by saying that external conquest and 
military virtues rank higher than a peaceful international order, Machiavelli was
• • • • • 33rebuking an older republican tradition, associated in particular with Cicero’s teaching. 
This point is particularly important for later republican thinkers consistently linked 
aggressive imperialism with state of war, and in opposition to such a view recovered the 
classical republican connection between the desirability for peace and defensive 
external policies. This resistance against expansionist imperialism involved an attempt 
to create a republican peaceful order at the international level, and hence to overcome 
the state of war. It is quite revealing that the ideology of imperialism, praised by 
Machiavelli in his discussion of Ferdinand of Aragon’s policy of conquests, was the 
main target of later republican thinkers in their attacks on the imperial project of the 
Habsburgs, the successors of Ferdinand.
Machiavelli’s realism is widely accepted, and quite rightly so, in contemporary 
International Relations. For one of the founding fathers of the discipline, E.H. Carr, 
‘Machiavelli is the first important political realist’ to ‘revolt against utopianism’; as 
such, continues Carr, he laid down the ‘foundation-stones of the realist philosophy’.34 
Wight used the term ‘Machiavellian’ to name the realist tradition of international 
theory.35 More recently, David Boucher and Michael Doyle restated the same view. For 
Boucher, Machiavelli is one of the central figures of modern ‘empirical realism’, and 
for Doyle, the Florentine thinker is the main example of the classical ‘fundamentalist 
realism’.36 There is, however, a crucial problem with this conventional interpretation. 
Because Machiavelli’s name is associated both with the tradition of power politics and
33 Viroli disagrees with this reading and offers an interpretation of Machiavelli’s views on foreign 
politics, which stresses its defensive character. See From Politics to Reason o f State, pp. 162-4; and 
Maurizio Viroli, ‘Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics’, in GiselaBock, Quentin Skinner and 
Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
pp. 159-61.
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (Papermacs Edition, London: Macmillan, 1981, 
initially published in 1939), p.63.
35 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, 
London: Leicester University Press, 1991), see in particular chapters 7,8, and 9.
36 See, respectively, Boucher, Political Theories, chapters 5 and 6, and Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace, 
chapter 2.
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with the notion of reason of state, it is concluded that reason d'etat is a typical realist 
concept. Historically, this is a problematic view. In other words, although 
‘Machiavellians’, in Meinecke’s sense, and non-Machiavellian republican thinkers both 
recur to the term raison d'etat, they use it with different meanings, and associate it with 
distinct political moralities. These crucial clarifications are still more difficult to grasp 
in the sense that in a vital point later republican thinkers built on Machiavelli’s 
contribution. The Florentine republican was probably the first modern political thinker 
to adopt in a systematic way a secular approach to political morality. The realm of 
politics is not to be constrained by religious virtues, but rather, in an ethical political 
order, religion must be subordinated to politics.37 As it will be discussed below, such a 
secular vision of politics is also vital for the republican conception of reason of state. 
But before we move to that idea, it is necessary to briefly see how the Machiavellian 
legacy of power politics was later recovered by the tradition of realpolitik.
From Machiavelli to realpolitik
The transformation of certain ‘Machiavellian’ themes, such as the quest for power and 
the defence of expansionist policies, into a theory of realpolitik is a huge topic that 
cannot be fully treated here. Indeed, Meinecke devoted a 433-page book to investigate 
such a topic. What I briefly seek to show is how those Machiavellian themes survived in 
modern political thinking, by being incorporated into a nationalist conception of raison 
d'etat. This point is in line with the claim I offered in chapter 1 concerning the 
nationalist nature of the realist theory of international politics. The impact of 
nationalism on the Machiavellian version of reason of state is clearly visible in 
Meinecke’s work, first of all in his definition of the state. ‘The State is an organic 
structure whose full power can only be maintained by allowing it in some way to 
continue growing; and raison d'etat indicates both the path and the goal for such a 
growth’.38
In fact, one of the central themes of Meinecke’s work is precisely how some 
ideas originally developed by Machiavelli were later integrated into the tradition of 
realpolitik, which emerged during the nineteenth century with the nationalist revolution. 
The nationalisation of the modern sovereign state, and the new idea of the national state,
37 On the relation between political and religious moralities, see Berlin, ‘The Originality of Machiavelli’.
38 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.l.
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gave a new meaning to the old Machiavellian conception of reason of state. Such an 
intellectual process culminates in Leopold Ranke’s work.39 In the nineteenth century, 
the idea o f ‘State-egoism’ acquired ‘great moral power’ and Ranke ‘saw in it the most 
powerful impulse’ in modern history.40 From Machiavelli, Ranke kept the idea of 
expansion: state power ‘must continue constantly to grow’.41 Another German historian, 
Hans Baron, who interestingly was a student of Meinecke, places Ranke’s contribution 
in the political context of nineteenth century Germany. He argues that Ranke believed 
that the author of The Prince was trying to show that only an expansionist conception of 
reason of state could protect Italy from foreign domination. The idea that national 
liberation could only be achieved through power politics and a ‘new prince’ served, for 
Ranke, as a guide for the unification of Germany. The Prince was praised by the early 
generation of the German realpolitik tradition as offering a political programme for 
national unification.42 Thus, Machiavelli’s defence of imperial expansionism fits 
perfectly into an aggressive nationalist ideology.
Towards the end of his book, Meinecke raises a crucial question: ‘But why does 
this old story... sound like a new story now when Ranke tells it?’43 The answer to this 
question lies in the national idea. Nationalism, says Meinecke, ‘created entirely new 
possibilities for power politics’.44 In this regard, ‘From Machiavellism to Nationalism -  
this could be described as the theme of the whole sinister development of which we 
have tried to clarify the earlier stages’.45 It is interesting to note that here Meinecke 
changes the tone of his language. What is on some occasions described as ‘moral 
progress’, like when he discusses German national unification, becomes now a ‘sinister 
development’.46 Such a change is confirmed by the hopeful note that Meinecke leaves in 
the conclusion of the book. We need
To take up once again the old question concerning the bounds of raison d ’etat, and present the desirable 
relationship between politics and morality in the manner in which it derives from the combination of 
historical investigation and experience.47
39 The argument here, of course, follows the claim made above in chapter 1.
40 Meinecke, Machiavellism, pp.385-6.
41 Ranke, cited in Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.386.
42 Baron, ‘The Republican Citizen and the Author of ‘The Prince” , p.219.
43 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.386.
44 Machiavellism, p.414.
45 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.410.
46 Meinecke was of course deeply influenced by German history. During the nineteenth century, when 
Bismarck -  ‘the master of modem raison d ’etat’ -  unified Germany the triumph of the national idea 
seemed indeed a moral progress; yet, from the perspective of the post-Great War, when Meinecke wrote 
his book, the defeat of Germany made nationalism to appear like a 'sinister development’.
47 Machiavellism, p.424. It is interesting to note that this is amazingly similar to Vincent’s conclusion in 
his shrot article on ‘realpolitik’.
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This remark reminds us that there is a second theme in Meinecke’s book. He 
also investigates how from the very beginning of modern political history some thinkers 
tried to reconcile the idea of reason of state with international principles and 
institutions, that is, rationalism in Wight’s sense. Indeed, Meinecke says in the 
introduction of his book that it is ‘the struggle for and against Machiavellism’ that he is 
going to describe.48 However, being a child of the age of nationalism, he could not fully 
escape the categories of realism and idealism and never referred explicitly to two 
conceptions of reason of state, but rather to raison d'etat and its opponents. In this 
sense, Friedrich Kratochwil is rather more helpful when he refers to an old political 
tradition that was able to include the idea of ‘public international interest’ within the 
concept of national interest.49 Let me now discuss how the early modern republican 
political tradition tried to achieve this.
Justus Lipsius and the republican conception o f raison d'etat
As we saw, one of the conclusions of Machiavelli, ‘the author of The Prince’, was that 
rulers must be prepared to do evil in order to achieve the good. Moreover, this belief 
was reinforced by the assumption that, contrary to domestic politics, in international 
politics there is no escape to that predicament. In relations with allies and enemies alike, 
the sovereign prince is bound to do evil in order to survive. The Machiavellian view, as 
Skinner observes, posed a ‘challenge which subsequent writers on statecraft have found 
it almost impossible to ignore’.50 In particular, later theorists of statecraft had to 
demonstrate that there is nothing intrinsic to international politics that necessarily 
requires ‘to do evil’. On the contrary, ideas such as virtue, justice, and the rule of law 
have a crucial place in relations between sovereigns. This is particularly true in the case 
of later republican thinkers who attempted to develop what can be named as the notion 
of ‘international virtue’: it is a political virtue for rulers to create and maintain an 
international respublica. This requires, first of all, a concept of reason of state which 
includes a concern for the international common good.
In this thesis, Justus Lipsius is considered to be a central figure in the 
development of the republican conception of raison d'etat. In this regard, his main
48 Machiavellism, p.ix.
49 Kratochwil, ‘On the Notion of “Interest”’, pp. 12-8.
50 Skinner, ‘Introduction’, p.xxiv.
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political work, Six Books o f Politics,51 will serve to illustrate the emergence of such a 
conception in early modern Europe, and how it affected international politics. Before, 
given the claim made here that Lipsius is a republican thinker, it is important to briefly 
address the argument of those who place him in the absolutist camp, in opposition to the 
ideology of republicanism. Indeed, it was observed that Lipsius’s political work is ‘the 
most elaborate and eloquent plea for princely rule’, which offered a ‘powerful 
repudiation’ of the republican arguments of those who supported the Dutch revolt of the 
sixteenth century against the Habsburgs.52 Given this assertion, it is essential to show 
how a thinker who defended domestic absolutism falls, in terms of international 
political theory, into the republic tradition. This is yet another example of the 
intellectual contradictions that mark the republican political tradition, as it has already 
been pointed out in the introduction of the thesis. In a certain sense, there is here a 
parallel, albeit in the opposite direction, with Machiavelli. Whereas the Florentine 
thinker developed a republican view of the domestic constitutional political 
organisation, but a theory of power politics when it came to foreign affairs; Lipsius, 
despite his defence of domestic absolutism, adopted a republican view about external 
statecraft. Lipsius may be seen as belonging to an intellectual tradition, which lasted 
until the beginning of the nineteenth century, that attempted to reconcile a monarchical 
form of government with republican values. Although republican thinkers tended to be 
aware of the potential disadvantages of monarchy, they still believed in the possibility 
of reconciling monarchical government with the republican spirit. It was in this context 
that terms such as ‘mixed constitution’ and ‘limited monarchy’ emerged. Finally, and 
crucially, Lipsius’s international republicanism appears in the way he uses a distinct 
republican language to discuss foreign politics.
Martin van Gelderen himself admits that Lipsius, following Cicero, adopted the 
republican ideas of prudence, virtue, and justice in his discussions of politics. He 
affirms that Lipsius’s ‘Neostoicism and republican theory had the same epistemological 
foundation’. They both ‘employed the same ‘language’ and used the same conceptual 
scheme and identical organising categories.’ It was merely ‘in arguing that the vitas 
civilis could only be attained in a political order that was marked by unified, virtuous
51 Justus Lipsius, Six Books o f Politics or Civil Doctrine, Written in Latin by Justus Lipsius: Which Does 
Especially Concern Principalities (Translated by William Jones, London: Richard Field, 1594).
52 Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought o f the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 180-7.
53 See the discussion in Blair Worden, ‘English Republicanism’, in J.H. Bums (ed.), The Cambridge 
History o f  Political Thought, pp.443-8.
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princely rule’, that Lipsius ‘plainly refuted republicanism’.54 These remarks show quite 
well that when Gelderen treats Lipsius as opposing republicanism, he is referring to 
Lipsius’s opposition to the creation of a republican political regime in the United 
Provinces, and not to intellectual major departures from the republican political 
tradition. Indeed, the conceptual language is the same. This places Lipsius squarely 
within the tradition of ‘Renaissance humanism’, more specifically within the classical 
‘mirror-for-princes tradition’,55 abandoned by Machiavelli in the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, with the authorship of The Prince. In other words, and 
notwithstanding some similarities between the two thinkers,56 Lipsius sought to recover 
the older tradition of reason of state, associated with classical republican authors, that 
was heavily attacked by Machiavelli. Lipsius’s break with the Machiavellian tradition 
of reason of state is noted by other historians of early-modern Europe. In his discussion 
of Dutch republicanism in the context of early-modern European political thought, Eco 
Haitsma Mulier argues that the ‘myth of Venice’ played a crucial role in the 
development of the republican ideology in the United Provinces.57 As many others in 
the Low Countries, Lipsius also praised Venice as an example of a moderate republic.58 
In particular, Lipsius admired the fact that Venice had always been peace-loving and not 
expansionist. This shows again the contrast between Lipsius and Machiavelli, for the 
second criticised Venice for its moderation and its inability to expand, as in opposition 
to the imperial Rome.59 Thus, contrary to Machiavelli, Lipsius showed a clear concern 
for peace over expansion, a quality associated with the republic of Venice.60 We have 
here an example of the disagreement between those, like Machiavelli, who favoured 
political constitutions that permitted the creation o f ‘commonwealths for expansion’ and
54 See Martin van Gelderen, ‘The Machiavellian Moment and the Dutch Revolt: The Rise of Neostoicism 
and Dutch Republicanism’, in Bock et al, Machiavelli and Republicanism, p. 219.
55 Gelderen, Dutch Revolt, pp. 181-5.
56 See Gelderen, ‘The Machiavellian Moment and the Dutch Revolt’, pp.209-10.
57 Eco Haitsma Mulier, ‘The Language of Seventeenth-Century Republicanism in the United Provinces: 
Dutch or European?’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages o f Political Theory in Early-Modern 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 179-95.
58 Mulier, ‘Dutch or European?’, p. 184.
59 Machiavelli’s comparison between Rome and Venice is discussed in Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 183-218.
60 This should not be understood as a denial of Machiavelli’s influence on Lipsius. According to Mulier,
‘ [i]n his work on government and the state [Lipsius] referred by name to Machiavelli as a sharp intellect, 
but immediately added a warning that his prince had taken the wrong road’, Eco Haitsma Mulier, ‘A 
Controversial Republican: Dutch Views of Machiavelli in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in 
Bock et al (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism, p.252. Moreover, Lipsius was in general influenced by 
the republican idea of secular political virtues, as it will be argued below.
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those, such as Lipsius, who defended constitutions suitable for ‘commonwealths for 
preservation’.61
Among the recent work of the historians of political thought, it is Richard 
Tuck’s Philosophy and Government that mostly contributes for a new interpretation of 
the significance of the idea of raison d ’etat in modern political history.62 As he himself 
says, in his investigation on the nature of early modern political thought in Europe, ‘a 
proper understanding of raison d ’etat theory became the first priority’.63 This led Tuck 
into an investigation of the Renaissance political thinking, in particular the humanist 
and republican traditions. For the purpose of our argument, the significance of Tuck’s 
work lies in his claim that the language of raison d ’etat was used in distinct ways and 
was indeed associated with different political theories. One can draw two implications 
from this argument. First, the language of raison d ’etat, with its origins in the 
Renaissance, deeply influenced subsequent political thought up to the natural law 
theories of the end of the seventeenth century.64 Secondly, historically, it is a mistake to 
treat reason of state as always having the same meaning; instead, its history is made of 
intellectual breaks. It is in this context that we should understand the distinction 
between Lipsius’s republican conception of raison d ’etat and Machiavelli’s approach. 
As many others, Tuck also recognises that Machiavelli was ‘in some sense a precursor 
of the raison d ’etat writers’.65 Yet, he adds that the humanist notion of reason of state 
developed in the last quarter of the sixteenth century in Northern Europe, despite ‘the 
undeniable links with the Machiavellian tradition’, ‘broke with it in some crucial 
respects’.66 It is fundamental to grasp the nature of this break for some of the ‘crucial 
respects’ are directly concerned with international politics. For instance, in the cases 
where it is morally permitted to recur to war, Lipsius says, in desperate matters, i.e. self- 
preservation, ‘let [the Prince] decline gently from the lawes, yet not except it be for his 
own conservation, but never to enlarge his estate’.67 Here we have the first fundamental 
distinction of the early modern theory of just war. Moral principles could be broken 
when preservation was at stake, ‘but not for any other reason, such as the enhancement
61 For the significance of this distinction, see Worden, ‘English Republicanism’, p.466; and, for a more 
extensive discussion, Judith N. Shklar, Montesquieu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chapter 3.
62 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).
63 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.xii.
64 Tuck affirms that the influence of raison d ’etat on ‘natural law theories’ is ‘the principal historical 
claim which I am making’. Philosophy and Government, p.xiv.
65 Philosophy and Government, p.xii.
66 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.40.
67 Quoted in Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.57.
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of a ruler's or his country's glory '6* In other words, self-preservation and self-defence, 
but not expansionist and aggressive policies, were just causes of war. In these views we 
capture exactly the difference between Lipsius and Machiavelli.69
Like Tuck, Gerhard Oestreich sees Lipsius as ‘heir to the Italian Renaissance’ 
and places his thought firmly within the early-modern European humanist tradition.70 
For Oestreich, Lipsius was ‘the chief figure’ of European political thought during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whose ‘mirror of princes appealed to the prudentia
<71
of the leading personalities in the state...and called for vis to be restrained by virtus' . 
Indeed, in the preface to the book, Lipsius is clear concerning his intentions to offer 
advises to the rulers. He starts by addressing the ‘Emperor, Kings, and Princes’.
The change you sustain is great and glorious. What is more magnificient among men, then for one to have 
authority over many; to give laws and commands; to govern the sea, the land, peace and war?72
Lipsius continues by making, at once, the distinction between two forms of exercising 
princely authority. ‘Your end’ is to exercise such tasks for ‘the profit and good of the 
Commonwealth’; ‘you govern for the benefit of men’. However, there are ‘idle and 
wicked Princes, who in a kingdom think upon nothing else but the commandement they 
have...and who do imagine they are not given to their subjects, but their subjects to 
them’.73 Again, it is illustrative to compare this distinction with Machiavelli’s views 
expressed in Chapter XV of The Prince, where he affirms that ‘a ruler who wishes to 
maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary’.74
Lipsius firmly rejects such an assertion. Yet, it might be observed that a concern 
with the ‘good of the Commonwealth’ may require external expansion. To distinguish 
between the good of the state and the interest of the ruler does not in itself define a 
republican conception of external reason of state. The emphasis on the common good 
over the good of the ruler may serve as the foundation for a non-Machiavellian 
conception of reason of state, but it does not avoid per se a notion of reason of state 
which accepts expansionism. Indeed, the ideology of democratic nationalism might be 
simultaneously compatible with a concern for the domestic common good and with a
68 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.58. Emphasis in the original.
69 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.57.
70 Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modem State (Edited by Brigitta Oestreich and H.G. 
Koenigsberger, translated by David McLintock, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 1-9 
and 33-8.
71 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.9.
72 Six Books o f Politics, preface.
73 Six Books o f Politics, preface.
74 The Prince, p.55.
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defence of external expansionism. In this regard, one of the greatest contributions of 
Lipsius was the idea that the good of the commonwealth and the benefit of citizens, the 
central duties to be pursued by the ruler, require a peaceful international order. To 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace is a duty of the ruler that follows 
from her/his duty to guarantee domestic security. This new kind of secular prince, in 
Lipsius’s view, embraces the classical Roman values and is, ‘in the Stoic sense’, a ruler
75of the world, and not just of her/his own country.
In the first and second books, Lipsius addresses the nature of ‘princely rule as a 
moral institution’.76 Lipsius’s political morality for rulers rested on Stoicism, which he 
recovered from his interpretation of Roman thinkers, in particular Tacitus, but also 
Cicero. In brief terms, Stoicist political morality stresses three ideas. In the first place, a 
detached and sceptical view of the world, freed of grandiose political utopias. Secondly, 
a particular kind of resignation in the face of adverse fortune, which gives the necessary 
self-discipline to endure the most terrible calamities.77 Finally, a set of moral maxims of 
statecraft to deal with the ‘stormy age’ of European wars.78 According to this neo- 
Stoicist moral theory, Lipsius told the seventeenth-century statesmen that the ‘proper 
conduct of the prince’ must follow ‘prudence’ and ‘virtue’: ‘Prudence and virtue alone 
can make the sovereign a perfect ruler’.79 The way Lipsius defines political virtue and 
prudence places his thought decisively within the republican political tradition.
For Maurizio Viroli, ‘the tradition of the political virtues’, inherited from 
classical Rome, played a central role in the historical emergence of the republican 
language of politics in early modern Europe.80 According to this classical tradition, and 
in particular for Cicero, there are four types of ‘virtues proper to the political man’: 
‘prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance’.81 The first two, prudence and justice, are 
central to Lipsius’s thought. ‘Prudence’ ‘consists in the capacity of directing [political] 
action by reason’. Thus, ‘it bears the responsibility of making the right choice’ 
concerning the ruler’s behaviour. The virtue of ‘justice’ concerns not the right 
behaviour, but the ultimate goal that the ruler must pursue: the preservation of human
75 See Oestreich, Neostoicism, p. 28.
76 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.40.
77 This second point is the foundation of what could be called a politcal morality for citizens, which 
requires above all discipline, obedience and self-control of political passions. See Oestreicht,
Neostoicism, pp.6-7, 30 and 33.
78 See Burke, ‘Tacitism, Scepticism’.
79 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.43.
80 Viroli, From Politics to Reason o f State, pp. 12-30. See also the discussion in Skinner, The Renaissance, 
pp. 84-101.
1 Viroli, From Politics to Reason o f State, p. 18.
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• • • 82 society in accordance with universal principles of life, liberty and equality. These
definitions are indeed adopted by Lipsius.
In book one, Lipsius starts be affirming that ‘prudence’ is a fundamental
political virtue.83 It tells how the ruler should act in rational terms. ‘Without prudence’,
says Lipsius, ‘power is blind’.84 As Oestreich put it, prudence ‘gives discernment and
true judgement’, and upon it rests the art of politics.85 In book four, Lipsius
distinguishes between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ prudence. The former refers to ‘the dayly
managing of matters in time of peace’, whereas the latter is concerned with the right
behaviour in war,86 which will be further discussed below. As for ‘justice’, Lipsius calls
it a ‘greater virtue’: ‘It is a virtue observing that which is just and right’. As such, ‘to
administer justice is the principal duty of a prince’.87 Lipsius ends his discussion about
political morality with a vital distinction, typical of the republican ideology: ‘a tyrant
* * 88regards only...his own comodity, and a king the profit and good of his subjects’. 
Therefore, and despite his preference for princely rule, Lipsius remains within the 
republican moral tradition of statecraft. As it was already noted, this particular mixture 
of support for a monarchical regime and the use of a republican language was common 
in the Renaissance Europe. In this respect, it is revealing that Lipsius avoided titles such 
as ‘The Prince’ or even ‘Reason of State’ for his treatise on politics, calling it instead 
Six Books o f Politics. As Viroli remarked,
Referred to kingly or princely rule, the adjective “political” ...retains the commitment to justice and the 
common good...[it] indicates that the king possesses less power than a non-political king, and must 
accept checks and limitations. The label “political” clearly separates the prince from the tyrant, and makes 
him resemble a republican ruler. When advocates of monarchical government resorted to the word 
“politicu?, they always intended to attach to the image of the monarch some of the connotations that 
belonged to the vocabulary of the respublica: the rule of law, the commitment to justice and the common 
good.89
This describes perfectly well Lipsius’s contribution and shows the influence of the idea 
of republican political virtue on his thought.
82 Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, pp. 16-9.
83 Six Books o f Politics, p. 1.
84 Six Books o f Politics, p.41.
85 Neostoicism, p.43, see the discussion in pp.41-4.
86 Six Books o f Politics, p.61.
87 Six Books o f Politics, pp.27-9.
88 Six Books o f Politics, p.23.
89 Viroli, From Politics to Reason o f State, pp.68-9.
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After having laid down his political morality for rulers, Lipsius explicitly 
addresses, in chapters 13 and 14 of book four, the question of reason of state. In chapter 
14, he raises the question whether it is permissible for a ruler to recur to the political 
vice of ‘deception’: ‘After what manner, and how far...deceipts are to be admitted’.90 
Lipsius defines ‘deceipts’ as actions that violate ‘virtue or the laws for the good of the 
Prince and the state’,91 in other words what Machiavelli calls ‘necessity’. Lipsius
• • • 92distinguishes between three kinds of deception: ’light’, ‘middle’ and ‘great’. In order 
to fully understand Lipsius’s discussion of this fundamental question, we need to refer 
to another crucial distinction made by the early-modern humanist tradition between a 
‘state of emergency’ and a ‘normal state of affairs’. During the latter, ‘moral and legal 
rules remained valid’; only during a state of emergency the ruler could break those rules 
in name of the public interest (salus publica) 93 It is during these extraordinary periods 
that Lipsius admits that ‘deception must be used to counter deception if the common 
good requires it’.94 But even in these cases, Lipsius establishes two important 
qualifications. First, he tolerates the first, the ‘light’, and the second, the ‘middle’, but 
roundly condemns the third, the ‘great’, in any occasion.95 As Oestreich observed, 
Lipsius ‘condemns those who think that anything is just...if it serves to maintain the 
government’.96 Moreover, Lipsius is unequivocal in his rejection of injustice, which 
shall not be permitted ‘even for the common good’.97 Secondly, Lipsius makes it quite 
clearly that the state of emergency is an extraordinary situation, and that the main duty 
of the ruler is to restore peace, the normal state of affairs, and not to maintain the 
condition of emergency in order to increase power 98 Therefore, resting on strong moral 
foundations, reason of state turns into a doctrine of civic and moral virtue, defending a 
prudent and not an expansionist self-interest. As some historians, following the 
argument of Oestreich, recently pointed out, Lipsius inaugurated a tradition of advice- 
books to princes, for which it was crucial to distinguish between ‘true reason of state 
(ratio status genuinay and ‘false reason of state {ratio status spuria)'99
90 Lipsius, Six Books o f Politics, p. 115.
91 Six Books o f Politics, p. 115.
92 Six Books o f Politics, p. 115.
93 See Wolfgang Weber, ‘’’What a Good Ruler Should Not Do”: Theoretical Limits of Royal Power in 
European Theories of Absolutism, 1500-1700’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 4 (1995), p.902.
94 Cited in Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.49.
95 Six Books o f Politics, pp. 115-23. See also, Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.49.
96 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.48.
97 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.49.
98 See Lipsius’s discussion on a ‘just peace’, Six Books o f Politics, pp. 178-86.
99 Weber, ‘’’What a Good Ruler Should Not Do’”, p.900.
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In accordance with his political morality, Lipsius affirms that peace is the 
ultimate political goal, and he ‘warns against the principal causes of war: ambition, 
power-hunger and acquisitiveness’.100 In this regard, in book five, addressing the 
question of ‘military prudence’, he treats the problem of just and unjust wars. In very 
conventional terms, according to the humanist tradition, the issue of the justice in war is 
further divided into three questions: just origins, just causes and just objectives.101 Here, 
Lipsius’s discussion, in particular on the causes and origins of war, is dominated 
exclusively by defensive, and not offensive, concerns.102 As for the objectives of war, ‘a 
good end is required, which is peace’.103 As we saw, Machiavelli links his political 
morality with his views on foreign policy, and the ‘quest for power’ by the prince turns 
into the ‘quest for empire’ by the state. Lipsius made the connection in rather different 
terms: virtuous and prudent statecraft leads to the quest for international peace. We have 
here again the vital distinction between ‘commonwealths for expansion’ and 
‘commonwealths for preservation’. What is quite interesting is Lipsius’s ability to 
reconcile a conception of the sovereign state based on power with a Neostoicist political 
morality, which in the end permits to discipline and to limit the use of state power itself.
The central place of the notion of just war in Lipsius’s political thought also 
shows the importance given to the rule of law in international relations. In this respect, 
Lipsius’s thought needs to be understood in the context of early modern European 
humanism. Among sixteenth and seventeenth centuries humanists, there was a 
widespread conviction that in political matters a rational behaviour must follow legal 
considerations. This is connected with the growing of a new discipline, ‘legal science’, 
based essentially on the interpretation of Roman jurisprudence, in early modern 
Europe.104 This ‘new science’ developed a ‘vocabulary and conceptual apparatus’ 
designed to comprehend political life in Europe, which ultimately gave origin to modern 
public law. Social groups, among them states, were legally personified, enjoying a set of 
rights but also ‘responsibilities before the law’.105 International political crises, as those 
which characterised sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European politics, gave new 
urgency to the development of legal concepts. The outcome was that the publicists came 
‘to establish a certain monopoly over...political discourse’, particularly regarding the
100 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.51.
101 See the discussion in Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.51.
102 Six Books o f Politics, pp. 127-32.
103 Six Books o f Politics, pp. 132-3.
104 See Donald Kelley, ‘Civil Science in the Renaissance: the Problem of Interpretation’, in Pagden (ed.), 
The Languages o f Political Theory, pp.57-78.
105 Kelley, ‘Civil Science’, p.67.
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activities of European states.106 The ‘triumph of the legal professionals’ meant also that 
the behaviour of sovereign states in early modern Europe was strongly influenced by 
legal considerations. The law of nations, drawing on the Roman notion of ju s  gentium, 
the law common to all civilised gentes, became the common legal body of the emergent 
European sovereign states. In the case of statecraft, a generally accepted political maxim 
was that the ‘ruler is bound by the laws, [and] his authority is limited’.107 For instance, 
the transformation of the notion of just war from a moral principle to a fundamental 
norm of the law of nations shows the impact of the early modern legalist ideology on 
early modern European politics. The immediate implication of the impact of the legal 
science is that a proper understanding of the doctrine of raison d ’etat cannot be isolated 
from the emergence of the European public law.
A final point that needs to be briefly made concerns Lipsius’s secular humanism, 
which was ‘confessionally neutral’. As Oestreich so well put it, with the humanist and 
the republican traditions, ‘Western Christendom...was once again linked with the world 
of antiquity’,108 more specifically with classical Rome. As it was noted above, 
Machiavelli played a decisive role in the development of modern political thought 
towards secularisation. Above all, a secular view of political reason is in opposition to 
politics conducted by confessional passions. In early-modern politics, the way to deal 
with such an opposition was probably the key issue. Quite ironically, as we shall see 
now, it was a Cardinal, by opposing the Catholic Habsburgs’s quest for empire, by 
making alliances with Calvinist states, and by presenting the Thirty Years’ War as a 
political rather than a religious conflict, that mostly contributed to the consolidation of 
the secular conception of raison d ’etat. This point also suggests that Lipsius’s thought 
strongly influenced Richelieu’s views on statecraft. Indeed, the next section of the 
chapter will show how some of Lipsius’s republican themes were adopted by France’s 
foreign policy during the struggle against the Habsburgs’s imperial project.
French policy during the Thirty Years’ War
The French Secretary of State, Cardinal Richelieu, is often associated with the doctrine 
of raison d'etat. This is largely linked to his central role in the emergence of a unitary
106 Kelley, ‘Civil Science’, p.68.
107 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.43.
108 Neostoicism, p.8.
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and centralised state in France between the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIV, which 
has been traditionally taken as an example of the modern process of state-building. 
Moreover, this historical process has given origin to a widespread theory of the modern 
sovereign state, where domestic absolutism and external raison d'etat are seen to be 
complementary doctrines. Meinecke expresses quite well the connection between the 
two.
Unless a sovereign and unified State Will were created and recognised, there could be no unified and 
effective fostering of the concrete interests, and again without this the new concept of sovereignty would 
have remained empty and purposeless.109
The argument developed here accepts the historical association made by Meinecke 
between domestic absolutist sovereignty and raison d ’etat. What shall be disputed, 
following the first part of the chapter, is the meaning attributed to Richelieu’s approach 
to reason of state by most of contemporary international political theory. In particular, it 
will be argued that reason of state, as it was developed in early modern France, 
recognised constraints on the exercise of external sovereign authority. If it is true that 
the opposition to an imperial political order in Europe, pursued by the two major 
Catholic monarchies other than France, respectively Austria and Spain, gave a new 
significance to the doctrine of raison d ’etat, it is misleading to think that Richelieu’s 
foreign policy was based ‘purely on advantage and expediency’.110 This interpretation 
equates the concept of reason of state with its Machiavellian, and later, realpolitik 
conception. It does not correspond, however, to the republican conception, as the term is 
used in this work. We shall now see how this latter conception influenced Richelieu’s 
understanding of France’s interests.
Before we begin our discussion of Richelieu’s statecraft, we need to briefly 
recall the republican conception of raison d ’etat, as it was elaborated above. Four 
central ideas characterise such a conception. First, the republican tradition strongly 
opposed imperial expansionism and the ideology of empire. Secondly, it developed, as 
we saw in the case of Lipsius, a secular political morality based on the ideas of justice, 
prudence and virtue. Thirdly, early modern republicanism showed a deep concern for 
the international public good, which was seen as a fundamental condition to maintain 
domestic political order. Finally, the republican tradition recognised the importance of
109 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p.225.
110 J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 122. It should 
be noted that Elliott disagrees with this view.
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the rule of law in international politics. Now what needs to be perfectly clear is that 
Richelieu’s approach to the doctrine of raison d'etat corresponds to the republican 
conception as it was formulated by Lipsius.
Opposition to the Habsburg imperial project
Richelieu's time in power can be divided into two distinct periods. The first covers the 
period from his appointment, in 1624, to Louis XHI's Royal Council, to his victory over 
the Catholic party, organised around Marie de Medicis, in 1630. The members of this 
party, named by Richelieu’s supporters as ‘Machiavellians’, strongly attacked 
Richelieu's foreign policy, in particular his opposition to Catholic imperialism. Against 
the Cardinal, they defended a ‘peaceful coexistence with the Habsburgs abroad and the 
suppression of heresy at home’.111 The second period follows the consolidation of 
Richelieu's power, and lasts until his death in December 1642. In November 1630, in 
the so-called 'Day of Dupes', the Catholic party attempted unsuccessfully to remove 
Richelieu from power. After such a failure, nobody in the French circle of power 
seriously challenged Richelieu's policy of resisting, if necessary with a war, the Spanish 
and Austrian imperial project.112 The triumph of Richelieu over the Catholic faction 
coincided with the fall of La Rochelle in 1629.113 The victory of Louis XIII over the 
Huguenots in the town of La Rochelle marked the end of the period in French political 
history known as the 'state within a state', and the beginning of the unification and the 
centralisation of the French state. With the Catholic party weakened, and with the 
Huguenots defeated, Louis XIII had at last the necessary domestic unity to pursue a 
foreign policy based not on confessional considerations but on state interests. This 
domestic process demonstrates quite well the link between the existence of an internal 
supreme authority and external reason of state. However, as we shall see, contrary to the 
conventional view, the picture of absolutist states pursuing their foreign policies on the 
basis of reason of state does not necessarily correspond to the realist doctrine of external 
statecraft.
111 Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States J494-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),
p.228.
Bonney, The European Dynastic States, p.231.
113 The significance of the the fall of La Rochelle is discussed by David Parker, La Rochelle and the 
French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in Seventeenth-Century France (London: Royal Historical 
Society, 1980).
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French interests were, above all, to defeat Habsburgs's imperialism, and thereby 
to consolidate French position in European politics. For instance, in a memorandum of 
1629, Richelieu wrote that ‘[ojutside our realm...it must be our constant purpose to 
arrest the course of Spain's progress’.114 To achieve that, he adopted the strategy of 
identifying the ideology of empire with Spanish interests and with Habsburg 
expansionism. Of course, he was aware of the supranational character of the ideology of 
empire, as the existence of a radical Catholic party in France demonstrated. Yet, the 
‘Spanization’ of Habsburg imperialism was a necessary step to justify a policy of 
external alliances with Protestant states. To be successful in his policies, the Cardinal 
had to avoid at all costs the division of European Christianity into two factions, one 
Catholic, the other Protestant. This made him resisting those who attributed a religious 
character to the European conflicts, and to treat Catholic and Protestant states alike as 
potential allies. As Richelieu often observed, he ‘had no intention of intervening in a 
war of religion’.115 The conflicts were between states, each with its own interest, and the 
duty of the statesmen was to reconcile those interests. It is in this regard that Richelieu’s 
foreign policy is quite secular.
In accordance with such a secularism, the interests of France led Richelieu to 
make alliances with Protestant states, immediately after he came to power. Still in 1624, 
he signed an alliance with the United Provinces; and in 1625, he arranged the marriage 
of Louis XHI's sister to Charles I of England. Later, after French domestic pacification, 
in January 1631, France concluded a five-year alliance with Sweden, which had just 
intervened in the Thirty Years’ War to protect the Protestants princes from the Austrian 
Habsburgs. Finally, just before French engagement in the Thirty Years' War, in 
February 1635, a new defensive alliance was made between France and the United 
Provinces. On the other hand, it has to be noted, France also signed a defensive treaty 
with Bavaria, a Catholic power. In fact, in 1630, Richelieu was simultaneously 
negotiating two treaties: one with a Protestant king, the Swedish Gustavus Adolphus, 
the other with a Catholic ruler, head of the German Catholic League, the Bavarian 
Maximilian.
Richelieu’s attempt to guarantee the liberty of the German small states against 
the Emperor was also the result of France's opposition to the ideology of empire. This 
goal required however that German rulers, deeply divided by the religious conflict
1.4 Quoted in G. Pages, The Thirty Years War (London: Routledge, 1971), p. 117.
1.5 Pages, The Thirty Years War, p. 120
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within the Empire, accepted a secular conception of raison d'etat. As G. Pages 
observed, Louis XIII and Richelieu
wished to maintain the traditional liberties of the electors and princes and, to do this in the face of 
imperial ambition, they wished to convince the Catholic electors that their interests were the same as 
those of the Protestants electors and tliat they could only safeguard them by breaking with the emperor.116
This anti-imperial political project was consistently defended by the French diplomats 
during the negotiations of Munster that led to the signature of one of the Treaties of the 
Peace of Westphalia. As French leaders repeatedly said, it was to achieve the 
independence of the German princes that France intervened in the war. A war to 
safeguard ‘German liberties’ was also a war to prevent Habsburg imperialism. For the 
defence of 'German liberties' was nothing more than an attempt to considerably reduce 
the Emperor's authority, by strengthening the autonomy of German states.
Richelieu's political morality and the rule o f law
The French conduct during the Thirty Years' War is considered to be the first historical 
example of the link between the concept of raison d'etat and diplomatic practices.117 In 
this regard, Richelieu and Mazarin turned occasional practices into a doctrinal system. 
From what has been argued so far, it is fairly easy to see why the doctrine of the reason 
of state arose in France. Being geographically situated between Spain and the German 
Empire, it was the country most threatened by the Habsburgs’s imperial project. This 
led French rulers inevitably to oppose both Habsburgs’s monarchs. Yet, as France, 
Austria and Spain were all Catholic countries, the French were obliged to downplay 
religion as a crucial factor to define statecraft. As a result, France was the only 
European state, during the conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that quite 
consistently placed the interests of the state above confessional considerations. This 
leads us to consider Richelieu’s political morality, and to try to answer the question 
raised by many: does Richelieu’s approach reflect the belief that the interests of the state 
are above any other consideration?
116 Pages, The Thirty Years War, p. 120.
117 See Meinecke, Machiavellism, chapter 6.
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In his historical investigation on the evolution of modern diplomacy, Henry 
Kissinger recently emphasised that ‘Richelieu’s concept of raison d ’etat had no built-in 
limitations’. Thus, continues Kissinger,
In the world inaugurated by Richelieu, states were no longer restrained by the pretence of a moral code. If 
the good of the state was the highest value, the duty of the ruler was the aggrandisement and promotion of 
his glory.118
Given that Kissinger’s view reflects the conventional belief, how correct is Kissinger’s 
assessment of Richelieu’s conception of raison d'etafl Specifically, how right is 
Kissinger in saying that Richelieu’s concept ‘had no built-in limitations’ on the external 
exercise of sovereign authority? The best way to investigate this point is to place 
Richelieu's conduct in its proper intellectual context. Arguably, two of the strongest 
influences on Richelieu's doctrine of raison d'etat were the thought of Lipsius, in 
particular his views of political morality, and the legalist ideology, which considerably 
influenced the European political life of his time.
The influence of Lipsius’s thought on Richelieu’s approach to politics was 
recently emphasised. In his study of Lipsius’s political thought, Oestreich observes that
Richelieu...seems to have been influenced by Lipsius. In his youth he had been close to the party of the 
Politiques, at whom the Civilis doctrina seems to have been aimed, and he lived in the Neostoic climate 
of his age. Anyone who studies the cardinal’s practice and reads his political testament can discern the 
voice of the Netherlander.119
As we saw above, according to Lipsius’s political ethic, statecraft must follow a set of 
moral maxims. In particular, Lipsius’s thought appealed to the prudence of the rulers 
and called for vices to be restrained by maxims of justice.120 With these moral 
foundations, reason of state turns into a doctrine of political virtue, which defends a 
prudent and not an expansionist self-interest. Such a political morality was indeed 
adopted by Richelieu. As all theorists of reason of state, Richelieu also made a 
distinction between a private, or civil, morality and a public, or political, morality. Such 
a distinction gives rise to a double moral standard or, in other words, to two different 
conceptions of virtue. However, in a way that separates him from the Machiavellian
118 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp.66-7.
119 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.198. Similarly, in his short political biography of Richelieu, Elliott has noted 
that ‘Richelieu had the complete works of Lipsius in his library of the Palais Cardinal, and a copy of the 
Civil Doctrine in his more private library’. Richelieu and Olivares, p.26.
120 Oestreich, Neostoicism, p.9.
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tradition, for Richelieu political morality in external affairs was never equated with a 
ruthless quest for power and with an imperial policy. The opposition to Catholic 
imperialism without falling in an amoral behaviour explains Richelieu’s secularism: it 
was secular in the sense that certain political goods required the abandonment of 
religious considerations, but it was not the radical secularism of Machiavelli, for 
Richelieu managed to develop a secular political morality that could be reconciled with 
normative principles.121
What is striking, and can only be explained by the coexistence of particular 
political circumstances, is that Richelieu’s political morality could acquire a certain 
republican flavour. Of course, it is not possible to see Richelieu as a distinct republican 
thinker. Yet, his struggle to maintain the independence of the French state facing the 
threat, both domestic and external, of Catholic imperialism made him to establish 
political alliances with groups heavily influenced by the republican ideology, such as 
the politiques within France, and Venice and the Dutch in foreign politics. Moreover, he 
defined his political agenda in accordance with certain republican principles. It was this 
combination of a number of political factors, to a certain extent accidental, that makes 
Richelieu’s raison d'etat an example of statecraft influenced by republican ideas. In the 
case of Richelieu, what is distinctively republican about his conception of reason of 
state is the use of the language of justice and law rather than the language of power. The 
use of such a vocabulary is visible in Richelieu’s arguments to justify both the war with 
the Habsburgs and the policy of alliances with Protestant states.
The legalist ideology also had a considerable influence on Richelieu’s approach 
to politics. Indeed, a careful analysis of France’s behaviour before and during its 
involvement in the Thirty Years’ War shows the Cardinal’s concern with legal 
considerations. This is particularly noticeable in the declarations of war and in the 
making of alliances, using in both cases arguments from the just war doctrine.122 In the 
conflicts with the Habsburgs, Richelieu’s justifications for his actions relied heavily on 
the doctrine of just war. As we saw before, one of the moves made by the Cardinal was 
to identify Habsburg’s imperial aims with Austrian and Spanish interests. Such a move 
was fundamental in order to justify French involvement as an act of just self-defence 
against Austrian and Spanish aggression. Likewise, the alliance with the Dutch
121 An important study of Richelieu’s secularism and political morality is William F. Church, Richelieu 
and Reason o f State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). See also Donald M. Mackinnon,
‘Power Politics and Religious Faith: The Fifth Martin Wight Memorial Lecture’, British Journal of 
International Studies, 6 (1980), pp. 1-15.
122 See D.P. O’Connell, ‘A Cause Celebre in the History of Treaty-Making: The Refusal to Ratify the 
Peace Treaty of Regensburg in 1630’, The British Yearbook o f International Law, XLII (1967), pp.71-90.
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Republic, a Protestant state, was seen as an act of necessity to avert the loss of the 
French state.123 The evocation of legal arguments to justify the alliance with the Dutch 
was a response to the charge made by French Catholics that to ally with a Calvinist state 
rebelling against Spanish authority favoured both heresy and sedition in France. 
Moreover, those legal principles were used in combination with the argument defending 
the public good of all Christendom. As one of Richelieu’s supporters in France 
affirmed, ‘these alliances concern only the security of peoples, the preservation of 
states, and the public tranquility’.124 Therefore, Richelieu presented the war with Spain 
in terms of the justice of French opposition to imperialism and the alliances with 
Protestant states as defensive alliances. This seems to demonstrate Richelieu's concern
to ground his foreign policy on moral considerations and the extent to which his vision of the mutual 
relations of European states was set within a conventional framework determined by the presumed 
requirements of natural law, the just war and legitimate defence.125
The respect for the rule of law was of primary importance to the creation of a durable 
peace. According to the editor of Richelieu’s instructions for the French negotiators at 
the Conference of Munster, the German historian Fritz Dickmann, ‘for Richelieu the 
great political decisions were also decisions of conscience; much more than we might
• • 19Aexpect he evaluates questions of power politics by way of legal concepts’. Therefore, 
as William Church put it, Richelieu ‘consistently defended legality, built upon it, and 
believed it essential to the peace of Europe’.127
By placing Richelieu’s approach to politics both in the context of Lipsius’s neo­
republican political morality, and in the emergence of the European public law, we have 
a different picture of the Cardinal’s political outlook, far from the conventional one 
expressed by Kissinger. It is true to say that Richelieu's policy marked the triumph of 
raison d'etat over confessional diplomacy. Yet, this is not the same as saying, as 
Kissinger does, that Richelieu’s conception of raison d'etat ‘had no built-in limitations’. 
For Richelieu, reason of state was not above any other consideration; it was above 
confessional considerations. It certainly was not above moral justifications. As for 
international law, legal considerations were imbedded in Richelieu's conception of
123 Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares, p. 125.
124 Cited in Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, p.3 97.
125 Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares, p. 122.
126 Cited in Dietrich Gerhard, ‘Richelieu’, in Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stem (eds.), The Responsibility of 
Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p.98.
127 Church, Richelieu and Reason o f State, p. 372.
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raison d'etat. Of course, it can still be argued that Richelieu’s use of the language of just 
war was simply a moralistic justification behind which he concealed his real interests, 
which were to achieve an hegemonic position for France in Europe. However, one thing 
is to make decisions purely based on self-interest and then use legal arguments to 
legitimise the decision. Another thing is to try to reconcile self-interests with legal 
considerations and with the international public interest. That is, to make decisions 
within a legal framework, which of course involves a particular political talent in using 
the flexibility of the laws for his own advantage, but also the preoccupation to respect 
legal limitations.128 Such a preoccupation was clear in a further political goal pursued 
by Richelieu: the general peace of Europe.
Raison d'etat, the international common good, and collective security
To fully understand Richelieu’s view of the European political order as a whole, it is 
also necessary to discuss his attempt to help implementing ‘unne bonne paix’ in 
Europe.129 What was then Richelieu’s conception of a good peace? It was observed that 
‘Richelieu’s vision of the eventual peace embraced a system of collective obligations to 
secure the peaceful coexistence of all European powers’.130 The treatment of Richelieu’s 
vision of European peace leads us to briefly consider Sully’s Grand Design. At the end 
of the sixteenth century, Sully was a minister of the French king Henry IV. In his 
memories, he referred to a project for the European political order, which he attributed 
to Henry IV. Such a political project has been interpreted by some as proposing the 
establishment of a European confederation with a system of collective security. For 
instance, as a solution to European conflicts, Sully refers to a ‘federal council to settle 
disputes and maintain the peace’, resulting from ‘a reunion of all the different states’.131 
Remarks such as this one even led F. H. Hinsley to refer to Sully as a forerunner ‘of the 
League of Nations or United Europe or the United Nations experiment’.132 This
128 For a very interesting article which shows, in the Swedish case, ‘a peculiar early modern 
preoccupation with matters of international law’, see Erik Ringmar, ‘The Relevance of International Law: 
a Hegelian Interpretation of a Peculiar Seventeenth-Century Preoccupation’, Review o f International 
Studies, 21 (1995), pp.87-103.
129 See Hermann Weber, ‘Une Bonne Paix: Richelieu’s Foreign Policy and the Peace of Christendom’, in 
Joseph Bergin and Laurence Brookliss (eds.), Richelieu and His Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
pp.45-69.
130 Gerhard, ‘Richelieu’, p. 105.
131 See F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace: Theory and Practice in the History o f Relations 
between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp.24-6.
132 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace, p. 13.
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suggests, first of all, that the war against the Habsburgs was not meant to lead merely to 
an international anarchy of sovereign states, dominated by French hegemony, but rather 
to the implementation of what we could call in contemporary language a system of 
collective security.
Sully’s plan of a European confederation was recovered by Richelieu under the 
term o f ‘the peace of Christendom’.133 Such a peace did not mean simply the end of the 
Thirty Years’ War, but also, and more importantly, the defeat of imperial projects in 
Europe. The freedom of European political communities was seriously threatened as 
long as the tyranny of universal monarchy loomed over Europe. Thus, the peace of 
Christendom was understood primarily as a durable political framework that could 
preserve all European states in untroubled coexistence and liberty.134 The 
implementation of the ‘bonne paix’ demanded the acceptance by all European political 
communities that the security of each one was a collective concern. As such, a general 
commitment to join in a collective response against future imperial projects was 
essential. In other words, it would be indispensable that at least the major powers agreed 
that the anti-imperial principle constituted the foundation of a just international order. 
This resistance to universal monarchy is one of the constitutive principles of a 
republican conception of international society, and it was an integral part of Richelieu’s 
conception of ‘une bonne paix’.
The anti-imperial peace required, thus, the maintenance of political equilibrium 
in Europe. In this regard, it has been noted that Sully’s Grand Design also talked about a 
plan
to divide Europe equally among a certain number of Powers in such a maimer that none of them might 
have cause either of envy or of fear from the possessions or powers of others...The whole, therefore, of 
what seems proper to be done is to support them all in a kind of equilibrium...[this is]...the purport of the 
Design.135
Clearly, the grand design anticipated the concept of balance of power as a necessary 
condition for international political order.136 During France’s intervention in the Thirty 
Years’ War, Richelieu was consistently negotiating simultaneous defensive alliances
133 In Richelieu’s words: ‘une bonne Paix en toute la Chrestiente’; cited in Weber, ‘Une Bonne Paix’, 
p.46.
Weber, ‘Une Bonne Paix’, p.48.
135 Sully, quoted in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 27.
136 For this interpretation, see Adam Watson, The Evolution o f International Society (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 183.
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with Sweden and with Bavaria, respectively a Protestant and a Catholic state. Besides 
showing a secular approach to diplomacy, as it was earlier noted, these simultaneous 
negotiations demonstrate also the influence that the notion of balance of power had on 
French policy. For instance, referring to ‘the Spaniard and the Swede’, Richelieu wrote 
in his papers that
we must above all take care that in bringing down one we do not raise the other to such a point that he is 
more to be feared than the former. We must also act with such caution that instead of setting one against 
the other, we do not become involved in war with one of them. Such a step would allow the other to 
increase in such strength that even if the king were victorious he would lose more from the easy manner 
in which the other became more powerful than he would gain from his own victory.137
This indicates both that Richelieu attributed to France the role of maintaining the 
European balance of power and that the ultimate purpose of those two treaties was to 
maintain the balance between Catholic and Protestant states and thereby to counter the 
over-mighty power of the house of Austria and the king of Sweden. As many others in 
the seventeenth century, Richelieu also believed that the idea of political equilibrium 
should be included in the public law of Europe.138 This shows that, contrary to what is 
often believed, a system of collective security and the institution of the balance of 
power may be part of the same approach to international political order. Indeed, this 
view was expressed by Hinsley. Noting the coexistence of legal and institutionalist 
principles with political and statist elements, Hinsley suggested that such a tension ‘is
139the key to an understanding of the printed version of the 'grand design” .
Besides the consensus on the anti-imperial principle, the establishment of a 
lasting good peace was related with two further points: the signature of a general peace 
treaty, and the need to institutionalise the principles of collective security through a 
formal agreement. The first was achieved with the Peace of Westphalia.140 With the
137 Quoted in Pages, The Thirty Years War, p. 140.
138 See D.P. O’Connell, Richelieu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), pp.289-90.
139 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace, p.25.
140 It should be noted that Richelieu’s vision of a good peace was not fully realised in the Peace of 
Westphalia. First, France and Spain did not sign a peace treaty and continued fighting until 1659; 
secondly, the Peace did not create a German Confederation, in the terms that Richelieu defended, but 
maintained the formal superior authority of the Emperor. For instance, the two Peace Treaties signed in 
Munster and Osnabruck were both signed between the Emperor, representing the German Empire, and 
respectively France and Sweden. Yet, this failure to fully follow Richelieu’s vision of European peace 
does not mean that the Peace of Westphalia cannot be seen as implementing a collective security system. 
For a comprehensive and very helpful discussion of the Peace of Westphalia, both its relation with 
Richelieu’s peace project and its contribution to the European political order, see Andreas Osiander, The 
States System o f Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions o f International Stability (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), chapter 2.
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signature of a general peace treaty, the system of common security would be extended 
to the whole Europe. In order to work and to last, the European system of collective 
security should be based upon mutual guarantees binding all participants in the peace 
negotiations. In this regard, its implementation, which gives it a collective character, 
required the participation of all states of Christendom. As one observer noted, it was a 
‘peace fo r  the whole of Christendom and ensured by the whole of Christendom’.141 
Moreover, with its principles recognised in a general peace treaty, the collective security 
system became part of the European public law.142
The system of collective security was intimately linked to the security 
guarantees provided by the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck. ‘The security of peace 
was to be ensured by a guarantee enshrined in the treaty itself.. .the guarantee came into 
operation when peace was threatened or broke down altogether’.143 The guarantors of 
peace, in other words the major powers, had to act against violations of the peace. In 
particular, a fundamental principle of the security guarantees concerned the role of all 
contracting external powers as protectors of German liberties against the Emperor.144 
The inclusion in the Peace of Westphalia of this general clause guaranteeing the respect 
for the anti-imperial principle shows the vital role of great powers in implementing 
security. In other words, the Peace of Westphalia gave rise to a concert-based collective 
security system, in the sense that the Treaties entrusted the responsibilities of leadership 
in security issues to a small group of major powers. According to Hermann Weber, 
Richelieu was, therefore, ‘the first to make a system of collective security the objective 
of a continuous, practical policy’.145 This follows what Sully fifty years earlier 
identified as Henry IV’s Grand Design, which confirms Hinsley’s view of the Grand 
Design as a project for European collective security. To show, again, how history is full 
of ironies, the political plans of a former Huguenot leader were to be implemented by a 
Cardinal. Such an irony shows the prevalence of political interests over confessional 
considerations in the politics of early-modern France, in line with the notion of raison
141 Weber, ‘Unne Bonne Paix’, p.61.
142 However, we should not seek in the Peace of Westphalia a developed notion of international law. 
Indeed, the Treaties not even dealt with sovereignty from a legal perspective. What became part of the 
European public law were the ideas associated with the notion of collective security, namely the idea that 
peace and security in Europe are indivisible, that all states must contribute to the maintenance of peace, 
and that the major powers have a special role to play in the management of European security. See 
Osiander, The States System o f Europe, chapter 2.
143 Weber, ‘Unne Bonne Paix’, p.59.
144 See Osiander, The States-System o f Europe, pp. 46-9.
145 ‘Unne Bonne Paix’, p.59. Osiander also affirms that ‘Richelieu...envisaged an elaborate collective 
security system’, The States System o f Europe, p.27.
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d ’e ta t146 Yet, the triumph of the idea of reason of state, contrary to what is often 
believed, was accompanied by normative considerations about international order and 
by the emergence of a system of collective security.
Conclusion
The argument of this chapter claimed, first, that the opposition between normative 
considerations and national interest denotes a particular conception of reason of state, 
developed initially by Machiavelli, and later adopted by the tradition of realpolitik. As a 
result, the concept of reason of state is discussed by this latter tradition without any 
connection to moral and legal rules. As it was noted in the beginning of the chapter, the 
English school has to a certain extent corrected this view. In particular, when Wight 
formulated a non-realist conception of national interest in ‘Western Values’. Yet, Wight 
is not entirely consistent on this point and, for instance, in his lectures on International 
Theory, he imputes the idea of raison d ’etat to the Machiavellian tradition. This chapter 
tried to correct this last point and in the process to develop some of the suggestions 
offered by Wight in ‘Western Values’. In line with the argument of the thesis, the 
pursuit of such an attempt heavily relies on the republican political tradition. The central 
republican figure in the treatment of raison d ’etat, it was argued, is Lipsius. This is 
clear in his views on political morality, which are founded on the thought of classical 
republican figures such as Cicero and Tacitus. In this context, the emphasis was on 
three central ideas of Lipsius: justice and the rule of law, prudence and defensive 
strategies, and secularism and the concern for the international public good. The 
significance of Lipsius’s contribution is that it shows how reason of state and some 
normative principles, historically, emerged and developed together. The advantages of 
such a conceptual redefinition is that, on the one hand, the idea of reason of state 
acquires a moral content, and on the other hand, principles concerned with the 
international common good loose a great deal of their idealist reputation.
In the last part of the chapter, it was asserted that Richelieu’s external conduct 
lies within the normative terms established by the republican conception of raison 
d ’etat. Apparently, when asked on his deathbed to forgive his enemies, Richelieu
146 It is illustrative to note that one of the French delegates to the peace negotiations in Munster 
complained that ‘the Swedish delegates were too little concerned with raison d ’etat and excessively 
attached to the protestant cause’. See Osiander, The States System o f Europe, p. 28.
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replied that he never had personal enemies, but only those of the state. This shows 
undoubtedly the high moral value of raison d ’etat for Richelieu. This is not denied in 
this chapter. What is firmly rejected is the view that Richelieu’s conception of reason of 
state had no built-in limitations, as some seem to believe. The struggle of all his life was 
to separate diplomacy from religious considerations, but Richelieu never aimed at a full 
emancipation of the state from normative principles. Rather, he saw statecraft embedded 
in a larger moral and legal universe, and in this sense he was a moderate child of 
Machiavelli. Although Richelieu himself cannot be seen as a republican thinker, the 
influence of republicanism on his external statecraft is visible in three crucial points: 
first, in the opposition to the ideology of universal empire; secondly, Lipsius’s idea of a 
virtuous external statecraft appears in Richelieu’s conduct, both in his secular 
conception of raison d ’etat and in his respect for the rule of the law of nations; thirdly, 
Richelieu consistently showed a typical republican concern for the common good in his 
attempt to include the good of Europe in the French national interest.
The distinction between these two different conceptions of reason of state is 
crucially important for the question of the ontological divide. As we saw in the 
introduction of the thesis, for those who accept the ontological divide, reason of state 
tends to be understood in terms of mere self-interest and not as concerned with the 
international public good. If states are perceived as being ontological primitive agents, 
which were self-constituted in the international state of nature, then it is logical to see 
the formulation of their political interests as an inward-outward process. For instance, 
such an ontological divide is clear in Machiavelli’s belief that it is impossible to 
replicate the principles of the domestic republican political order at the international 
level. Yet, Machiavelli failed to grasp that the republican political project was 
simultaneously domestic and international. Indeed, the assertion of this point constitutes 
one of the fundamental breaks between later republican thinkers and the author of The 
Prince. It is fundamental to grasp that for republican figures, such as Lipsius, the 
constitutional and secular domestic political order that the ruler has the duty to maintain 
is part of an overall secular and just international order. In this regard, domestic virtue 
required international virtue, and the concern for international common good was an 
integral part of the national interest. Therefore, instead of accepting the ontological 
divide, what we need to understand is that the political virtues associated with the idea 
of raison d ’etat were part of the broader republican virtues that also sustained domestic 
political order. The notion of virtuous external statecraft was not developed by primitive 
agents living in the state of nature, but it was rather the result of the influence of the
160
republican ideology on early modern European states. Thus, we may indeed conclude 
that the conception of raison d'etat discussed in this chapter is constituted by a 
republican understanding of virtuous political life which includes both domestic and 
international politics. For such a conception, domestic political order starts at the 
international level, and the duties and responsibilities of the rulers do not stop at the 
state borders. By maintaining international peace, rulers contribute for the safety and 
security of their and other states’ citizens alike. In this sense, every state contributes to 
the governance of international society as a whole. In short, the republican conception of 
raison d'etat denotes the belief that domestic political order and interstate order are both 
part of a larger world political order.
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CHAPTER 5: THE REPUBLICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY, MIXED POLITIES AND DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY
As we saw in the introduction and in chapter 3, for the statist conception of international 
society, the modern states system is composed of like-units, in the form of unitary 
sovereign states. We find here the third element of the statist approach to international 
society, which rests on two ideas. First, modern international society is exclusively 
composed of sovereign states; and, secondly, a unitary conception of sovereign statehood. 
Thus, in historical terms, the statist approach claims that modem international society is 
exclusively composed of unitary sovereign states. In this regard, historical cases of political 
systems characterised by divided sovereignty are seen either as medieval hangovers, like 
the German Empire, or as a result of imperial experiences, like European colonial empires, 
which makes them to fall into the domestic side of the domestic/international divide. The 
consequence of this historical narrative has been a clear unwillingness by contemporary 
International Relations to discuss the notion of divided sovereignty, which occupies an 
important place in the work of many early modern political thinkers. However, as we noted 
in the introduction of the thesis, some recent works within International Relations have 
shown a disposition, if not to focus explicitly on divided sovereignty, at least to challenge 
the statist view. For instance, Barry Buzan and Richard Little, and John Gerard Ruggie 
argue that international anarchy may be compatible with the differentiation of units.1 
Moreover, as it was also already noted, Martin Wight put forward a similar challenge by 
explicitly questioning the positivist doctrine of exclusive state personality.2
Building on these suggestions, the explicit focus of this chapter is the notion of 
divided sovereignty, as it was developed by Samuel Pufendorf to explain the constitutional 
nature of the German Empire after the Peace of Westphalia. Before I discuss Pufendorf s 
work, which constitutes the central part of the chapter, it is necessary to address other 
important questions. First, I will briefly explain how two different conceptions of extended
1 See the introduction above, p.5.
2 See the introduction above, p. 8.
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empire coexisted in early modern Europe. After this section, I turn to Pufendorf s treatment 
of the constitutional nature of the post-Westphalia German Empire. Specifically, I will 
show how the Westphalia’s constitutional puzzle led Pufendorf to develop the concept of 
confederated union of states, characterised by the division of the marks of sovereignty. 
However, to prepare the grounds for the rest of the chapter, to understand why the concept 
of divided sovereignty has been ignored within International Relations, and why it is 
helpful to recover it, we need to be aware of what I call the ‘Westphalian myth’ and 
‘modem anomalies’.
International political theory, the Westphalian myth, and modern anomalies.
As I noted above, for the statist approach, modem international society is exclusively 
composed of unitary sovereign states. There is however something odd about this historical 
view. First of all, the moment of the emergence of the states system is quite long. It 
occurred, in the words of Terry Nardin, ‘between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries’. 
Moreover, such a historical moment is full of examples that are ‘less easily 
accommodated’, such as personal unions, confederations, alliances, and the Holy Roman 
Empire, which lasted until the beginning of the nineteenth century,3 and was then replaced 
by the German Confederation, also founded on the division of sovereignty, which survived 
until 1870. To be precise, the final consolidation of the modem states system did not take 
place until the 1960s, when ‘the nearly uniform system of sovereign equality’ was at last 
established.4 Yet, when this happened, some regions of modem international society, most 
notably Western Europe, were engaged in creating institutional forms of divided sovereign 
authority. From these modern anomalies, we can draw one obvious conclusion: in historical 
terms, the states system, exclusively composed of unitary sovereign states, never existed. 
Yet, most people in the discipline of International Relations persist in believing in its 
existence, and this is so for understandable reasons. The sovereign unitary state has been 
undoubtedly the prevalent unit in modern international society, and most of the important 
issues that affect world politics seem to revolve around the state. In this regard, it is quite
3 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p.51.
4 Bariy Buzan and Richard Little, ‘The Idea of “International System”: Theory Meets History’, International 
Political Science Review, 15 (1994), p.253.
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natural to treat modem international society as a political system composed of unitary 
sovereign states. However, such a view conceals important features of modem international 
society and, more significantly, buries in the dust of the past relevant concepts that once 
recovered may help to illuminate some important theoretical concerns.
Indeed, some of those concerns recently emerged in contemporary International 
Relations literature. As we saw in the introduction of the thesis, reflecting the growing 
doubt about conventional explanations, a number of scholars address the question of 
functionally differentiated units.5 This shows at once that the issue of an international 
society composed of unlike-units is on the agenda of contemporary international political 
theory. There is, however, a tendency to equate the modern Westphalian international 
society, as in opposition to the concept of international anarchy as such, with a political 
system of like-units. For instance, Ruggie uses the term ‘institutional framework of 
sovereignty’ to characterise the modern states system.6 Likewise, for Buzan, Charles Jones 
and Little, ‘the modem international system...is made up of sovereign states, conceived as 
like-units’.7 As a result of a rather interesting conceptual move, but in my view ultimately 
unsatisfactory, these authors make a crucial distinction between the concept of anarchy and 
political modernity. As Buzan and Little argue, historically, there have been different types 
of anarchical international systems. For instance, some, like the medieval system, were 
composed of unlike-units. As such, the idea of anarchy may be ‘compatible with 
differentiation of units’.8 However, for Buzan and Little, the modem Westphalian states 
system is formed by functionally undifferentiated units, defined as unitary sovereign 
states.9 Therefore, Ruggie, and Buzan and Little seek to reconceptualise the notion of 
anarchy without attempting to reconsider the nature of modern international society. To a 
large extent, this results from the need to offer an explanation for the fact that certain 
international changes, which are occurring at the levels of interaction and the nature of 
units, do not result from an overall international structural transformation. In other words, 
according to these authors, we just need to reformulate the notion of international anarchy
5 See, for instance, John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998); and Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘Reconceptualizing 
Anarchy: Structural Realism Meets World History’, European Journal o f International Relations, 2 (1996).
6 Constructing World Polity, p. 146.
7 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic o f Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.89.
8 Buzan and Little, ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy’, p.403.
9 For the comparison between the medieval and the modem international systems, see Ruggie, Constructing 
the World Polity, pp. 146-7, and Buzan and Little, ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy’, pp.414-5.
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in order to accommodate views such as ‘a modified Westphalian system’10 or even a ‘post- 
Westphalian states system’.11 However, even if these accounts of international change are 
able to abandon the idea of a structural change, they still need to rely on a historical 
transformation from political modernity to something ‘post-it’. Yet, this move from 
emphasising a structural change to stressing key historical transformations does not solve 
all problems, as we shall see below.
Some scholars also refer to the importance of the idea of divided sovereignty. The 
most notably case, Stephen Krasner, notes that the actual content of sovereignty has been 
contested throughout the history of the modern international political system. In some 
cases, the exercise of sovereign authority varied with the issue area, as it happened for 
instance in the Holy Roman Empire.12 The claim that modem world politics has been 
characterised by a permanent contestation of sovereign authority led Krasner to reject the 
assertion, made by many, that contemporary violations of territoriality and sovereign 
autonomy reflect a basic transformation of the international political system. The normative 
and legal principles of the political system of sovereign states, argues Krasner, have 
persistently been compromised.13 Yet, this new historical interpretation does not lead 
Krasner to offer a new definition of the concept of international society. Rather, he includes 
such an interpretation within a broad realist explanation.14 Thus, in his attempt to 
reconceptualise international political modernity, without redefining the nature of the 
anarchical political system, Krasner seems to follow the opposite route, in comparison to 
the one taken by Buzan and Little, Linklater, and Ruggie.15 In my exercise of recovering a
10 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, pp.45-61.
11 Although developing a different argument, comparing to Buzan and Little and Ruggie, Andrew Linklater 
also believes that it is possible to go through a historical transformation from the Westphalian modernity 
without necessarily occurring a structural change from international anarchy. See The Transformation of 
Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), in particular pp. 168-78, where Linklater argues that a 
‘post-Westphalian international society’ is compatible with the persistence of a formal anarchical structure.
12 Stephen D. Krasner, *'Westphalia and All That’, in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas & 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.235- 
64.
13 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, International Security, 20 (1995/96), pp. 115-51.
14 The reason I include Krasner’s argument in the broad realist tradition is justified by the following 
statement: ‘Given the asymmetries of power, diversity of interests, and the weakness of institutionalizing 
mechanisms in the international system, it would be more productive to stop thinking of the Westphalian 
model as some ideal or historical reality and to treat it as a reference point or convention that is useful in some 
circumstances but not others. Some states have the power to preserve their territory and autonomy; others do 
not’, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, pp. 150-1.
15 Yet, against the general direction of his argument, Krasner notes that ‘normative discourse’ should 
‘contribute to the more imaginative construction of institutional forms-forms that compromise Westphalia- 
that could create a more stable and peaceful international system’, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, p. 151.
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forgotten constitutional imagination, I try to link the two tasks. To do that, I heavily rely on 
the modern republican tradition.
From a republican perspective, Daniel Deudney’s work on the Philadelphian system 
also addresses the notion of confederation of states or, in his terms, ‘compound republics’.16 
I disagree, however, with Deudney’s argument on two grounds. First, it seems to me that 
the way Deudney conceptualises sovereignty is not satisfactory. Although Deudney also 
focuses on ‘large-scale security structures that are alternatives to the state and anarchy’, that 
is on ‘interstate unions’,17 he rejects the conceptual viability of the notion of divided 
sovereignty. According to Deudney, sovereignty is ‘the ultimate source of all legitimate 
authority in a polity’,18 and as such cannot be divided. Those who talk about divided 
sovereignty, for Deudney, ‘are conflating sovereignty and political authority’.19 Yet, 
historically, the republican idea of divided sovereignty emerged with the attempt to divide 
the exercise of sovereign authority through different governmental institutions, as this 
chapter will try to demonstrate.20 Secondly, in my view, Deudney’s discussion suffers from 
an implicit belief in the ‘American exceptionalism’, which leads him to ignore the impact 
of constitutional alternatives to the state and anarchy elsewhere, both in Europe and in the 
European colonial empires.21 As a result, he also ends up with the conventional statist 
conception of the Westphalian political system.22 One of the implications is that the 
Philadelphian system looses some of its historical meaning, becomes a short-lived 
historical example that constitutes an exception to the modern rule, and turns into an ideal 
model for a post-Westphalian international society. In other words, by seeing the
16 See ‘The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States- 
Union, circa 1787-1861’, International Organization, 49 (1995), pp. 191-229; and, ‘Binding Sovereigns: 
Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia 
Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 190- 
239. Another work that discusses the republican conceptions of international society and divided sovereignty 
is Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
17 Deudney, ‘The Philadelphian System’, pp.191-2.
18 ‘The Philadelphian System’, p. 198, my emphasis.
19 ‘The Philadelphian System’, p.198.
20 One of the reasons that leads Deudney to reject the idea of divided sovereignty is his belief in the 
legitimacy of popular sovereignty, which of course stems from his focus on the republican ideas of the 
American Founding Fathers. Thus, he needs to distinguish between the ultimate unitary nature of popular 
sovereignty and the division of the exercise of political authority.
21 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that ‘the European political order as a whole was frequently understood to 
be a type of republic’; ‘The Philadelphian System’, p. 192. Yet, he never develops such view and ends up by 
opposing the Philadelphian republican order against the Westphalian statist order, pp.222-4.
22 See Daniel Deudney, ‘Binding Sovereigns’, pp. 190-2.
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Philadelphian system as an exceptional historical example, Deudney is not able to entirely 
escape the anomaly argument.
It is important, at this point, before we shift to the historical investigation, to 
introduce some key notions. The first is divided sovereignty: sovereignty is not understood 
as a form of unitary authority, where sovereign power is concentrated in a central political 
institution, but as a set of marks that divide sovereign authority over different political 
issues, which can be exercised by distinct political institutions and distributed across 
borders.23 In this chapter, the idea of divided sovereignty is discussed in the context of 
international confederations. Thus, the process of the internationalisation of sovereignty 
presupposes the idea of an extended mixed respublica which, following Deudney, may be 
defined as ‘an institutionalized system of decentralized power constraint’, characterised by 
the existence of ‘multiple authorities not hierarchically arranged’.24 In this regard, a 
republican confederation cannot be included in the conventional ‘dyad of hierarchy and 
anarchy’.25 In order to fully understand the historical origins of the idea of a republican 
confederation, it is necessary first of all to briefly explain the early modern treatment of the 
notion of imperium.
Two conceptions of extended empire
To understand the idea of divided sovereignty, it is important to remember that modern 
European states emerged in the context of imperial political structures. Conventional 
political theories, and specifically most of international theories, identify these imperial 
systems with medieval politics and see the emergence of modern international society in 
terms of a stark discontinuity with medievalism. This chapter will challenge such a view, 
by presenting a twofold argument. First, it will be argued that the notion of divided 
sovereignty was the result of the adaptation of those imperial structures to modern politics. 
In this regard, the chapter opposes the discontinuity thesis, and accepts a degree of 
continuity between the medieval and the modern. This alternative interpretation requires in
23 For recent discussions of divided sovereignty, see Buzan and Little, ‘The Idea of International System’, 
p.253; Krasner, ‘Westphalia and All That’, p.237; and Onuf, The Republican Legacy, pp. 113-38.
‘The Philadelphian System’, pp. 192-98.
25 Deudney, ‘The Philadelphian System’, p. 194.
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turn a stress on the central role of Renaissance political thought in the emergence of both 
the ideas of divided sovereignty and international society.
In early-modern Europe, there were three different meanings of the word imperium, 
and all inherited from classical Rome. First, the idea of an absolutist monarchical empire. 
Despite the end of the Western Roman Empire in 476, the significance of the idea of 
universal monarchy did not vanish. Moreover, the imperial institution was recovered during 
the middle ages. The imperial title was given again in 800 to Charlesmagne, and from his 
successors, it passed to the German Hohenstaufens and on to the Austrian and Spanish 
Habsburgs. According to the second meaning, imperium meant the rule of law founded on a 
common constitution over multiple dominions. In contrast to the absolutist conception, this 
second use of the term imperium designates ‘rule by rules, and not domination by brute 
force’.26 It is in this conception o f ‘empire’ that we find the origins of the idea of confederal 
republican order. Finally, the third meaning was related to the emergence of ‘particularist 
claims to authority’, which resulted into the notion of imperium as unitary state 
sovereignty.27 This chapter focuses on the second meaning of the idea of empire. It will be 
showed, first, in which way such a meaning was perceived, by its proponents, to be in 
opposition to the first meaning of imperium, associated with the ideology of universal 
monarchy. Secondly, it will also be demonstrated that for some of those proponents, most 
notably for Samuel Pufendorf, the confederal conception of empire was seen as an 
alternative to the third meaning of imperium as state sovereignty. This view suggests a 
different interpretation of the evolution of modern international society. Instead of seeing it 
as a state system composed of like-units, this republican reading, emphasising the 
importance of post-imperial, or confederal, political structures where the marks of 
sovereign authority were divided, treats such polities not as medieval hangovers but as 
normal modern political institutions. Before we proceed with the discussion, it is important 
to clarify in which sense the first meaning of the term imperium will be discussed here, for 
the international implications of the idea of universal monarchy will also be addressed in 
the next chapter. The term universal monarchy was used both in the context of an ideology 
of world empire, which will be treated in the next chapter, and as an absolutist monarchical 
empire. Although the two were linked in early modern Europe, they deserve in this thesis a
26 See Onuf, The Republican Legacy, p. 127.
27 See David Armitage, ‘Introduction’, in David Armitage (ed.), Theories o f Empire 1450-1800 (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998), p.xvi.
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distinct conceptual treatment. In this chapter, the focus will be on the latter meaning of the 
term. Thus, the expression ‘two conceptions of extended empire’ refers to the distinction 
between an absolutist monarchical empire and a confederal republican empire.
The idea o f absolutist monarchical empire
As many other political ideas in early modern Europe, the notion of absolutist monarchical 
empire also has Roman origins. From the second half of the first century A.D., the term 
imperium came to carry a territorial dimension’, as imperium Romanum, or Roman 
empire. As this indicates, the association between imperium and an extended territorial 
entity was the result of the expansion of Rome, through war and conquest29 It was this 
meaning of the imperium Romanum that both the medieval and the early modern emperors, 
who saw themselves as the heirs of the Roman emperors, sought to revive. In addition, 
during the early modern period, besides the idea of an extended territory, the Roman 
Empire was also associated with a specific kind of political regime: absolutist monarchy. In 
the words of Anthony Pagden, ‘[t]he transformation of the status of the Roman emperor 
from Augustus to Constantine the Great effectively involved the transformation of a Roman 
principes into a theocratic Hellenistic monarch’. In early modern Europe, adds Pagden, 
‘this understanding of what it was to exercise imperium was identified [as] monarchy’.30 
Thus, the Roman empire was seen as the historical example of both an extended territorial 
empire and an absolutist monarchy; hence the term absolutist monarchical empire adopted 
here.
In early modern Europe, it was the Habsburgs, both the Spanish and the Austrians, 
who first sought to create an absolutist monarchical empire. As the Roman imperial model, 
Charles V’s empire involved a process of territorial expansion, captured by the term 
‘incorporating empire’,31 or in Machiavellian terms, ‘commonwealth for expansion’. Such
28 Armitage, ‘Introduction’, p.xv.
29 See the discussion in J.S. Richardson, ‘Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of Power’, in 
Armitage (ed.), Theories o f Empire, pp.l and 5-9.
30 See Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World: Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 
1800 (London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 15.
31 See John Robertson, ‘Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modem European Political Order’, in 
John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union o f1707 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.5-6, and 19-20.
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• * 32an expansion required the attempt ‘to concentrate power in the hands of a single man’. 
Thus, again in line with the Roman empire, the political regime of the Habsburgs’s empire 
was also an absolutist monarchy.33 As a Spanish writer put it, addressing his monarch, 
‘your majesty...has an empire of undivided jurisdiction from this to the far hemisphere’. 
Indeed, according to contemporaries, ‘the Spanish monarchy constituted a single legislative 
body from the Netherlands to Chile’.34 For instance, in accordance with the absolutist 
ideology, ‘the American possessions were legally a part of the kingdom of Castile’,35 and, 
in an illustrative way, the imperial ceremonies in the colonies ‘meant to suggest a 
continuity between the viceroy and the Roman consuls’.36 The appearance of the idea of 
confederal union in the reflections of many political thinkers in those regions threatened by 
Spanish and Austrian imperialism is another point that demonstrates the Habsburgs’s 
aspirations to create an absolutist monarchical empire. During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, the confederal nature of the Dutch United Provinces and of the Swiss 
Confederation resulted largely from their opposition to the Habsburgs’ territorial 
imperialism.37 This shows at once that, in contrast with expansionist empires, ‘confederal
38union was represented as antagonistic to extensive territorial empire’.
This brief clarification of the term absolutist monarchical empire is important in the 
sense that it helps to understand the meaning of confederated empire, for the latter emerged 
as a reaction against the former, despite some confusion originated by the use of the term 
empire in both cases. Moreover, given the example of Rome, which seemed to demonstrate 
that all types of empires were bound to be closely associated with the practice of territorial 
conquest, early modern republican thinkers tried to deal with a crucial issue. As Pagden 
puts it,
32 Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), p.3.
33 According to Pagden, ‘in theory’, the Spanish empire was ‘a confederation of principal ties held together in 
the person of a single king’, see Spanish Imperialism, p.3. Yet, even if this is legally true, the point is that 
early modem reflection on the political nature of the Habsburgs’s empire identified it with the idea of 
universal monarchy. See for instance, Pagden, Spanish Imperialism, chapter 2. See also Richard Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.65-80.
34 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 137.
35 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 46.
36 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 139.
37 See Robertson, ‘Empire and Union’, pp.21-3. These became the most famous examples of confederations. 
Yet, there were other attempts, and all related with anti-imperial motivations, such as the Bohemian, 
Moravian, Austrian, and Hungarian Estates Confederation, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, both of 
which opposed the Austrian Habsburgs’ territorial imperialism. See Robertson, ‘Empire and Union’, pp.23-4.
38 Robertson, ‘Empire and Union’, p.5.
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The conflict between the political visions of empire and republic is based on the assumption that because all 
empires are founded upon conquest none...[is] in fact ever able to achieve the transition from an extended 
assembly of states to a true confederacy’.39
In other words, for early modern republican thinkers, how to extend a republican order to 
the international sphere became a crucial question. One of the answers was the notion of 
confederated republic.
The idea o f a republican confederal union
The notion of a republican confederal empire was also inspired in the classical Roman 
model. As in the case of the absolutist form of empire, Rome, but now the republic, 
provided the ‘foundation myth’. As Pagden notes, ‘Tacitus spoke of the Roman world as an 
‘immense body of empire’...the kind of political...unity created out of a diversity of 
different states widely separated in space’.40 Of course, this is associated with the second 
meaning of the term imperium, identified above as the decentralised form of the rule of law 
within the Roman republic.41 It is this idea of a diversity of territories united under the rule 
of law that underpins the republican conception of empire. Early modern republican 
thinkers recovered such a view of imperium when they tried to show that ‘size...was no 
impediment to true republican government, so long as the various parts of the state 
constituted an association of states or a confederacy’.42 Thus, the Roman republic and the 
early republican phase of the empire were used as historical examples of a confederal 
empire.
We first find a strong attempt to develop the idea of a confederal empire in early 
Italian Renaissance with the school of legal humanism.43 Those legal humanists lived in a 
political context marked by the struggle for political self-determination against the
39 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 16.
40 Lords o f All the World, pp. 13-4.
41 See Richardson, ‘Imperium Romanum’, pp. 1-5.
42 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 16.
43 See Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology o f  Law and 
History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and Donald R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social 
Thought in the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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Emperor. Their contribution to the fight for political freedom involved the development of 
intellectual weapons. Yet, and this point is crucial to understand the idea of confederal 
empire, their fight did not involve a radical attack on the imperial structures, but only a 
defence of the modification of those structures in a way that could respect communal 
political freedom. This was, in turn, linked to the intellectual context of Renaissance 
Northern Italy. Renaissance legal humanists, on the one hand, sought to justify the freedom 
of political communities in Northern Italy, but on the other hand ultimately accepted the 
existence of imperial structures. In the language of contemporary international theory, 
which was not the language of the Renaissance, but helps to understand the points I am 
trying to make, the coexistence between political self-determination and imperial structures 
has a double meaning. First, Renaissance political communities acquired their autonomy 
gradually and within existent imperial structures, and not in a condition of the international 
state of nature.44 Secondly, these imperial and societal structures, historically, formed the 
constitutional framework in which the idea of divided sovereignty emerged.
These views received an extensive treatment by legal humanists. As it was noted, 
their central political concern was the justification of the Northern Italian city-states’ fight 
for political liberty against the Emperor. Legally, these cities were vassals of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and this condition extended as far back as the ninth century. Yet, despite 
this legal subjection, Northern Italian cities were able to acquire a great measure of de 
facto  autonomy during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Such a political self- 
determination was threatened y the Emperor Barbarossa’s expeditions to Northern Italy 
during the second half of the twelfth century. From that moment, the Holy Roman 
Emperors tried ‘to impose their rule’ in Italy, ‘while the leading cities...fought with no 
less determination to assert their independence’.45 The Emperors had a very strong ally in 
the scholastic legal school, which interpreted Roman Law in the terms of the Justinian’s 
Code. For scholastics, Roman law was interpreted in a way that permitted the Emperor to 
be ’regarded as the dominus mundi, the sole ruler of the world’.46 The implication of this
44 F.H. Hinsley makes a similar point when he says that the newly independent city was ‘still part of the 
Empire because it had acquired its rights by the overt or tacit consent of the Emperor’, see Sovereignty 
(Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.81.
45 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.5.
46 Skinner, The Renaissance, p. 8. For a discussion of the political and legal arguments in defence of the 
Emperor’s authority, see Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp.92-108.
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conventional view was that the legitimisation of the cities’ resistance to the imperial 
dominion required a legal revolution. Pure political arguments and the fight for self- 
defence were not enough.
The decisive move was to abandon the interpretation of Roman Law as civil law 
and to see it as the common law of the Respublica Christiana. The Corpus Juris began to 
be presented ‘as a kind of European common law, which [was] not necessarily associated 
with political subordination to the emperor’. For legal humanists, Europe was regarded less 
as a system of political subordination than as a set of communities, which recognised a 
single common law.47 Such a theoretical break, however, accepted the existence of two 
levels of legal authority. First, the domestic legislative sovereignty, which justified the 
cities’ claims to political self-determination. For instance, Bartolus, in one of his works, 
explicitly asked ‘whether the Italian cities may be said to have the rights to make their own 
laws’. His answer was that ‘every king within his own kingdom is equivalent in authority to 
the Emperor’, and in this sense Italian cities ‘ought to be recognised as fully independent 
sovereign bodies’.48 At a second level, legal humanists admitted that the Emperor kept 
some sovereign authority over the Respublica Christiana, and it is in this sense that it was 
referred that the reaction of the legal humanists was not radical. In particular, it was 
recognised that the Emperor had the authority to mediate conflicts between the civitas, and 
to impose his views, and to organise external defence against the common enemies of the 
Respublica Christiana 49 Therefore, we have here what is probably the first early modem 
attempt to formulate the conception of divided sovereignty. Whereas some marks of 
sovereignty, such as legislative and fiscal powers, were earned by the civitas\ other marks 
of sovereign authority, such as some judicial powers and supranational authority in the 
domain of external defence, were retained by the Emperor.
It is also in the context of the emergence of the idea of mixed constitutions that we 
need to understand the conception of divided sovereignty. For republicans, the central 
purpose of the mixed constitutions was the protection of political freedom. Now, political 
liberty can be, above all, threatened by both dominion and corruption. To deal with the 
former, it is fundamental to limit attempts to absolute power. In the Renaissance, the 
arguments defending the imposition of constitutional limits on the exercise of absolutist
47 Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution, p. 16.
48 Skinner, The Renaissance, pp. 10-1.
49 Black, Political Thought in Europe, pp.88-9.
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power were made in support of the resistance against the Emperor. Thus, in this sense, the 
defence of a constitutional mixture of sovereign powers resulted from the rejection of 
absolutist monarchy.50 The other threat to political freedom, corruption, according to 
republican thought, is the consequence of the degeneration of the three basic types of 
polity, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, into, respectively, tyranny, oligarchy, and 
anarchy. The solution ‘was to ensure moderation and proportion by combining or mixing 
[the] various types’ of political regime.51 In this way, political liberty was guaranteed 
through the establishment of mixed constitutions, where political power was balanced and 
divided between different social groups. Therefore, it seems safe to affirm that the idea of 
mixed constitutions is, historically, associated with republicanism in a double way. First, it 
is related with the struggle for a republican value: political liberty. In addition, a 
constitution that guarantees the freedom of political communities reflects a republican 
model of governance, where the central elements are the rule of law and the division of the 
exercise of sovereign authority. In other words, the idea of divided sovereignty was largely 
the result of the transposition of the republican political principles to the international level.
To further clarify the idea of a confederal respublica, founded on a common 
constitution, and where the marks of sovereignty are divided, we need, in addition, to 
discuss the coexistence between the concepts of universitas and civitas. ‘Between the 
highest Universality or ‘All-Community’ and the absolute Unity of the individual man, we 
find a series of intermediating units, in each of which lesser and lower units are comprised 
and combined’. This defines what Otto Gierke calls the ‘federalists construction of the 
Social Whole’.52 In the words of Bartolus,
The Emperor is truly lord of the entire world. And this does not prevent that others should be lords in a more 
particular sense, because the world is a kind of universitas, and hence there may be a person who possesses 
the said universitas and yet the individual things do not belong to them.53
50 See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), p.45.
51 See Richard Bellamy, ‘The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of Powers, Rights and 
Representative Democracy’, Political Studies, XLIV (1996), p.440.
52 Political Theories, p.21.
53 Quoted in Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution, p. 15. Onuf also argues that 
Bartolus’s view of international political order is founded on the idea of ‘associations in ascending order of 
size’, see The Republican Legacy, pp.70-1.
1 7 4
Thus, for the Renaissance publicists, the European respublica was simultaneously united 
and plural. The concept of divided sovereignty was the result of such unity and pluralism. 
On the one hand, the newly independent civitas expressed the political pluralism of the 
Renaissance Europe, while, on the other hand, the Emperor symbolised the unity of the 
Respublica Christiana. There is of course a medieval outlook in the imperial nature of such 
a unity; but this results from the fact that independent political communities were formed 
within imperial structures. Despite such a medievalism, the point that needs to be stressed 
is that the political transition that occurred during the Renaissance originated the notion of 
divided sovereignty. To be a modern concept, it was just necessary to replace the Emperor 
by the idea of respublica. In this case, sovereign authority would be divided between the 
level of the respublica and the level of the states.
So far, the chapter has argued that we find in Renaissance republican thought, the 
emergence of the notion of a confederal system of international political order, composed 
by a variety of political communities, which shared the marks of sovereign authority among 
them.54 We shall see now how Pufendorf, in order to explain the constitutional nature of the 
German Empire after the Thirty Years’ War, recurred also to the ideas of confederation and 
divided sovereignty.
Samuel Pufendorf and the constitutional nature of the German Empire
Contemporary International and Political Theory tends to treat Pufendorf s political thought 
in a very statist way. Indeed, the conventional interpretations in both disciplines 
complement each other. Whereas within Political Theory, Pufendorf is seen as one of the 
first modern thinkers to have conceptualised the sovereign state, for international theory 
scholars he is one of the early theorists of the modem states system. As we saw in chapter 
3, in Systems o f  States, Wight treated Pufendorf as the first modern thinker to use the notion 
of states system in the contemporary meaning as an international system composed of 
unitary sovereign states.55 After Wight, this statist reading of Pufendorf s work has been
54 Black also tries to recover a confederal model of international society, which is associated with the thought 
of the sixteenth century German thinker, Johannes Althusius, see Antony Black, ‘Nation and Community in 
the International Order’, Review o f  International Studies, 19, 1 (1993), pp.84-6.
55 See Martin Wight, The Systems of States (edited by Hedley Bull, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
1977), p.21.
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widely accepted in international political theory. For instance, Andrew Linklater treats 
Pufendorf s thought as representative of the emergence o f ‘the classic theory of the modem 
states-system’.56 Charles Beitz sees Pufendorf as an exponent of ‘the morality of states’
• • * • 57approach, to which ‘States, not persons, are the subjects of international morality’. More 
recently, David Boucher, who otherwise is a strong critic of Wight’s approach to the history 
of international political thought, restated the conventional interpretation of Pufendorf s 
thinking. For Boucher, Pufendorf‘presented an elaborate theory of the... state system’, and
58as such captured the ‘Westphalian moment’ of modern politics.
Likewise, within the History of Political Thought, and within Political Theory, 
Pufendorf is mainly seen as a theorist of the sovereign state. The emphasis on the statist 
dimension of his thought is part of a broader interpretation, which includes Pufendorf 
within the modern school of natural law.59 James Tully’s work reveals the terms in which 
the natural law and the statist interpretations often appear together. According to Tully, 
Pufendorf sought ‘to develop, within a framework of natural laws... a theory of the 
consolidating independent political societies or states, the authority of rulers, and the duties 
and rights of subjects’.60 This view leads Tully to conclude that ‘being the first to present a 
comprehensive theory of the existing European state system, Pufendorf is the first 
philosopher of modem politics’.61 Still among historians of political thought, a different 
interpretation, developed by Friedrich Meinecke, also emphasises the statist nature of 
Pufendorf s thought, by considering him a precursor of the German historical tradition of 
the raison d ’etat?2
However, by stressing the statist dimension of his thought and ignoring other 
relevant ideas also developed by the German thinker, which in fact distance him from the 
statist conception of the modern international society, these views reveal a one-sided 
interpretation of Pufendorf s contribution to modern political thought. Rather interestingly,
56 Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations (Second Edition, London: Macmillan, 1990), 
p.62. For Linklater’s treatment of Pufendorf, see the chapter 4 of the book, pp.62-79.
7 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), p.65.
58 See Political Theories o f International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 10, 
pp.223-54.
See Richard Tuck, ‘The Modem Theory of Natural Law’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages o f  
Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.99-122.
60 ‘Introduction’ to Pufendorf, On the Duty o f Man and Citizen (Edited by James Tully, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.xix.
61 ‘Introduction’, p.xx.
62 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine ofRaison d ’Etat and Its Place in Modern History 
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), chapter 9, pp.224-43.
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the suggestions for a different interpretation of Pufendorf s work are offered by Wight and 
Hedley Bull themselves. In one occasion, Wight alludes to Pufendorf as a theorist of 
international confederations,63 and Bull admits that Pufendorf s notion of ‘system of states’ 
refers to ‘particular groups of states... which were sovereign yet at the same time connected 
so as to form one body-like the German states after the Peace of Westphalia’.64 Of course, 
by having not developed these suggestions, Wight and Bull show their belief that an 
exploration of this ‘other’ Pufendorf was not fundamental to define modem international 
society. This is the view that I challenge here in my discussion of Pufendorf. Within 
International Relations, it was Murray Forsyth who first offered a new interpretation of 
Pufendorf s contribution. For Forsyth, Pufendorf presented ‘the first coherent and sustained 
theoretical analysis of the nature of a confederation of states’.65 Significantly, as I shall 
argue, such a contribution is part of a larger intellectual attempt to understand the nature of 
those intermediate political bodies which marked the history of modern international 
society.
The new interpretations among historians of political thought also point in the same 
direction. J.G.A. Pocock considers that the reflections of Pufendorf on the nature of a 
confederacy of states provided the model for the notion of extended republican empires 
developed by eighteenth century Atlantic colonial theorists.66 Likewise, John Robertson 
argues that Pufendorf was one of the first modern thinkers to analyse systematically the 
idea of confederated unions of states.67 Finally, and most recently, Richard Tuck revised his 
earlier views and now ‘sharply distinguishes Pufendorf from Grotius and Hobbes’, 
attributing to the German thinker a ‘fluid account of sovereignty’ in the context of 
international federations.68 These new interpretations are accompanied by a recognition of 
the influence of the republican tradition on the thought of Pufendorf. The emphasis on 
Pufendorf s republicanism receives full recognition in Nicholas Onuf s recent book, where
63 Martin Wight, ‘Balance of Power and International Order’, in Alan James (ed.), The Bases o f International 
Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.97.
64 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 12.
65 Murray Forsyth, Unions o f States: The Theory and Practice o f Confederation (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1981), p.80.
66 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Politics o f Extent and the Problems o f Freedom (Colorado Springs: The Colorado 
College Press, 1987); and ‘States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modem 
Perspective’, in Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (eds.), Conceptual Change and the Constitution (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1988), pp. 55-77.
67 ‘Empire and Union’, pp.25-7.
68 Richard Tuck, The Rights o f War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 151.
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he includes Pufendorf within the category o f ‘continental republicanism’.69 My account of 
Pufendorf builds on these views that point towards a new interpretation of the German 
thinker’s contribution to the understanding of modern international society. In particular, it 
treats Pufendorf as a theorist of republican confederations and divided sovereignty.
Westphalia's constitutional puzzle
The terms of the Peace of Westphalia originated a constitutional puzzle, which in turn gave 
rise to a debate in Europe about the unitary conception of sovereignty. On the one hand, the 
Treaties recognised the sovereignty of the states of the empire by, for instance, giving them 
the right to sign treaties with foreign powers (Article 8 of the Treaty of Osnabruck and 62 
to 66 of the Treaty of Munster)70 On the other hand, the Treaties also accepted the 
sovereign authority of the Empire, considering it as an entity with international legal 
personality. In this regard, it was the Empire, through the Emperor, and not the states, that 
signed the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck. This raised an obvious problem for those 
using an unitary conception of sovereignty. Those who recognised the sovereignty of the 
Empire, to maintain this position, were obliged to ignore the sovereign powers of the states; 
those who recognised the sovereignty of the states, on the other hand, could not give an 
account of the sovereign authority of the Empire. Thus, neither argument could explain the 
complexity of the constitutional order of the Empire.
This problem forced political thinkers and lawyers to reflect more deeply on the 
constitutional nature of the Empire. Accordingly, the beginning of the seventeenth century 
was marked by a growing interest in public law within the Empire. Although there were 
divergent positions regarding the character of the imperial constitution, the dominant ones 
shared a common view: the German Empire was a form of state and as such could be 
defined by the traditional, or Aristotelian, conceptions of statehood. There were some 
important exceptions. For instance, the constitutionalist Christoph Besold defined the
69 The Republican Legacy, pp.47-57.
70 See Krasner, ‘Westphalia and All That’, p.245; and Andreas Osiander, The States System o f  Europe, 1640- 
1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions o f International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 46-7.
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• 71 • • 72Empire in terms of a ‘mixed constitution’. Yet, by calling the Empire ‘a form of state’, 
Besold also applied the category of sovereign statehood in his analysis of the Empire. In 
short, like the predominant legal schools, Besold continued to define the Empire as a single 
state. It is at this point that the work of Pufendorf on the German constitution is quite 
significant.
Pufendorf rejected all those arguments. In the recent words of a historian, ‘What 
transformed this debate was the appearance in 1667...of Samuel Pufendorfs De Statu 
Imperii Germanic! 13 Likewise, Forsyth claims that Pufendorf s main contribution was to 
abandon altogether the arguments o f ‘all those who persisted in considering the Empire as a 
state, whether mixed or unitary’.74 In the same vein, another student of the German thinker 
affirms that Pufendorf ‘transferred the constitutional problem from the arena of internal 
political relations to the setting of international relations’.75 To fully grasp Pufendorf s 
answer to the constitutional puzzle created by the Peace of Westphalia, we need to 
understand that the German thinker recurred to the political language used by the 
Renaissance legal humanists during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the language of 
continental republicanism. As we saw above, that humanist tradition tried to reconcile 
political freedom with an extended constitutional order. The result of such an effort was the 
concept of a political respublica, founded on the notions of mixed constitution and divided 
sovereignty. Three centuries later, we find the same arguments in Pufendorf.
Pufendorf and the concept o f a mixed polity
i) ‘Pufendorf the constitutional historian’
71 For a discussion of these arguments, see Julian H. Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: 
Bodin and His Critics’, in J.H. Bums (ed., with the assistance of Mark Goldie), The Cambridge History o f  
Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.317.
72 Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution”, p.324.
73 Robertson, ‘Empire and Union’, p.25.
74 Forsyth, Unions o f States pp.79-80.
75 Leonard Krieger, The Politics o f Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance o f Natural Law (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 163.
179
As it is often observed, in his work on The Present State o f Germany,76 Pufendorf wrote 
that ‘Germany is an irregular body, similar to a monster’.77 This observation has been the 
source of a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding, largely because there is a 
tendency to treat it as a complete statement, when it is in fact only the first part of a full 
sentence. This partiality stems largely from the nature of contemporary approaches to the 
work of the German thinker. As we saw above, the majority of historians of political 
thought and of international political theorists see Pufendorf mainly as a theorist of the 
modern concepts of unitary sovereignty and international states system. For these scholars, 
the use of the term ‘monster’ would be the obvious conclusion of a theorist of the modern 
sovereign state when looking at a ‘medieval’ institution like the German Empire. However, 
if  we return to Pufendorf s observation concerning the constitutional nature of the German 
Empire, we notice at once that the second part has not deserved as much attention as the 
first half of it. Indeed, the full sentence ends with the following qualification: ' i f  it is 
measured by the common rules o f politics and civil science ’;78 this part has been almost 
ignored. The consequence of what seems at first sight a minor mistake is a 
misunderstanding of historical proportions; in the process, a crucial dimension of 
Pufendorf s thought has been forgotten.
When Pufendorf told his readers that the forms of the state found in classical 
political thought were not adequate to define the Empire, he not only criticised all previous 
legal schools in their treatment of the constitution of the Empire, but he also gave the first 
step to develop his own international constitutional theory. Pufendorf shifted from an 
analysis based on pure Aristotelian concepts of the state, which he called the ‘regular forms 
of states’, to a historical and descriptive method 79 The most notable result of the work of 
Pufendorf as a constitutional historian is the idea of a confederation of states. To fully grasp 
the relevance of such a concept, and its ‘modem’ nature, it is essential to perceive the move 
that Pufendorf, as a constitutional jurist, makes from constitutional history to constitutional
76 The work was originally published in 1667, in Latin, with the title, De Statu Imperii Germanici, pretensly 
authored by a Venetian traveller, who attempted to explain the constitutional nature of the German Empire 
after the Peace of Westphalia, and who rejected all the existent explanations. The discussion here is based on 
the English edition. The Present State of Germany, or an Account o f the Extent, Rise, Form, Wealth, Strength, 
Weaknesses and Interests o f that Empire (translated by Edmund Bohun, London: 1690, 1696).
77 See The Present State o f Germany, p. 152.
78 The Present State o f Germany, p. 152, my emphasis.
79 See John G. Gagliardo, Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806 
(London: Indiana University Press, 1980), p.40.
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theory. The difficulty to clearly see such a move rests on the fact that the latter is almost 
entirely based on the former.
Pufendorf arrived at the concept o f ‘states-system’ through an historical analysis of 
the evolution of the Holy Roman Empire. He traces the historical evolution of the interplay 
between the sovereign powers of the Emperor and of the states down to the Treaty of 
Westphalia. The history of the Empire constituted, for Pufendorf, a case of degeneration of 
regular into irregular forms of state, through a gradual process of acquisition of power by 
the states. Pufendorf starts his historical account with Charlemagne’s sovereignty over 
Germany: ‘under Charles the Great, Germany became a part of the kingdom of France, and 
was...subject to the absolute empire or sovereignty of those princes’.80 Pufendorf also 
argued that Charlesmagne’s sovereign title derived from conquest, and not form the Roman 
law. As such, he denied the continuity between the classical and the medieval Roman 
Empires, and indeed attacked those who argued that the Holy Roman Empire was the heir 
to the Classical Roman Empire. For him, such a historical link was the creation of the 
Popes to guarantee the security of the Holy See and of Western Christendom.81 Thus, the 
first important historical change in the Empire occurred with the separation of the German 
lands from France, after the death of Charlesmagne: Germany ‘became again a free 
State’. The expression ‘free state’ means, for Pufendorf, that the new relations between 
the Imperial Estates and the Emperor rested on a lde facto  post-Carolingian independence 
of the princes which became de jure in the form of feudal contracts’. Such a contractual 
relationship was recognised by the Golden Bull of the fourteenth century. At this historical 
moment, the German lands, in political terms, became an elective Empire. However, 
despite the historical transformation, the Carolingian and the German Empires had 
something in common. Both were regular forms of states, and as such their constitutional 
nature could be explained by the conventional Aristotelian categories: an absolutist 
monarchical empire in the first case; and a limited monarchy in the second. This latter form 
lasted until the Thirty Years War, when great political transformations occurred, which 
were confirmed by The Peace of Westphalia.
To understand the profound constitutional transformations introduced by the 
Treaties signed in Munster and Osnabruck, Pufendorf starts by discussing ‘the power of the
80 The Present State of Germany, p. 11.
81 The Present State o f Germany, pp.20-4.
82 The Present State o f Germany, p. 13.
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Emperor’ and ‘the rights of the States of the Empire’.83 He stresses both ‘the limits to the 
imperial power’, and the preservation of the German liberties, noting that this relationship 
was recognised ‘by way of compact’.84 Thus, argues Pufendorf, the Emperor is ‘the head of 
a confederate body’, which is ‘very different in degree from that of a full and perfect 
kingdom or empire’.85 Pufendorf is of course alluding here to the disintegration from a 
regular to a irregular form of state, and to the consequent emergence of ‘a system of co­
ordinate States, which are Confederates each to other’.86 In his account of the confederate 
system, Pufendorf also refers explicitly to the idea of divided sovereignty. For instance, 
although the states enjoy domestic sovereignty over their own subjects, ‘there are few 
instances in which the Emperor can directly and immediately command the subjects of 
another Prince’.87 Therefore, Pufendorf tells us, the Peace of Westphalia validated the 
disintegration of the monarchical form of the Empire into a sort of a confederation of states. 
In Pufendorf s words, ‘So now Germany...tends naturally to the state of a Confederate 
System* **
However, it has to be noted, the term ‘disintegration’ has a double meaning: on the 
one hand, it designates the liberty of the states; but on the other hand, it means the 
establishment of a kind of confederation among them, including the Emperor. For instance, 
we should remember that during the negotiations in Munster and Osnabruck, the German 
states quite consistently showed hostility to the French project, which involved the 
complete fragmentation of the Empire. Such opposition reveals a different conception of 
'German liberties' compatible with legal commitments to the Imperial constitution. The 
crucial question now is to see the theoretical implications that Pufendorf drew from the 
narrative that he tells. For Pufendorf, the return to the condition of absolute monarchy was 
out of question. On the other hand, a continuing degeneration of the Empire would provoke 
its dissolution and give place to a system of regular states, what we now call an 
international system. Alarmed with such a possibility, Pufendorf added to his historical 
analysis a normative defence of the constitution of the Empire, which pushed him to 
develop his constitutional theory. Now, the constitutional theorist replaces the historian.
83 This is the theme of chapter 5 of the Book, see The Present State o f Germany, pp.82-97.
84 The Present State o f Germany, pp. 82-7.
85 The Present State o f Germany, pp. 87-8.
86 The Present State o f Germany, p.89.
87 The Present State o f Germany, p.93.
88 The Present State o f Germany, p. 153. Emphasis in the original.
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ii) ‘Pufendorf the constitutional theorist’
There are three relevant indications in Pufendorf s career which suggest that he took his 
work as a constitutional jurist in a quite serious way. First, he included the theoretical 
conclusions of his historical analysis of the constitution of the German Empire in two of his 
central philosophical works, respectively On the Law o f Nature and Nations, published in 
1672, and On the Duty o f Man and Citizen according to Natural Law, published in 1673. 
Secondly, in 1675, eight years after the publication of his views on the constitution of the 
Empire, he published a collection of essays, Select Scholarly Essays, which responded to 
his critics, reaffirming, and also reformulating, his previous arguments. Finally, Pufendorf 
devoted part of the last years of his life to the preparation of a new edition of On the 
Constitution o f  the German Empire*9 All this makes one think that the constitutional 
writings of Pufendorf are an essential part of his theoretical contribution to modern political 
thought.
Pufendorf admits that the Empire ‘has something of irregularity in it’. In this regard, 
as it has already been observed above, its constitutional nature cannot be explained by any 
of the ‘regular forms of government, as they are usually described by the masters of 
politics: we must therefore the more accurately enquire what its true form is’.90 In 
accordance with such observation, Pufendorf rejects the predominant interpretations of the 
Empire. He rejects, first, the argument of those who pretend that the Empire is an 
aristocracy,91 and then the claim that the German Empire was a regular monarchy, either 
absolutist or limited.92 Pufendorf argues that the notion of unitary sovereignty, either in its 
absolutist or in its limited version, is not useful to explain the constitutional nature of the 
Empire. At this point, we may notice that Pufendorf is moving towards the idea of divided 
sovereignty. If regular states are characterised by a unitary form of sovereign authority, 
then those to which such a conception of sovereignty does not apply, irregular states, are 
necessarily defined by a division of the marks of sovereignty. Moreover, in line with this 
argument, Pufendorf still adds that the Empire is not a ‘system of many Sovereign States
89 Krieger, The Politics o f Discretion, p. 156.
90 The Present State o f Germany, p. 135.
91 The Present State o f Germany, pp. 140-3.
92 The Present State o f Germany, pp. 143-52.
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and Princes...united in League’;93 in other words, the German Empire was not merely an 
alliance of states. Rather, it is ‘something (without a name) that fluctuates’ between limited 
sovereignty and a league.94 After having dismissed the alternative answers, Pufendorf is 
ready to build a new conceptual category able to define the post-Westphalian Empire. It is 
important to note that there is an element of urgency in Pufendorf s attempt to define this 
intermediate political body. First of all, because to perpetuate the inability to define the 
Empire would allow the emergence of new conflicts in Germany. The ‘Emperor is always 
labouring to reduce [Germany] to the condition of a regular Monarchy’, and the states are 
trying to acquire ‘to themselves a full and perfect liberty’.95 This state of affairs, which 
resulted from the constitutional degeneration that started with the Thirty Years War, could 
only end with a general agreement on the constitutional identity of the German Empire. Of 
course, by associating the new concept with a stable political future for the Empire, 
Pufendorf reveals the ultimate modern, and not medieval, nature of his conceptual analysis.
The first innovation offered by Pufendorf, in comparison to the other schools of 
thought, is the notion of divided sovereignty. Although, as we saw, it is a sign of 
irregularity, it is not necessarily a constitutional anomaly; all it requires is a conceptual 
effort to grasp its nature. Pufendorf achieves such a task by integrating his conceptual 
innovation within a republican confederal theory of a constitutional political system. The 
key move made by Pufendorf to interpret the nature of the German confederation was to 
treat sovereign authority as a set of marks, which can be divided and shared by different 
bodies. As such sovereignty is not inevitably concentrated in a supreme central power. In 
the case of the post-Westphalia German Empire, the sovereignty was divided between the 
states and the imperial institutions. On the one hand, the states had full sovereignty in the 
legislative, judicial and taxation policies. On the other hand, the Empire was sovereign in 
the domains of internal arbitration, external defence, and in certain foreign affairs issues.96 
It is important to note that the division and sharing of sovereignty occurs within a political 
community, founded on a common constitution. This corresponds to a post-imperial 
republican political order; or, for Pufendorf, a confederation of states.
93 The Present State o f Germany, p. 153.
94 The Present State o f Germany, p. 153.
95 The Present State o f Germany, p. 153. In this regard, in chapter 8, devoted to ‘the German interest,
Pufendorf rejects the prescriptions of those who defended the reinforcement of states’ sovereignty against the
Emperor, see pp. 187-92.
96 See Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, pp. 193-5.
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Therefore, it may be concluded that Pufendorf s constitutional theory adds new 
notions to the classical types of states. As an alternative to the ‘regular states’, or civitas, 
Pufendorf created the notion o f ‘commonwealths’. In the category of the commonwealths, 
Pufendorf made two further important distinctions. The first, between ‘irregular states’ with 
a mixed constitution and ‘state-systems’.97 Within the type of ‘states-system’, Pufendorf 
distinguished ‘personal unions’ from ‘confederations of states’. A confederation of states 
results
when several neighbouring states are so connected by perpetual alliance (treaty) that they renounce the 
intention of exercising some portions of their sovereign power, above all those which concern external 
defence, except with the consent of all, but apart from this the liberty and independence of the individual
Q£
states remain intact.
Thus, the notion of confederation of states served as ‘a cure for irregularity’. In this regard, 
we should replace the distinction between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ states, by the more 
positive dual category o f ‘simple states’ and ‘states-system’,99 but always bearing in mind 
that the latter does not have the same meaning as the contemporary concept of 
‘international system’. Pufendorf explicitly distinguished between a ‘loose’ and a ‘close’ 
states systems. The ‘loose’ system was the political system formed ‘between all peoples 
through natural law’.100 It corresponds to our contemporary notion of international society. 
The confederation of states is an example of a ‘close’ states system. In other words, a 
republican confederation is an intermediate political body between the hierarchical unitary 
sovereign state, a regular state, and international anarchy, the loose states system.
After the Peace of Westphalia, Pufendorf included the German Empire in the 
category of a confederation of states. In fact, his constitutional works were written first and 
foremost to clarify the entity created by both the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck. In this 
regard, Pufendorf makes recommendations to prevent the condition of the empire from 
deteriorating further. Thus, to the various political rulers of the German Empire, he 
recommended that they should preserve the confederation instead of trying to achieve full 
independence. This follows Pufendorf s belief that both the peace of the Empire and
97 Pufendorf, On the Duty o f Man and Citizens, p. 144.
9SOn the Duty o f Man and Citizens, pp. 144-45.
99 Krieger, The Politics o f Discretion, p. 163.
100 Forsyth, Unions o f States, pp.80-1. For the notion of ‘loose system’, see also Pufendorf, On the Duty o f  
Man and Citizens, Book Ii, Chapter 17.
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German liberties required the maintenance of the fragmented political order associated with 
the idea of confederation, which avoided the concentration of power either at the Imperial 
or at the states’ level. Those political goals could not be sustained if the Emperor sought to 
reinforce its power, threatening thereby the states’ liberties, or if the states attempted to 
consolidate their independence. Indeed, and tragically anticipating nineteenth century 
German and European history, Pufendorf declared that ‘Germany... cannot be reduced back 
to the state of a regular monarchy, without the utter ruin of the nation and government’.101
Before I conclude the chapter, it is important to note that from Pufendorf s views on 
the nature of confederations, one does not draw a theory of political systems founded on 
divided sovereignty. To pursue this line of reasoning would mean to treat Pufendorf as a 
theorist of confederations of states who is able to provide answers about the way they 
function. This is not the point of this chapter, and I believe that it is not a relevant question 
(I even doubt that it can be raised at all).102 My purpose is only to draw some implications 
regarding the nature of modem international society. The significance of Pufendorf s 
contribution lies fundamentally in two points. First of all, it shows that the collapse of an 
imperial political order is not necessarily replaced by an anarchical international system, as 
it is assumed in most of contemporary international political theory. By studying the 
historical evolution of the Holy Roman Empire, Pufendorf concluded that the collapse of 
the imperial medieval order could originate a situation in which a constitutional treaty gives 
origin to a union of states. This in turn leads Pufendorf to build a modern conceptual 
category called confederation of states. In this regard, it seems safe to suggest that 
Pufendorf saw in his conception of a confederated states-system a central contribution to 
the understanding of the modem political world that he saw unfolding in seventeenth 
century Europe. The constitutional work of Pufendorf teaches a fundamental lesson 
regarding the nature of modern politics. There are clear limits to the use of pure types of 
political systems, be it an essentialist conception of sovereign statehood or an abstract and 
unhistorical notion of anarchical international system composed by like-units. Moreover, 
these limits continued to be recognised by much of early modern political thought.103
101 The Present State o f Germany, p. 192.
102 From Pufendorf constitutional study, we may perhaps conclude that it could be useful to engage in 
comparative historical studies on constitutional forms of international political organisation other than the 
unitary sovereign state.
103 For instance, Leibniz defined the German Empire in terms of a balance and division of sovereignty 
between the Empire and the states. See Leibniz, Political Writings (Edited by Patrick Riley, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 111-20. Later, Montesquieu treated die German Empire as a
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Conclusion
The central claim of this chapter is that mixed confederations, whose normative structure 
rests on the division of the marks of sovereignty, have had a significant place in the theory 
and practice of modem international society. This view disputes the belief that the unitary 
sovereign state has been the exclusive political agent of modern international political 
history. When statist theorists define the modern concept of sovereignty exclusively in 
unitary terms, they are considering a particular manifestation of sovereignty, even if 
dominant, as synonymous with the very concept of sovereignty. As such, the fundamental 
importance of the idea of divided sovereignty in the historical development of modem 
international society entirely escapes them. In this chapter, I argue that in his analysis of a 
post-imperial political order in Germany, and building on views elaborated by Renaissance 
humanists, Pufendorf developed the republican idea of a mixed confederation of states. In 
this regard, he tells us that between the international state of nature and the unitary 
sovereign state, there are mixed forms of political systems where the marks of sovereignty 
are divided among different institutions. If we take Pufendorf seriously, we might have 
another way to tell the story of the development and expansion of modem international 
society. In this story, the conception of confederation of states plays surely a greater role 
than in the traditional account. Interesting enough, international lawyers themselves 
acknowledge the significance of the confederal principle and of the idea of divided 
sovereignty in the history of modern international society. In this regard, it is worth quoting 
Lassa Oppenheim.
The distinction between full sovereign states and partially sovereign states implies that sovereignty is 
divisible, so that the powers connected with sovereignty need not necessarily be united in one 
hand...Particularly influenced by the experience of the member states of the German Empire after the 
Westphalian Peace, and the establishment of the United States of America, Switzerland and Germany as 
federal states with sovereign powers divided between the federal state and the constituent member states, the 
need to distinguish between absolute and partial sovereignty became widely...accepted.104
confederation or, in his terms, as ‘republique federative’, see Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws (Edited by 
Anne Cohler, Basia Miller and Harold Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 131-3. In 
addition, eighteenth century republican thinkers sought to reformulate the European colonial empires in terms 
of confederations. See Pagden, Lords o f All World.
104 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, Volume 1: Peace, Introduction and Part 1 (Ninth edition, edited by 
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, London: Longman, 1996), p. 124. See also the discussion in pp.245- 
56 on ‘composite international persons’. In the same vein, John Westlake affirms that ‘sovereignty is partible’
187
Such a recognition demands International Relations scholars to address how the existence 
of confederations of states and divided sovereignty affect our understanding of the idea of 
international society.
By claiming, against the statist approach, that both divided sovereignty and mixed 
polities are important elements of modern international history, the argument of this chapter 
constitutes a further step to develop a conception of international society that escapes the 
ontological separation between domestic and international politics. In particular, it avoids 
two features of such a divide. First, it rejects the view that modem states emerged in the 
condition of the state of nature. Such a view is the result of the analogy between states and 
individuals. The contract between individuals gives origin to a collective person, which is 
seen as an autonomous agent in the state of nature. The implication of such an analogy is 
that by definition the central attribute of the person of the state, sovereignty, ought to be 
indivisible. However, and contrary to such an assertion, in this chapter, it was argued that 
the modern state, understood not as a person but as a political constitutional order, emerged 
within the framework of broader constitutional structures. In the particular case of the 
German confederation, it was established in the context of the fragmentation of imperial 
structures, and deeply influenced by constitutional and normative practices that originated 
in the Renaissance. Yet, if one assumes that sovereign states are like autonomous 
individuals in the state of nature, it is impossible to perceive this point. By rejecting the 
state of nature argument, the claim of this chapter escapes a second feature of the 
ontological divide; namely, that modern international society is exclusively formed of 
unitary sovereign states. If we understand that states are not persons but rather 
constitutional orders, which historically emerged in the framework of broader constitutional 
systems, we may then grasp that those constitutional orders can be both unitary sovereign 
states and mixed confederations.
The view that there is an intermediary level between the states system as a whole 
and the unitary sovereign state challenges the stark dichotomy between international and 
domestic politics, on which most theories of International Relations rest. In addition, in 
historical terms, this view suggests a different interpretation of the evolution of modern 
international society, emphasising the importance of the adaptation of post-imperial
and discusses the notion of ‘semi-sovereignty’, see Chapters on the Principles o f International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894), pp.86-91.
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structures to modern political conditions, which originated the emergence of mixed 
confederations. In other words, such a process of adaptation denotes the existence of an 
element of continuity between the medieval era and modernity. It illustrates what Gierke 
once observed, without the retention of some medieval elements ‘the Modern World could 
not have been what it is’.105 The ultimate implication of such a historical argument is that 
contemporary examples of mixed polities, such as for instance the European Union, should 
not be seen as examples of a ‘post-Westphalian community’, as Linklater puts it.106 The 
European Union denotes rather the formation of a constitutional and political entity, which 
may be defined by the idea of ‘multi-level polity’, where sovereignty is dispersed ‘across 
and between a variety of loosely interacting levels of governance’.107 As this chapter tried 
to show, such a constitutional order should be understood as a manifestation of the modern 
Westphalian international society.
105 Political Theories, p. 5.
106 See ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State’, European Journal o f  International 
Relations, 2 (1996), pp.77-103.
107 Richard Bellamy, ‘A European Republic: Plural and Divisible’, Europa Europe (1999), p.5.
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CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL RESPUBLICA: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND
EMPIRE
The last two chapters are the first two stages of the overall attempt to develop a 
conception of international society that escapes the ontological separation between 
domestic and international politics. Chapter 4 puts forward a notion of raison d'etat 
which includes the idea of the international public good and as such rejects the view that 
states’ political interests only reveal narrow national concerns. Chapter 5 disputes the 
assertion that modem international society is exclusively composed of unitary sovereign 
states. Thus, these two chapters have corrected two consequences that follow from the 
ontological divide, which result in a misconstruction of both the principles of states’ 
external conduct and the constitutional nature of international agents. This chapter will 
address a further consequence of the ontological divide, identified above in the 
introduction of the thesis as the ‘second implication’, namely that the international 
normative structure is exclusively created by sovereign states. Such a view rests on the 
assumption that modem states emerged and initially acted in a pre-societal and pre- 
normative state of nature. In this regard, the rejection of that implication involves a 
critique of this assumption.
In particular, this chapter directly addresses Wight’s view about the need of 
formulating a conception of international society as a constitutional entity greater than 
the sum of its parts. In other words, an idea of international society that is distinct from 
the notion of a society of states. To show that international norms are formed in a social 
and normative context, and not in the state of nature, is a crucial part of such an 
endeavour. In accordance with the overall argument of this thesis, it will be argued that 
the republican political tradition provides us with a more satisfactory account of the 
development of the international normative structure. In this regard, the chapter will 
focus on the idea of international respublica. In addition, in developing my argument, I 
will offer in the process a different view of the historical origins and evolution of 
modern international society.
Given that the concept of international respublica emerged as a reaction against 
the ideas of universal monarchy and territorial conquest, the first part of the chapter will 
discuss the nature of such notions. In the second and most substantial part, the chapter 
will explore the eighteenth century conception of international respublica. Here the
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focus will be mainly on the work of Charles de Montesquieu. In addition, the chapter 
will also discuss the views of other eighteenth century republican theorists, namely the 
contributions of David Hume.1 The chapter shall conclude with a comparison between 
the republican conception of international society and the notion of the society of states, 
specifically addressing the two central problems associated with the latter notion, which 
were discussed in chapter 3: the distinction between international society and, on the 
one hand, international system and, on the other hand, world society.
Universal monarchy and political anarchy
The idea o f universal monarchy
The expansionist strategy of the Habsburgs, from Charles V to Philip IV, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked the emergence of the project of universal 
monarchy in early modern European politics. Since the reign of Charles V, which 
started in 1519, the Habsburgs sought to implement an imperial order in Europe.2 
Simultaneously Holy Roman Emperor and Spanish monarch, Charles V became the 
political symbol of the universal monarchy.3 Whereas the former title gave him a 
connection with the classical Roman Empire, the latter made him the ruler of an 
expansionist European empire. He could thus link the old to the new world and as such 
to integrate the Americas into a European universal monarchy. As it was observed, ‘the 
sheer extent of his inheritance made possible a monarchy on a scale not seen since the
1 The treatment of Hume as a republican thinker is not a consensual point among historians of political 
thought. In this regard, this chapter draws on a particular interpretation of Hume’s thought, which suits 
the overall argument of this thesis. For Hume’s republicanism, see in particular J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.493-8, and ‘Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A 
Study of the Relations between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of 
Eighteenth-Century Social Thought’, in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue: The 
Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), pp.235-52; and John Robertson, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition’, 
in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue, pp. 137-78. See also the discussion in Knud Haakonssen, 
‘The Structure of Hume’s Political Theory’ in David Fate Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.182-221.
2 For the Habsburg expansionism, see J. H. Elliott, Europe Divided 1559-1598 (London: Fontana Press, 
1968); and Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (London: Fontana Press, 1979).
3 For a discussion of the arguments used to defend Charles V’s universal monarchy, see John M. Headley, 
‘The Habsburg World Empire and the Revival of Ghibellinism’, in David Armitage (ed.), Theories o f  
Empire 1450-1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp.45-79.
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Roman Empire’.4 In this regard, Charles V could claim to be the ‘universal and sole 
monarch of the world’.5
To fully understand the political significance and the appeal of the imperial 
ideology, it is necessary to briefly return to the medieval period. In the Middle Ages, the 
term universal monarchy stood for the government of those political powers with 
universal pretensions: the Papacy and the Empire. The legal and moral justification for 
world imperium came from Roman Law, which described the Emperor as dominus 
mundi, that is as the ruler that could claim to monarchia universalis, or to world 
domination.6 For Roman Law, the term ‘universal’ had a double meaning. On the one 
hand, ‘it referred to the superiority of the emperor over all other rulers’; and, on the 
other hand, ‘it designated the area of imperial authority, which was regarded as 
universal and not circumscribed by any political borders’.7 This usage of the term 
universal had also a double implication. First, no territorial limits could be imposed on 
the Emperor’s authority and as such the world as a whole could be subject to his rule. 
Secondly, all other rulers of both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ world were bound to the 
Emperor’s law. Such a conception of universality could thus be used to justify any 
policy of expansionism. Those who favoured the project of universal monarchy in early 
modern Europe used these arguments quite consistently. Not only during the 
Habsburgs’s period but also in the eighteenth century during the reign of the French 
king Louis XIV, as we shall see below.
For those who defended the project of universal empire, the Emperor was bound 
to fulfil two central functions: to preserve peace within Christendom, and to expand and 
defend the Christian faith against non-Christians. The first function, inherited from the 
Roman Empire, gave origin to the idea o f ‘imperial peace’, which was first elaborated in 
early Renaissance by the Florentine writer Dante.8 In his book, De Monarchia, 
published in the fourteenth century, Dante called for political unity under the authority 
of the emperor. He claimed that only a strong universal authority could maintain peace 
among Christians. As he put it,
4 John Robertson, ‘Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modem European Political Order’, in 
John Robertson, >1 Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union o f1707 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.6.
5 Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World: Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500- 
c.1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p.40.
6 For a discussion of the way the Roman legacy was used to justify universal monarchy, see Pagden, 
Lords o f  All the World, pp. 11-28.
7 See Franz Bosbach, ‘The European Debate on Universal Monarchy’, in Armitage (ed.), Theories o f  
Empire, p. 85.
8 According to Pagden, the Piedmontese Mercurio de Gattinara, Charles V’s grand chancellor, was ‘an 
admirer of Dante’s De Monorchia', see Lords o f All the World, p.40.
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Human race is at its best when a single prince and one law rule it. So it is evidently necessary for the 
welfare of the world that there should be a single monarchy or princedom, which men call the Empire. 
Whenever disputes arise, there must be judgement. Between any two independent princes controversy 
may arise and then judgement is necessary. Now an equal cannot rule over his equal, so there must be a 
third prince of wider jurisdiction who is ruler over both, to decide the dispute. This third ruler must be 
the monarch or Emperor. And so monarchy is necessary for the world...the world is ordered best when 
justice is most powerful, and justice is most powerful under a monarchy or empire.9
Thus, the memory of the Roman peace in antiquity originated a ‘vision of order and 
peace under a Universal Empire’. For many Europeans, the Roman Empire became the 
symbol for political unity of the Western civilisation, and Pax Romana stood for ‘peace 
and order’.10 The other function, the preservation of the Christian faith, demanded from 
the Emperor the capacity to defend Christendom from the external menace of the Turk 
and to impose religious unity challenged from within by the Protestant Reformation. 
The maintenance of universal peace and the preservation of Christian orthodoxy 
allowed the Emperor to legitimately use military power and engage in an aggressive 
political behaviour.11
The idea of universal monarchy was recovered during the first half of the 
seventeenth century to legitimise the imperial claims of the Habsburgs. In 1640, an 
influential treaty, De Monarquia Hispanica, which defended the idea of universal 
monarchy, was published by a Napolitan thinker, Tommasio de Campanella. Despite 
the title, Campanella considered the Habsburgs, and not only the Spanish monarch, as 
the new Roman emperors. Following Dante and other proponents of universal 
monarchy, Campanella also argued that the establishment of the empire was 
fundamental in order to maintain peace in Europe, to defeat the Protestant revolt, and 
to defend Christendom from the Ottoman threat.12 Campanella’s work also 
demonstrates that for many in Europe the issue that was really at stake in the Thirty
9 Cited in Frank L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State System (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1958) p.48. Adam Watson also notes Dante’s support for the empire as means to 
achieve peace. See The Evolution o f International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 143. For two 
helpful discussions of Dante’s political thought, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f Modern 
Political Thought, Volume One, The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 16- 
8; and Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), pp.96-100.
10 Watson, The Evolution, p.99. Watson goes as far as observing that the ‘desire for an international 
authority or world government’ still exists in the twentieth century, see p. 106.
11 SeeBosbach, ‘The European Debate’, pp.87-8.
12 See Anthony Pagden, ‘Instruments of Empire: Tommaso Campanella and the Universal Monarchy of 
Spain’, in Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 
pp.37-63; and Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp.69-72.
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Years’ War was whether the future of the international political order would follow the 
imperial model of the universal monarchy. To a large extent, the central issues of the 
War, both religious and political, were the outcome of unsolved conflicts and struggles 
that had emerged during the sixteenth century. The background against which we 
should understand all those questions was the opposition between those who fought for 
universal monarchy and those who resisted in name of the liberty of Europe.
The ideology o f conquest and political anarchy
In this section, I want to focus on two issues. First, I shall point to the close association 
between the idea of universal monarchy and the ideology of conquest. Secondly, I will 
show how the pursuit of the ideology of conquest gave rise to a condition which was 
characterised by republican thinkers as political anarchy. It will also be clear that the 
definition of such a political condition, which resembles the realist idea of a state of 
war, results from a historical analysis and in this sense does not suffer from the 
abstractedness of the notion of the state of nature. The affinity between the ideologies 
of universal imperialism and conquest appears in a clear way in the work of yet another 
Italian, Botero, who also favoured the establishment of a universal monarchy by the 
Habsburgs. However, contrary to Dante and Campanella, who focused above all on the 
legitimacy and the functions of the universal emperor, Botero concentrated on the 
strategies to achieve universal dominion. A key idea of Botero’s work is the inevitable 
progress of ‘extended empires’.13 In this regard, it is not surprising that the title of his 
main book is ‘reason of state’, which reflects his attempt to locate ‘ragion di stato... in 
the Catholic imperialism of the Habsburgs’.14 True reason of state, affirmed Botero in a 
direct criticism of France’s alliance with Protestant rulers, should aim at Christian unity 
under the supreme authority of the universal monarch, who for the Italian writer was 
the Spanish king. As Machiavelli argued in the Prince, for Botero the ultimate goal of a 
strategy of conquest is the formation of an empire. In other words, the universal 
monarchy can only be achieved by a commonwealth for expansion, to use another 
distinct Machiavellian notion. It is perhaps more than a historical coincidence that 
Charles V inherited his Spanish dominions from his grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon,
13 Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 108.
14 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p.66. Of course, Botero’s conception of reason of state should be 
distinguished from Lipsius’s and Richelieu’s conception. See the discussion in chapter 4.
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praised by Machiavelli as the example of a new prince, mainly due to his policy of 
conquest. Following Dante and Campanella, and indeed Machiavelli, Botero always 
believed that the Spanish imperial dominion could produce universal peace. Now a 
major problem arises if world politics is dominated by states for expansion, without 
any of them being able to impose an imperial peace.
As we saw above, the idea of universal monarchy could be used to justify any 
policy of expansionism. Such a link anticipated a crucial historical transformation from 
the idea of universal monarchy to the spirit of conquest. When during the eighteenth 
century, it gradually became clear that the implementation of the project of universal 
monarchy was rendered impossible by the growth of a multiplicity of political powers, 
the imperial ideology turned into strategies of permanent conquest. In this regard, the 
latter was the heir of the former. The implications were enormous. Instead of 
establishing a universal empire, which could perhaps maintain world peace, strategies 
of permanent conquest gave rise to a condition of endless wars. Eighteenth century 
republican thinkers understood this and saw the ideology of conquest as their main 
intellectual enemy. For instance, in his essay on the balance of power, Hume strongly 
criticises the spirit of conquest. Likewise, Montesquieu condemned the Spanish 
preference for conquest over commerce. Against the idea of empires for expansion, the 
republican political tradition developed the notion of empires for preservation, whose 
establishment became the condition for the existence of a peaceful international 
respublica. Already in the seventeenth century, Samuel Pufendorf had this in mind 
when he distinguished ‘imaginary’ from ‘real interests’. It is worth considering how 
Pufendorf developed such a distinction. Imaginary interests aim
At universal monarchy, a monopoly, or some other tiling of the like kind. [It] can never be pursued by a 
Prince without infinite expense and destruction to his subjects...the attempt [to universal monarchy] 
would certainly fail: it being for the interest of all other States to oppose it with all their might.
Thus, the real interest of states is ‘to preserve the Balance of Power’.15 In accordance 
with his initial distinction, throughout the book, Pufendorf consistently argues that 
European states should base their policies on three principles. First, never aim at 
universal monarchy; secondly, be always aware of any attempt of ‘aggrandisement’ by 
a great power, particularly France; and, thirdly, develop commercial relations with all 
other states in order to promote peace in Europe.
15 Samuel Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History o f the Principal States ofEurope, in Two Volumes 
(London, 1748), pp.ix-x.
195
It can be argued that to consider the idea of universal monarchy today, almost 
three centuries after it ceased to be a relevant political option, is somehow 
anachronistic. In fact, the project of a world empire seems to be excluded from the 
contemporary agenda of international relations. There are, however, three reasons why 
I believe that an exposition of the concept of universal monarchy is fundamental in the 
context of this work. The first is the obvious historical reason. It was against strategies 
of universal dominion that the idea of international respublica emerged, and this 
concept is a central concern of this thesis. Secondly, as it has just been argued, the 
impact of the ideology of conquest on external statecraft, which historically gave origin 
to the condition of international political anarchy, cannot be properly understood if we 
do not place its origins within the idea of universal monarchy. Given that the idea of a 
state of war has strongly influenced contemporary thinking about international 
relations, it is important to understand how republican thinkers characterise it. In line 
with republican thought, the first chapter of the thesis tried to show that the 
characterisation of international politics as a state of war results not from the absence 
of an international sovereign authority, as many International Relations students argue, 
but from the mixture of an extreme aggressive conception of the nationalist ideology 
with imperialist policies, which knew its historical pinnacle in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. Thirdly, as we shall see 
below, notions such as sovereign statehood and balance of power, these days often 
identified with the realist theory, gain an entirely new significance if placed against the 
background of the idea of universal monarchy. In this regard, we should now turn to 
the idea of international respublica.
A republican conception of international society
The secular conception o f respublica Christiana and the Peace o f  Westphalia
Since the Renaissance, we find European republican thinkers consistently using four 
types of arguments against universal monarchy. First, such form of empire could never 
claim any kind of political legitimacy, for it was an example of unjust rule. To 
characterise such form of injustice, they often recurred to terms such as tyranny and 
corrupted rulership. Secondly, even if it could in the end produce peace, universal 
monarchy threatens political liberty, and as such it is morally unacceptable. Thirdly,
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every action to achieve world empire constitutes an aggression against all other states. 
Fourthly, all states are justified to combine their forces to wage a defensive and just 
war against the potential universal tyrant.16
The idea of respublica Christiana as a particular conception of international 
order gained full recognition in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. For instance, Andreas 
Osiander argues that European states felt a sort of collective social obligation towards 
Christendom, or Europe. In this regard, the political and diplomatic community referred 
to the Conferences in Munster and Osnabruck as the ‘senate of the Christian world’.17 
Although the term Christiana was often used, this should not lead us to overlook the 
secular conception of the seventeenth century international order.18 In fact, secularism 
was the only possible solution for a political order that had to recognise confessional 
pluralism and sought to end with the religious conflicts that so deeply affected European 
politics since the first quarter of the sixteenth century. More than on a common 
Christian religion, European public peace rested on ‘a common secular heritage’.19 
Ideas such as the opposition to universal monarchy, the rule of law, just war, a 
defensive conception of reason of state, division of power and political equilibrium 
were the central elements of that legacy, which had undoubtedly a strong humanist and 
republican flavour. Quite significantly, Pufendorf and Leibniz associated the Peace of
* j ( \
Westphalia with the seventeenth century European republican peace. Moreover, they 
both strongly opposed Louis XIV’s attempts to impose a universal monarchy in Europe. 
Leibniz devoted a great deal of his political writings to combat the French monarch’s 
expansionist policies.21 As for Pufendorf, he warned that ‘if the French nation should 
aim at universal Monarchy the attempt would be vain’, for ‘the other powers of Europe 
would join against France’.22 However, none of these writers explicitly developed a 
republican conception of international society. For instance, in Leibniz’s idea of 
Respublica Christiana, we can still notice a strong medieval outlook, where the papacy
16 See Bosbach, ‘The European Debate’.
17 Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions o f 
International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.27.
18 It is appropriate to remember that the Pope did not recognize any legitimacy to the Peace of 
Westphalia.
19 Osiander, The States System o f Europe, p. 74.
20 See Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History, and Leibniz, 'Mars Christianissimus (Most Christian 
War-God’, in Leibniz, Political Writings (Second Edition, edited by Patrick Riley, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 123.
21 See in particular, ‘Mars Christianissimus’, pp. 121-45; ‘Manifesto for the Defense of the Rights of 
Charles HI’, pp. 146-63; and ‘Letters to Thomas Burnett’, pp. 194-5, all in Leibniz, Political Writings.
22 An Introduction to the History, pp.309 and 392.
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and the Emperor play a vital role.23 As we shall see now, a truly secular notion of 
international respublica was only formulated during the eighteenth century.
Eighteenth century republican thinkers and world politics: Resisting empire and 
avoiding anarchy
The republican political tradition was still of the most important political traditions in 
eighteenth century Europe. This chapter discusses eighteenth century republican thought 
by focusing mainly on the work of Montesquieu and, to a certain extent, of Hume. 
Within International Relations, Montesquieu’s and Hume’s thought have been almost 
ignored. For instance, in his lectures on ‘International Theory’, which discuss more than 
a fair number of thinkers, ‘who happened to have said something about international 
politics’, Wight ignores Montesquieu. As for Hume, Wight mainly refers to him as 
someone who wrote an essay on the balance of power.24 Moreover, things have not 
improved lately. Excluding the case of Nicholas Onuf,25 the most recent books on so- 
called ‘classical theories’ do not discuss the work of either of these two republican 
thinkers. In their exhaustive treatments of the history of international political thought, 
Michael Doyle devotes three lines to Montesquieu, and David Boucher does not devote 
even one.26 Hume is also almost absent from these two books. Likewise, in the 
collection edited by Ian Clark and Iver Neumann, there is no chapter on any o f the 
two.27
This general ignorance is quite strange given that Montesquieu and Hume spent 
a considerable amount of time investigating relevant questions to international politics, 
such as alliances, confederations of republics, conquest, the relation between commerce 
and peace, the laws of war, and the implications of political republicanism for 
international justice and order. Here, I shall attempt, first, to show that both 
Montesquieu and Hume were engaged in answering the same questions that worried 
also Renaissance republican thinkers, namely how to resist the creation of an imperial
23 See ‘Codex luris Gentium’, pp. 165-76; and ‘Observations on the Abbe’s Project for Perpetual Peace\ 
pp. 178-83, both in Leibniz, Political Writings.
4 See Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Edited by Gabrielle Wight and Brian 
Porter, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 165-6,171, and 260-1.
25 See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
26 Michael W. Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace (London: W. W. Norton, 1997), and David Boucher, 
Political Theories o f International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
27 Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), Classical Theories o f International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1996).
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order in Europe and, simultaneously, how to avoid the condition of political anarchy. 
Secondly, I want to argue that in some crucial respects both thinkers provided more 
satisfactory answers than their Renaissance predecessors, adding some typical 
republican notions to deal with those questions. In particular, they both developed the 
idea of international respublica.
The threat of universal monarchy returned to European politics four decades 
after the Peace of Westphalia, during the last quarter of the seventeenth century and the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. This time, the project of world empire was 
pursued by the French Bourbons. After his hegemonic pretensions during the final 
stages of the negotiations that led to the signature of the Peace of Westphalia, Louis 
XIV’s strategy of conquest started in 1672 with the Dutch War. Despite the Peace of 
Nijmegen, which ended the war, French expansionist policy continued during the 
1680s. The French monarchy returned to its plan of territorial expansionism by 
invading the German Empire in 1688. At the same time, France was heavily involved 
in English politics, supporting the Catholic Stuarts against William of Orange. Given 
that universal monarchy was linked to political dominion both in the German Empire 
and in England, the struggle for succession for the English throne was thus bound up in 
the Bourbon expansionist attempt. This imperial project originated a grand alliance 
between Austria, England and the Dutch to oppose French policy of conquests, which 
eventually led to the Nine Years War, between 1689 and 1698. After the end of that 
war, which managed to halt for a brief moment French expansionism, the Spanish 
succession dominated the European diplomatic agenda.
In February 1701, Philip V, a grandson of Louis XIV, became head of the 
Spanish Empire. Simultaneously, the French monarch renewed his policy of conquest 
and in March of the same year French troops moved towards the Dutch borders. As a 
result, in September 1701, Austria allied again with the maritime powers, England and 
the Netherlands. On 15 May 1702, the war of the Spanish Succession started. While 
Louis XIV supported Philip V as the legitimate Spanish monarch, the members of the 
grand alliance favoured the candidature of the Habsburg Archduke Charles for the 
Spanish throne. The eventual recognition of Philip V as Spanish king, moreover after 
the death of the Duke of Burgundy, the successor of Louis XIV, raised the possibility 
of a dynastic union between France and Spain. Thus, besides the Spanish succession, 
the French succession was also a central issue. In addition, the English succession was 
also at stake. William died in 1702, and the French recognised James III, exiled in 
Paris, as the legitimate pretender of the English throne. Furthermore, France pursued its
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expansionism in the German Empire, and its diplomacy was attempting to have Louis
n o
XIV elected Holy Roman Emperor, an old pretension of the monarch. A union 
between the French and the Spanish empires, the election of Louis XIV, or his 
successor, to the Imperial throne in Germany, and finally a Stuart in the English throne 
would signify the establishment of a world empire, under the leadership of the 
Bourbons. In Pagden’s words, ‘Louis XIV’s project for an etat unifie. ..came to seem to 
many Europeans to be the successor state to the Habsburg Universal Monarchy’. This 
shows quite clearly that the idea of universal monarchy was the most pressing issue of 
international relations at the time. At the intellectual level, Campanella’s arguments 
defending the merits associated with imperial peace were recovered by a number of 
essays, this time supporting the pretensions of Louis XIV to create a universal 
monarchy.30 It is in this context that we need to understand the eighteenth century 
concept of international respublica, developed mainly by Hume and Montesquieu.
The study of the rise and the decline of the Roman Empire was a central part of 
Montesquieu’s attempt to oppose the project of universal monarchy. As a biographer of 
the French thinker observed, analyses such as this one were specially relevant when 
‘empires were on the agenda of every major modern state in Europe’ 31 In his work on 
the Roman imperial ideology, Montesquieu addresses two central themes.32 The first is 
the emergence of militarism, which was mainly the result of the Roman agrarian social 
structure.33 The love for land, and the need of slave labour to work it, originated a great 
interest in territorial conquest. In this way, Roman urge for expansion led to a strategy 
of ‘constant warfare’ and permanent conquest.34 Moreover, as a result of the rise of
• 35militarism, the Romans developed ‘the means to subjugate all other peoples’. It was 
thus the strategy of conquest, supported by a militarist spirit, that enabled Rome to
28 For the historical narrative, see Jeremy Black, The Rise o f the European Powers 1679-1793 (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1990), pp.28-54; Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International 
Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.43-70; and Osiander, The States 
System o f Europe, 90-6.
Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 150.
30 See Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
pp. 147-9.
Judith N. Shklar, Montesquieu (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.50. The issues of universal 
monarchy and empire dominated the thought of many political thinkers in eighteenth century Europe. 
See, inter alia, Pagden, Lords o f All the World.
32 See Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes o f the Romans ’ Greatness and Decline, in Melvin 
Richter, The Political Theory o f Montesquieu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
33 Richard Myers, ‘Montesquieu on the Causes of Roman Greatness’, History o f Political Thought, XVI 
(1995), p.37-47.
34 See Roger B. Oake, ‘Montesquieu’s Analysis of Roman History’, Journal o f  the History o f Ideas 
(1955), pp.44-59.
35 This is the theme of one of the longest chapters of the book, chapter VI. See Montesquieu, 
Considerations on the Causes, pp. 147-54.
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conquer the ‘world’. The militarization of Roman politics was characterised, says 
Montesquieu, by the separation of military from civil virtue and by the incapacity of 
the civil institutions to control the military forces. The troops started to be used for the 
private economic ambitions of senators, with the conquest of foreign lands giving rise 
to private armies. From a defensive force, composed of citizens, and fighting for self- 
defence, the army became an expansionist institution, ‘fighting for the sake of spoils 
victory brings in land and booty’.36 In the process, the ‘universal monarchy’ corrupted 
itself domestically. This brings us to the second theme addressed by Montesquieu: the 
Roman decline.
The second part of Montesquieu’s history tells ‘Rome’s downfall’. For the 
French thinker, Roman fall occurred mainly due to internal corruption and the rise of 
domestic factions.37 In order to support an extended empire, it was necessary to create 
imperial institutions. Internally, during the first century BC the state went through a 
process of extreme centralisation, in which the civic constitution was seized by the 
dictators, culminating with the rise of the first Emperor, Augustus. The empire was 
gradually transformed into an indivisible state, and such a constitutional transformation 
resulted in the victory of tyrannical rulership over the self-government of the peoples 
that were part of the empire. Externally, the conquest of foreign lands became violent 
and was pursued without respect for moral and legal principles. In particular, the 
consequence of such aggressive policies of territorial conquest resulted in the 
abandonment of both the doctrine of just war and the practice of concluding treaties of 
alliances. It should be noted that the period of early Roman expansion took place 
through alliances, flexible diplomacy and the respect for the rule of law.38 For instance, 
the historical record shows, during the republican period, the existence of treaties of 
alliance with republican semi-sovereign civitas. Yet, the strategy of military conquest 
overthrew the republican principles of that early period. In the end, Roman military 
despotism, which had already caused domestic corruption and tyranny, produced the 
collapse of the Empire.
From his historical analysis, Montesquieu drew three conclusions. First, a 
systematic policy of conquest leads inevitably to the decline and defeat of the 
aggressive state. In other words, a strategy of external expansionism produces 
inevitably internal corruption. As Judith Shklar so aptly put it, the exigencies of
36 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.88.
37 Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes, p. 159-62.
38 See Doyle, Empires, pp. 84-5.
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expansion make domestic politics ‘hostage to military projects’. In the end, Rome 
‘expanded beyond its ability to govern itself as a republic’.39 Secondly, Montesquieu 
tells his readers the story that Edward Gibbon was later to call the ‘immoderate 
greatness’ of Roman imperialism.40 When Gibbon used such an expression, he had in 
mind the ‘republican contradiction’, also noted by Montesquieu, and which deeply 
concerned eighteenth century republican thinkers. As it was demonstrated by Roman 
history, the collapse of republics might occur in consequence of the republican virtue. 
Because the Roman republic ‘was virtuous it defeated its enemies; because it defeated 
its enemies it acquired empire’.41 Paradoxically, it was the virtue of the Roman 
republic that ultimately led to imperial expansionism and to the subsequent decline. 
Yet, it should be noted that the target of republican thinkers such as Montesquieu or 
Gibbon was not imperial expansion as such. They accepted that imperialism could be 
compatible with republican values. Indeed, for republican thinkers Rome was always 
an empire: first, a republican empire; and later, a monarchical empire. Thus, the real 
problem was the form of imperialism that is founded on military conquest and seeks to 
achieve universal monarchy. Pocock has captured this fundamental distinction, when 
he affirms that the Roman republic ‘corrupted itself in the transformation of empire 
into a universal monarchy’.42 Thus, the history of Rome’s expansion and fall raised a 
crucial question to republican thinkers: how can modem republics avoid the fate of 
Rome? This was the question that, as in the case of other eighteenth century republican 
thinkers, concerned Montesquieu for a long period of his intellectual life. In addition, 
and thirdly, Montesquieu also concluded from his historical work that the project of 
universal monarchy is closely associated with the condition of political anarchy.
The connection between the quest for universal empire and political anarchy is 
further developed in a short essay (31 pages long), published in 1734 (which to my 
knowledge is not translated into English). The title is Reflexions sur la Monarchie 
Universelle en Europe43 The first point to note about the essay is that, as the 
Considerations on the Causes, it was also written as a contribution to the European 
debate about the project of universal monarchy. To respond to the proponents of the 
ideology of empire, Montesquieu starts his essay by raising the following question:
39 Shklar, Montesquieu, pp.57-9.
40 Cited by Doyle, Empires, p. 98.
41 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Gibbon’s Decline and Fall and the World View of the Late Enlightenment’, in J. G. 
A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 146.
42 J.G. A  Pocock, ‘Conservative Enlightenment and Democratic Revolutions: The American and French 
Cases in British Perspective’, Government and Opposition, 24 (1989), p.93.
43 Reflexions sur la Monarchie Universelle en Europe, in Deux Opuscules de Montesquieu (Bordeaux: G. 
Gounouilhou, M.DCCC.XCI), pp. 11-42.
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Can one nation achieve a permanent superiority over all other nations in Europe, as the 
Romans achieved in antiquity?44 To answer such a question, Montesquieu develops an 
analysis of the historical development of Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire in 
the West to the eighteenth century. He identifies four imperial attempts during this 
period. Charlesmagne’s during the eighth and ninth centuries; the subsequent attempts 
of the Popes to become the supreme monarchs in Europe; Charles V’s during the 
sixteenth century; and finally, Louis XIV’s during the second half of the seventeenth 
century and the first half of the eighteenth century.45
In the Reflexions, Montesquieu tries to show why, after the fall of the Roman 
Empire, imperial attempts failed in Europe. He argues that all imperial projects in 
Europe were opposed by both the spirit of nationalism, which turned small communities 
into greater nations under the leadership of a common ruler, and the spirit o f freedom, 
which led European nations to ally with each other to resist the hegemonic threat.46 For 
instance, English and French nationalism emerged and grew in the struggles against the 
Papacy and the Habsburgs. Likewise, Dutch nationalism solidified with the resistance to 
Charles V and the Philips. Finally, the freedom of the European nations was confirmed 
with the defeat of the last imperial attempt witnessed by Montesquieu, that of Louis 
XIV.47 If Montesquieu’s discussion ended here, it would be quite similar to 
conventional accounts within International Relations, which see the historical evolution 
of modern international society in terms of hegemonic attempts, counter-hegemonic 
alliances, and balances of power.48 Yet, Montesquieu is not entirely happy with this 
kind of argument. He believes that a satisfactory conception of international political 
society cannot rest only on the idea of national freedom.
This point is clearly made in the Reflexions. In a revealing way, and contrary to 
the common view in International Relations, Montesquieu does not define medieval 
politics as a hierarchical political system. Despite the imperial attempts of the Holly 
Roman Emperors and of the Popes, national freedom prevailed from an early age. From 
almost immediately after the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, ‘Europe was 
divided into many sovereign communities’.49 However, the struggle for national 
freedom produced a condition of political anarchy in medieval Europe, characterised by
44 Montesqiueu, Reflexions, p. 11.
45 Montesquieu, Reflexions, pp.20-34.
46 Montesquieu, Reflexions, pp.21-8. Montesquieu adds that the geographical disposition of Europe also 
helps nations to resist imperial attempts, p.20.
47 Montesquieu, Reflexions, p. 17, and pp.29-34.
48 See in particular the argument in Watson, The Evolution o f International Society.
49 Montesquieu, Reflexions, p.21.
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permanent territorial conquests and by a militarist ideology.50 If on the one hand, these 
military monarchies were able to resist imperialism; on the other hand, they never 
constituted a proper international respublica. In the Middle Ages, European nations 
lived in a condition of political anarchy. Yet, this should not be confused with the 
Hobbesian idea of the state of nature, which is a pre-social stage. For Montesquieu, 
medieval European nations constituted a political system; they had common customs, 
and even common rules. What they did not form, largely due to the prevalence of a 
military ethos, was an international respublica.
Montesquieu saw the emergence of a similar form of political anarchy in Europe 
during the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Again, as a result of 
both the nationalist spirit and of the imperial ideology of conquest. The first 
consequence was, in Montesquieu’s words, the ‘distortions of international law’. Here, 
his target was the expansionist policy of Louis XIV. The corruption of the principles of 
public international law, recognised by the Peace of Westphalia, was the outcome of 
France’s policy of conquest during the last quarter of the seventeenth century and the 
first quarter of the eighteenth century. As a consequence, in contemporary Europe, 
tyrannical rulers saw the law of nations as
a science that explains to kings how far they can violate justice without damaging their own interests. 
What a dreadful idea... You would almost think... that there were two entirely different types of justice: 
one, regulating the affairs of private individuals...civil law; the other, regulating the differences that 
arises between nations, tyrannises over international law.51
The other consequence was the return of the ‘military spirit’ and of arms race between 
sovereign states.
A new disease has spread across Europe; it has afflicted our princes and made them keep an inordinate 
number of troops. It redoubles in strength and necessarily becomes contagious; for, as soon as one state 
increases what it calls its troops, the others suddenly increase theirs, so that nothing is gained thereby by 
the common ruin. Each monarch keeps ready all the armies he would have if his peoples were in danger 
of being exterminated...Thus Europe is so ruined...we are poor with the wealth and commerce of the
50 Montesquieu, Reflexions, pp.21-2.
51 Montesquieu, Persian Letters (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 176. It should be noted that the Persian 
Letters is generally considered to be a critique of Louis XIV’s despotism. Published in 1721, after the 
monarch’s death, who died in 1715, the book is about two Persians who are visiting Europe, and spend 
long time in Paris. Uzbek and Rica, the two main characters of the stoiy, write regularly to their families 
and friends at home telling their impressions about Europe in general and France in particular. Being from 
a country regarded in Europe as tyrannical, any resemblance that they could find between French and 
Persian political systems would be seen as a criticism of French absolutism.
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whole universe, and soon, as a result of these soldiers, we shall have nothing but soldiers and we shall be 
like the Tartars.52
This demonstrates that, for Montesquieu, the rise of the military spirit and the 
formulation of policies purely based on self-interest are the negative consequences of 
imperial projects. To defend from Louis XIV’s aggressive policies, all European states 
had to enter into a process of arms race. This ‘military disease’ has also domestic 
implications, in the sense that it leads the ruler to reinforce its power, in an arbitrary 
way, which ignores the common good. In this regard, imperialism not only corrupts the 
aggressive state, but also other states, which are obliged to pursue military policies. In 
short, it is the whole international respublica that ends up in a state of general 
corruption; or, in other words, political anarchy.
Reacting against this state of international political corruption, in particular the 
military ethos of glory, Montesquieu denounced the influence of the ‘spirit of conquest’ 
on national policies. ‘There would be no justice in making war on account of the private 
disputes of the monarch...any more than a private individual can kill someone who 
refuses to give him precedence’.53 In this regard, the doctrine of just war permits only 
defensive wars against aggression and conquest: ‘There are only two cases in which war 
is just: first, in order to resist the aggression of an enemy, and second, in order to help 
an ally who has been attacked’.54 At this point, a clarification is required. Chapter 3 of 
the book 10 of the Spirit o f the Laws is entitled ‘on the right of conquest’, which seems 
to suggest that Montesquieu accepts a policy of conquests. Such a view would 
contradict Montesquieu’s strong criticism of both the idea of universal monarchy and 
the ideology of conquest. In this regard, we need to clarify what Montesquieu means by 
the right of conquest. Montesquieu says that ‘From the right of war derives that of 
conquest’.55 As we saw, for Montesquieu, defence against aggression is the only right of 
war. However, defensive wars might give origin to territorial acquisitions, and in this 
sense the defensive state may in the end engage in a policy of conquest. But the 
conquest has to follow the spirit of political justice: ‘Conquest is an acquisition; the 
spirit of acquisition carries with it the spirit of preservation and use, and not that of 
destruction’.56 In fact, Montesquieu refers to two forms of conquest. According to one,
52 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Edited by Anne Collier, Basia Miller and Harold Stone, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.224.
53 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, p. 177.
54 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, p. 177. See also The Spirit o f the Laws, pp. 138-9.
55 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 139.
56 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 139.
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the conquered people is preserved and the conqueror has the duty to give ‘this people a 
good political right and good civil laws’;57 as for the other form of conquest, it destroys 
the society and citizens of the conquered state.58 The former conforms to the right of 
nations, and the latter to the practices of the Roman Empire.59 Contrary to the tradition 
of realpolitik, to which military victories are a sign of moral superiority and as such 
legitimise any form of conquest, for Montesquieu we need other justifications to explain 
the right of conquest. It is, first, a right that derives from self-defence, and secondly, it 
implies political duties.60
From Montesquieu’s analysis of world politics, one can infer two points. First, 
his discussion of the rise and decline of the Roman Empire, crucially defined as a form 
of universal monarchy, clearly shows that Montesquieu was deeply concerned with 
eighteenth century international politics, in particular with the revival of the project of 
universal monarchy.61 Secondly, and quite significantly, in his critique of the project of 
universal monarchy, the French thinker resorted to republican arguments, which were 
developed initially in Renaissance. The criticism of ‘corruption’, ‘tyranny’, 
‘aggression’, and ‘conquest’, and the defence of moderation, rule of law, the virtues of 
the division of power, political liberty and of the right of resistance are all central ideas 
in Montesquieu’s historical work. Similarly, one of Hume’s central concerns was the 
tendency for imperial expansionism that he saw unfolding in eighteenth century Europe. 
He saw the ideology of conquest as inimical to a political system of moderate and 
peaceful relations, which could only be created by the growth of republicanism. Thus, 
the concern with eighteenth century politics is at the root of Hume and Montesquieu’s 
considerations on world politics. Moreover, as we shall see now, they both resort to 
republican arguments in order to develop the notion of international respublica.
The idea o f international respublica
For Montesquieu, and for Hume, the rule of law, the balance of power, and the spirit of 
commerce were the central ideas of the concept of international respublica. Such a
57 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 139 and p. 144.
58 The Spirit o f  the Laws, pp. 139-40.
59 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 139.
60 For a general, and very helpful discussion of the right of conquest, see Sharon Korman, The Right of 
Conquest: The Acquisition o f Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996).
61 In the Spirit o f the Laws, Montesquieu attributes to Louis XIV the pursuit of ‘the project of universal 
monarchy’, p. 136.
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conception of international society guarantees political freedom and a just political 
order. It is in this context that we shall understand Montesquieu’s famous definition of 
international law as being founded on ‘the principle that the various nations should do 
to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill 
possible’.62 Besides guaranteeing a just political order, the international rule of law,
♦ • , • 63resting on the rights of nations, would also ensure the political liberties of Europe. In
addition to the respect for the rule of law, the existence of a general political equilibrium
and the spread of the spirit of commerce were also essential for the creation of a
republican international political order.
The idea of political equilibrium was expressed in the notion of the balance of
power. Hume was the greatest defender of the republican conception of the balance of
power. Like Montesquieu and other eighteenth century republican thinkers, Hume was
deeply concerned with the project of universal monarchy. In the essay ‘Of the Balance
of Power’, he sees the balance of power as a response to strategies of ‘universal
monarchy’ and identifies in the eighteenth century a new threat to ‘the liberties of
Europe’.64 In accordance with the republican tradition, Hume also associated the
universal monarchy with the spirit of conquest and expansionism. He was a very strong
critic of ‘the endless view of increasing’,65 which would cause the disruption of the
republican peace and the consequent state of political anarchy.66 This would mean the
return of Europe ‘to the maxims of ancient policy’, where ‘all neighbours were
continually in arms’ and states ‘lived in perpetual war’.67 Political anarchy had of course
68domestic effects: ‘extensive conquests...must be the ruin of every free government’. 
One of the worst consequences of all would be the increase of public debts to pay 
external wars and standing armies. In this circumstances, civil order falls easily victim 
of ‘arbitrary governments’.69 Being the foundation of a republican order, the existence 
of a general balance of power would end with political anarchy. In this way, the notion 
of the balance of power is also associated with the international rule of law. For
62 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, p.7.
63 For Montesquieu, the rule of law and the balance of power are the vital conditions for political liberty. 
See The Spirit o f  the Laws, pp. 155-6.
64 David Hume, ‘Of the Balance of Power’, in Hume, Political Essays (Edited by Knud Haakonssen, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 156-8. See also, John Robertson, ‘Universal 
Monarchy and the Liberties of Europe: David Hume’s Critique of an English Whig Doctrine’, in Nicholas 
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Political Discourses in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.349-73.
65 Robertson, ‘Universal Monarchy’, p.358.
66 Hume, ‘Of the Balance of Power’, in Political Essays, p. 159.
67 Hume, ‘Of Commerce’, in Political Essays, p.97.
68 Hume, ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, in Political Essays, p.233.
69 Hume, ‘Of Public Credit’, in Political Essays, pp. 168-76
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instance, Hume considers a military intervention to maintain the balance of power as a
• x 70just war.
For both Montesquieu and Hume, the rise of the ‘spirit of commerce’ during the 
eighteenth century had considerably changed the nature of modem republics. As we saw 
in Montesquieu’s history of Rome, the ancient political virtue was warlike because it 
mainly resulted from the Roman agrarian structure, which required the conquest of land 
and slave work. In the eighteenth century, with an economic system based on exchange, 
the trading bourgeois individual of an urban commercial society was not inclined to 
military conquest and could be a virtuous citizen of a moderate republic. In this regard, 
being commercial polities, modern states could move away from the fate of Rome. Yet, 
republicans were also well aware of the commercial perils and adopted an attitude of 
critical evaluation to the growth of commerce. In particular, a commercial economic 
order could alienate the citizens from the public life and as such cause in the long run 
political corruption. Thus, the question that arose in the republican minds was what 
remedies ought to be taken against the commercial evils?71 If these evils could be 
assimilated to or eliminated by the republican values, then commercial polities could 
become ‘commonwealths for preservation’. It was this belief that led Montesquieu to 
affirm that ‘The natural effect of commerce is peace’.72 Hume agreed with Montesquieu 
and saw in free trade and the growth of commercial relations a crucial contribution to a 
republican and peaceful international order 73
The defeat of Louis XIV’s project of universal monarchy led Montesquieu to 
refer to Europe as ‘une grande Republique’: all nations ‘are members of a grand 
republic’, and political relations between those nations occur through ‘treaties’ and civil 
interchange.74 Likewise, Hume saw Europe as a republic of ‘a number of neighbouring
* 75 •and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy’. This
70 ‘Of the Balance of Power’, p. 158.
71 See J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana’, 
Journal o f the History o f Ideas, XL VIII (1987), pp. 340-3.
72 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p.338. See also the discussion in Pagden, Lords o f All the World, pp. 103-15, and 
179-84.
73 See ‘Of Civil Liberty’, pp.52-5, and ‘Of the Jealousy of Commerce’, pp. 150-3, in Political Essays. See 
also, Robertson, ‘Universal Monarchy’, pp.370-1. It should be noted however that, as other republican 
thinkers, Hume was well aware of the possible dangers of commerce, in particular of commercial 
mercantilism which could lead to strategies of imperial expansion. It is in this sense that he criticizes the 
British commercial empire. See ‘Of the Balance of Power’, p.159, and ‘Of the Balance of Trade’, in 
Political Essays, pp. 136-49. Here, Hume disagrees with Montesquieu, who offered an apologia for British 
commercial empire. See The Spirit of the Laws, pp. 156-66, and 325-33. See also the discussion in 
Robertson, ‘Universal Monarchy’, pp.367-73. For Hume’s critique of the British commercial empire, see 
also J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton’, in 
Virtue, Commerce, and History, pp. 125-141.
74 Montesquieu, Reflexions, p. 15.
75 ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, in Political Essays, p.64.
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international republic gained political recognition in ‘the great treaties which had begun
with the Peace of Westphalia’, and were pursued with the Peace of Utrecht76 Such a
confederacy, the other term normally used, was maintained, as we saw, through
commerce, the balance of power, and the rule of law. Therefore, in the place of
universal monarchy and political anarchy, ‘Europe had been visualized as a republique
confederative, held together by treaties and activated by a shared history’.77 In Edward
Gibbon’s words, this confederal structure resulted from a ‘happy mixture of union and
independence’.78 In terms of historical memory, the image of the Achaean League,
‘rather than the Roman Imperium\ or the ‘unrestrained state of nature’, became the
model ‘for governing the relationship between the nations of the world’.79 The
international respublica was then the solution to the problem faced by republican
thinkers: how to avoid the fate of Rome. In opposition to universal empire, this vision of
the international order would not be the result of the collapse of republicanism, but
rather its natural conclusion.80
As it is clear from Montesquieu’s and Hume’s views so far, they relate strategies
of conquest to both domestic corruption and international political anarchy. As
• 81Montesquieu so eloquently puts it, ‘An immense conquest presupposes despotism’. As 
a consequence, they also associate political moderation with external defensive 
strategies, the maintenance of domestic republican virtues, and the creation of an 
international respublica. Again in Montesquieu’s words, ‘the spirit of republics is peace 
and moderation’.82 These associations between internal corruption and universal 
monarchy, on the one hand, and internal and external republican virtues, on the other 
hand, suggest that for these two republican thinkers the ideas of international political 
anarchy and international respublica do not merely represent different views about the 
states system but rather distinct conceptions of world political organisation, which 
encompass the domestic and the international. As Hume so clearly perceived, it was 
only with the general acceptance of republican principles of free government that the 
improvement of international society could properly begin. In addition, the formation of 
an international respublica would create the conditions for the rise of domestic
76 See Pocock, The Politics o f Extent and the Problem of Freedom, pp.8 and 14; and ‘States, Republics, 
and Empires’, pp.69-70.
77 Pocock, ‘Conservative Enlightenment’, p.89. Emphasis in the original.
78 Quoted in Jeremy Black, ‘Empire and Enlightenment in Edward Gibbon’s Treatment of International 
Relations’, The International History Review, XVII (1995), p.442.
79 Pagden, Lords o f  All the World, p. 187.
80 See Pagden, Lords o f All the World, p. 189.
81 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 152.
82 The Spirit o f the Laws, p. 132, see also pp.24-5, where Montesquieu says that ‘moderation founded on 
virtue’ is the principle of republics.
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republican societies.83 The view of a unified world political society is expressed by 
Montesquieu in the following terms: ‘Europe is a Nation composed of many nations’, 
and the welfare of one is the welfare of all.84 In this way, the law of nations is ‘the law 
of the world’.85 Crucially, Hume’s and Montesquieu’s treatment of international society 
suggests that the concept of international respublica is significantly different from the 
notion of the society of states.
Distinguishing international respublica from the society of states
As we saw in chapter 3, the conception of the society of states embraces an individualist 
perspective, according to which states give origin to international society. We see here 
the analogy between individuals and states contracting in the state of nature to create a 
political society86. In turn, this view is supported on a historical narrative that 
emphasises the ontological prior status of the modem state over international society. 
Two main theoretical implications follow from such a view. First, the formation of 
international society is necessarily anticipated by the emergence of a states system. In 
an initial moment, states live in the state of nature and then, in a subsequent moment, 
those states create a political society. For the English school, and indeed for realists, 
these two moments are recurrent. After a major international war, which corresponds to 
the collapse of the previous political society and thus to the moment of the international 
state of nature, state rulers build a society of states again. The second implication of the 
statist approach is that cosmopolitan ideas and principles are seen as posing a threat to 
the survival of the society of states. For the English school, in historical terms, a 
cosmopolitan view of world order corresponds either to what existed before the 
emergence of the modern society of states, medieval imperialism, or to what may, in a
83 See Hume, ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, pp.63-77.
84 In Montesquieu’s words: ‘L’Europe n’est plus qu’une Nation composee de plusieurs, la France &
1’ Angleterre ont besoin de 1’opulence de la Pologne & de la Moscovie, comme une de leurs Provinces a 
besoin des autres: & l’Etat qui croit augmenter sa puissance par la mine de celiu que le touche, s’afFoiblit 
ordinairement avec lui’, Reflexions, p.36. In the same vein, Hume says that European nations form ‘at 
large.. .what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature’, ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and 
Sciences’, pp.65-6.
85 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 176.
86 For an explicit contractarian approach to the international order, see the recent work by Jolrn Charvet, 
respectively, ‘Contractarianism and International Political Theory’ in David Boucher and Paul Kelly 
(eds.), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 175-90; and 
‘International Society from a Contractarian Perspective’ in David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.), 
International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
pp. 114-31. It should be noted, however, that Charvet distinguishes his approach from the ‘society of 
states’ theory of international relations’, ‘Contractarianism and International Political Theory’, p. 187.
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revolutionary way, replace such a society. Not surprisingly, Hedley Bull’s use of the 
term ‘neo-medievalism’ denotes an explicit attempt to make an intellectual connection 
between those two ‘cosmopolitan’ conceptions of world order. The republican 
conception of international society disputes these views, as we shall see in more detail 
now.
The states system presupposes the existence o f an international society (and not the 
other way around)
As we saw in chapter 3, for the English school, the formation of a society of states is 
anticipated by the emergence of a system of states. The fundamental historical 
transformation is the evolution from a condition of system to a condition of society; 
hence the significance of the Peace of Westphalia for Bull. Such a historical process 
may be summarised as follows. After the appearance of the modem sovereign state, and 
thereby of the states system, and through a sort of an international social contract, states 
created a normative structure to regulate their relations. This reveals, as it was already 
pointed out, the ontological priority given to the sovereign state over international 
society, which makes the English school’s attempt to overcome the ontological 
separation between domestic and international politics not completely successful. 
Indeed, the historical view of the English school is somehow odd. It treats, initially, 
international society in non-societal and non-normative way, which corresponds to the 
moment of the state of nature, before the international social contract. It is only after the 
contract between states and the creation of the society of states, that the school’s 
approach shifts to a social and normative view of world politics. To understand this, 
though, we need to adopt an historical approach; this is why, for instance, Alexander 
Wendt fails to grasp it.87 The crucial problem that stems from this approach is that the 
English school separates the normative principles of the society of states from the 
constitutional and ideological structure of international society. I shall return to this last 
notion below, but before let me illustrate with some examples what I mean.
Take the case of the balance of power. For the English school, the balance of power 
is an international normative principle created by sovereign states. Although, due to 
their historical sensitivity, the members of the school implicitly perceived the
87 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp.31-2.
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republican nature of the concept of the balance of power,88 they persisted in linking its 
creation to the emergence of the states system.89 However, if we consider for instance 
Hume’s views on the balance of power, we see that such views are associated with the 
republican political principle of division of power. Such a principle applies to any 
political system, and cannot be treated merely as a normative principle created by 
sovereign states to regulate their mutual relations.90 Hume’s view indicates that the 
principle of the balance of power is associated with the republican ideology of free 
government, and its general principle that any stable political system has to rest on an 
equilibrium and division of power. The international respublica, Hume believed, must 
incorporate the principle of maintaining a balance between its political parts, as it 
happens in the domestic constitution of republics.91 Thus, the institution of the balance 
of power, as it is defined by the republican tradition, is not the result of any logic of 
anarchy, as realists believe, nor is it only the consequence of states’ concern for 
survival, as Bull argues. In historical terms, as we saw both in this chapter and in 
chapter 1, imperial policies of conquest, and indeed of universal dominion, which 
disrupt the balance of power, have been adopted as the adequate strategies to live in 
anarchy and to guarantee national survival. This means that the respect for the 
institution of the balance of power requires a political culture that values the division of 
power, the limits on the exercise of power, political freedom, and defensive strategies. 
In short, the principle of balance of power derives from the ‘republican spirit’.
In addition, this spirit, or ideology, influences the nature of international agents. 
This occurred for instance in the case o f ‘civilised monarchies’, which for Hume were a 
product of the rise of the spirit of republicanism during the eighteenth century. In 
Hume’s words, ‘the monarchical form...owes all its perfection to the republican’. In 
particular, ‘It must borrow its laws and methods, and institutions, and consequently its 
stability and order, from free governments’.92 Hume’s approach suggests that a 
republican view of political order, founded on the division of power, constitutes both 
the international principle of the balance of power and the ‘constitutional 
commonwealth’, including both republics and civilised monarchies. It also suggests that 
international normative principles, such as the balance of power, are not created by
88 See in particular Herbert Butterfield, ‘The Balance of Power’, pp. 132-48; Martin Wight, ‘The Balance 
of Power’, pp. 149-75, both in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1966); and Martin Wight, ‘The Balance of Power and International Order’, in Alan 
James (ed.), Bases o f International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.85-115.
89 See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 106.
90 See in particular Hume’s essay ‘Of Civil Liberty’, p.55.
91 ‘Of the Rise and Progress’, pp.64-5.
92 ‘Of the Rise and Progress’, p.68.
212
states merely out of their need to coexist peacefully and orderly, but result rather from 
the international constitutional and ideological structure. In historical terms, such a 
structure predated the emergence of sovereign states and indeed provided the social and 
normative framework in which the states system was constituted. For republicans, the 
belief in the virtues of the division of power anticipates the emergence of the 
international respublica. Indeed, such a belief is a fundamental condition. Thus, this 
view rejects the English school’s belief that the formation of international society was 
preceded by a pre-social and pre-normative state of nature. In addition, and crucially, 
such an international normative framework is mainly founded on cosmopolitan 
principles.
Cosmopolitan values are the foundation o f (and not a threat to) international society
As we just saw, the principle of the balance of power stems from a republican 
conception of political organisation, which rests on universal principles. In addition, the 
spirit of law, a central idea in Montesquieu’s work, is closely related to a universal 
conception of ‘justice’. As we saw in this chapter, the constitutional treaties, such as 
Westphalia and Utrecht, constitute a central element in the republican notion of world 
political order. Ultimately, the fundamental significance of treaties derives from the 
value attributed to the rule of pacta sunt servanda. International treaties can only have 
any effect if there is a reasonable assurance that agreements will be followed. In this 
way, the rule of pacta sunt servanda is founded on the belief that agreements and 
promises must be kept, which originates what has been called ‘legitimate 
expectations’.93 This analysis raises two points. First, the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda is a ‘general principle about the nature of international law’, and states ought 
to accept it before they regard treaties as binding.94 The second point refers to the 
origins of the rule of pacta sunt servanda.
Although sovereign rulers make treaties, historically, they did not create such a 
rule. As it was recently noted, states ‘cannot by treaty establish the principle that treaties 
are binding’.95 Indeed, the rule of pacta sunt servanda expresses more fundamental
93 See Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power o f Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 175, and p.36.
94 Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p.52. Emphasis in the original.
95 Arend, Legal Rules, p.52.
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assumptions about the nature of a just political order 96 It was a Roman legacy, which 
derived from the belief that law should promote a sense of equity and fair dealing. From 
Rome, and through the Renaissance, it became a universal principle of the law of 
nations. In this regard, it is Jean Bodin himself, for many a strong statist thinker, that 
refers to ‘the absolute rule that agreements should be faithfully kept’; and that no
97invocation, even on the grounds of raison d'etat, could justify a broken agreement. 
Even if the rule of pacta sunt servanda was subsequently approved by the consent of 
states, its moral force did not derive originally from states’ practices, but rather from a 
universal moral and legal principle. These brief considerations on the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda indicate that another fundamental normative institution of international 
society, treaty-making, is also founded on a universal principle, which applies to any 
type of political order. In addition, it also demonstrates that a vital institution of the 
states system was not created by states, but rather derived from established societal and 
normative practices.
Furthermore, the republican understanding of commerce was also deeply 
cosmopolitan. For republican thinkers, commerce was ‘far more than the simple 
exchange of commodities’; and a commercial international order required ‘the 
understanding of a common humanity’. In particular, republicans believed in ‘the 
humanizing power’ of commerce: the belief that the social interaction caused by
• 98 •commerce would render individuals more open and cosmopolitan. In Montesquieu’s 
formulation: ‘Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule 
that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is 
commerce, there are gentle mores’.99 Therefore, we can safely conclude that the idea of 
international respublica is founded on cosmopolitan values, which denote the existence 
of common world political principles. As Pocock put it, the European republic was a 
‘cosmopolitan confederacy’.100 Returning to the English school’s use of the idea of 
world society, discussed in chapter 3, we can make two concluding points. First, 
although the republican conception of international society emerged against the idea of 
universal empire, it rested from its emergence on cosmopolitan principles and values. 
Secondly, the awareness of this cosmopolitan elements allows us to rethink the
96 See, for instance, Hume’s remarks in ‘Of the Law of Nations’, in David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human 
Nature (Edited by Ernest C. Mossner, London: Penguin Books, 1985).
97 See the discussion in Bodin, On Sovereignty (Edited by Julian H. Franklin, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), book V, chapter 6.
98 See Pagden, Lords o f All the World, pp. 180-1.
99 The Spirit o f the Laws, p. 3 3 8.
100 ‘Conservative Enlightenment’, p.93.
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revolutionist category, as it was created by Wight, and to realise that certain so-called 
‘revolutionary’ concepts are indeed a central part of the notion of international society. 
To fully understand the significance of the idea of international respublica, we need 
now to briefly explain what I call the constitutional and ideological structure of 
international society.
Two central ideas define the notion of ‘constitutional and ideological structure’. 
First, it presents a view of a just world political order, which includes both its normative 
principles and the nature of its political agents. When Hume and Montesquieu refer to 
the spirit of republicanism they have in mind a view of a just political order. When I 
affirmed above that the principle of the balance of power ultimately derives from the 
republican spirit, I was implicitly referring to the ideological structure of world politics. 
Another eighteenth century republican thinker, Gibbon, nicely summarised this notion 
of ideological structure with the expression ‘the general manners of the times’.101 The 
second defining idea refers to the constitutive effects of the ideological and 
constitutional structure on the institutions and normative principles of international 
society. As we saw earlier during our discussion of Hume’s and Montesquieu’s notion 
of international respublica, the republican view of the world political order 
encompasses both domestic and international politics. A just political order at both 
levels rests on the same ideological structure. For instance, in the case of Montesquieu, 
it is clear that a just domestic order and a just international order, that is a world 
political order, both rest on the republican principles of virtue and moderation.102 In this 
regard, in the case of international society, the relevant point is to investigate how the 
ideological and constitutional structure determines the international normative 
principles. For instance, in the case of the balance of power, we could outline such a 
connection in the following way. The republican spirit of free government, 
characterised by a division of power, is part of the overall international ideological 
structure, which affects the organisation of domestic and international politics alike. 
What is at stake is the opposition between two political ideologies: the ideology of 
moderation which limits the exercise of power and the ideology of a tyrannical use of 
political power. From a consensus at the ideological level on the virtues of the division 
of power, it follows that the balance of power, protecting against strategies of conquest, 
and guaranteeing political freedom, becomes a key normative principle of international 
society. The same could be said of the relation between the spirit of commerce and the
101 Quoted in Black, ‘Empire and Enlightenment’, p.442.
102 See The Spirit o f the Laws, pp.22-8, p. 125, and p. 132.
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normative principle of commercial reciprocity; or of the relation between the spirit of 
the law and the normative principle that treaties ought to be respected. These 
connections demonstrate why eighteenth century republican thinkers believed that an 
understanding of the international ideological context was crucially important to grasp 
the nature of international society.
It should be noted that a similar emphasis on ‘ideational causation’ marks the 
recent work of constructivists. For instance, in his analysis of the ‘world polity’, John 
Gerard Ruggie uses the notion of ‘intersubjective beliefs’ to stress that international 
institutions can only function within a social context that recognises them to be 
legitimate.103 Such a social context, ‘suffused with ideational factors’,104 constitutes the 
foundation of international society by producing its normative structure. This is what 
Ruggie calls the constitutive role of international collective beliefs. In a similar way, 
Wendt alludes to the ‘ideational structure’ or ‘shared beliefs’ as the key factors to 
understand international politics.105 This thesis also attempts to explain the nature of the 
normative structure of international society by emphasising the fundamental importance 
of the international ideological structure. In this regard, it claims that it is crucial to 
study how the dominant spirits or the general manners of the times, in eighteenth 
century’s words, or the international political culture, in contemporary language, 
constitute the normative principles of international society. This thesis undertakes such 
a task by discussing how the republican political tradition defines international society. 
To a certain extent, the implication of such an approach is that what we call these days 
constructivism is not on the whole an intellectual revolution but, to a large extent, a 
return to old premises about the nature of the social and political world. It is my belief 
that those premises are visible in the work of the republican political tradition.106 As 
such, this thesis tries to develop a historically informed constructivist conception of 
international society. The emphasis on the constitutive function of the ideological and 
constitutional structure also indicates to what extent the republican conception of 
international society differs from the notion of the society of states, where the 
consideration of such a structure is almost absent.
103 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p.20.
104 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, p.33.
105 Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 139 and 160. Wendt says that ‘its political culture is the most fundamental 
fact about the structure of an international system’, p.250.
106 In this regard, it is interesting to note that Onuf s work attempts at the same time to develop a 
constructivist approach and to emphasize the significance of republican political thought to understand 
modem international politics.
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Therefore, the idea of international respublica, with its stress on ideational 
causation, helps us to develop a notion of international society ‘as a constitutional entity 
greater than the sum of the parts’.107 For both Montesquieu and Hume international 
society was the greater political respublica that exists above the states. In 
Montesquieu’s words, it is ‘a society of societies’.108 This explains the fundamental 
importance that they attached to constitutional treaties, such as Westphalia and Utrecht. 
It was during these ‘constitutional moments’ that the normative principles of the 
international respublica were recognised. Here, it is crucial to firmly distinguish 
between ‘creating’ and ‘recognising’ the normative principles of international society. 
To recover an important distinction made by Hume, whereas the first terms implies a 
group of primitive agents in the state of nature establishing through consensus a 
political society from its foundations; the second expresses the view that states are 
social entities that agree on the terms of their social and political coexistence through 
compromises achieved within an established social and normative context.109 It is in this 
sense that international society can be seen as a constitutional entity greater than the 
sum of its parts. In historical terms, this point is visible when we grasp that the 
emergence of the sovereign state and of the states system occurred in the context of a 
formed political society and not in the state of nature. When Wight criticised ‘the 
doctrine that the state is the ultimate unit of political society’, because ‘it entails the 
doctrine that there is no wider society to embrace states’,110 he was, I believe, defending 
such a view of an international political society. In other words, the same view that we 
find in the work of republican thinkers.
107 It should be noted that Jennifer Welsh also attributes a similar conception to Edmund Burke. Burke 
believed in, as she puts it, ‘the existence of a larger international society which exercises restraint upon its 
members; in this regard, states are ‘relatively, not absolutely perfect, and... parts of a greater whole’. See 
Jennifer M. Wesh, Edmund Burke and International Relations: The Commonwealth o f Europe and the 
Crusade against the French Revolution (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p.33.
108 The Spirit o f  the Laws, p. 131.
109 Hume’s critique of the state of nature and social contract doctrines appears in ‘Of Justice’ and ‘Of 
Political Society’, both in David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles o f  Morals (Edited by J.B. 
Schneewind, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), pp.20-38; and in ‘Of the Origin of Government’, 
and ‘Of the Original Contract’, both in Hume, Political Essyas, pp.20-3, and 186-201. For a discussion of 
Hume’s critique of those two doctrines, see Dario Castiglione, ‘History, Reason and Experience: Hume’s 
Arguments against Contract Theories’, in Boucher and Kelly (eds.), The Social Contract, pp.95-114.
110 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic 
Investigations, p.92.
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Conclusion
As I noted in the introduction of the thesis, the belief that ‘sovereignty precedes the 
international and gives rise to it’ is one of the implications of the ontological divide.111 
Seen as ontological primitive agents, and interacting in the state of nature, sovereign 
states are understood to be the creators of the international normative structure. Such a 
view rests on the assumption that states, originally, emerged and acted in a pre-social 
and pre-normative condition. This view is for instance clear in the first paper on 
international theory produced by Bull, where against the Hobbesian argument he 
recovered the Lockean double contract thesis.112 Although states do not enter into a 
pactum subjectionis, or a political contract, to establish an international government, 
they enter into a pactum societas, or a social contract, and as such create an 
international political society.113 In the very beginning of this chapter, I said that the 
rejection of the view of the statist origins of international society involves a critique of 
the state o f nature assumption. This chapter has attempted to accomplish such a task. 
For republican thinkers, world politics were never in the state of nature. Rather, what 
they investigate is how the ideological and constitutional structure is continuously 
reproduced in historical terms and how it affects the fundamental institutions of 
international society. By showing that for republicans the constitution of international 
society is the result of a set of intersubjective beliefs about the meaning of a just 
political order, this chapter has demonstrated that for the republican tradition states did 
not interact originally in a pre-societal and pre-normative state of nature. Rather, 
international political agents emerged and act within an ideological context. To 
understand the nature of the normative structure of international society, that is the 
existence of institutions such as balance of power, international law, state sovereignty 
and so on, it is essentially to grasp how the ideological structure constitutes those 
institutions. In other words, it is necessary to be aware of the ideational causation.
Such a perspective has a double merit. First, it permits a more accurate 
analytical approach, in the sense that the normative structure, or the fundamental 
international institutions, are seen as constituted by the ideological and constitutional 
structure, and not as emerging in an ideological vacuum. In historical terms, it disputes
111 See above p.3.
112 See Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in James Der Derian (ed.), 
International Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.75-93.
113 For the distinction between these two types of contracts, see Castiglione, ‘History, Reason and 
Experience’, pp.95-6.
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the belief in a stark separation between medieval and modern international society. 
When did modern international society emerge? is, to a certain extent, a wrong 
question. From an analytical perspective, it is not possible to completely understand the 
nature of modern international society by ignoring its medieval roots. Although such a 
historical transformation is characterised by some discontinuities, it is also marked by 
important continuities.114 For instance, during the negotiations that led to the Peace of 
Westphalia, it s clear that the majority of the participants saw themselves as 
reconstituting the respublica Christiana. The second merit of the republican approach 
is a normative one.
For eighteenth century republican thinkers, the construction of an international 
respublica would resolve the problems of aggressive conquests and wars. The 
republican moment that they believed they were witnessing during their age is part of a 
distinct view of the history of modern international society. Thinkers such as Hume or 
Montesquieu firmly believed that the emergence of a republican political order 
signified the triumph of civilisation over barbarism, both religious and tyrannical 
barbarism.115 Thus, in this respect, the idea of international respublica denoted a 
historical discontinuity with the medieval political order. Yet, even in this case, the 
political morality of republicanism is not the result of a complete break with the past 
but rather stems from the recovery of classical and Renaissance republican values. Of 
course, the return of barbarism, with the triumph of expansionist nationalism during the 
nineteenth century, indicates that the idea of international respublica is somehow 
associated with a story of a political failure. However, political failure does not 
necessarily mean intellectual failure. When in the early 1960s, Wight tried to recover a 
constitutional conception of international society, he was recognising the intellectual 
merits of those thinkers, whom he included within the category of rationalism. This 
chapter, following the general purpose of this thesis, tried to develop the legacy of a 
particular strand of such a broad category: republican political tradition. The central 
claim is that such a tradition permits us to fully explore the idea of international 
society, as presenting a conception of a just political order, and not merely a view of 
international order, where justice is seen in conflict with order.
114 The element of continuity is of course a central point of the argument advanced in chapter 5 
concerning the idea of divided sovereignty.
115 See the recent work by J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume Two: Narratives o f Civil 
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion of a thesis is normally the end of a long intellectual journey. To finish 
the intellectual journey of this thesis, I must still accomplish three brief tasks. First, I 
need to summarise the main stages of such a journey. Secondly, I shall emphasise the 
principal components of my reformulation of the concept of international society, which 
is the central task of this thesis. Thirdly, I will briefly refer to the significance of this 
thesis in the context of the discipline of International Relations.
I have built the argument of this thesis in three stages. First, in chapter 1, I 
discussed the realist conception of international anarchy as a state of war. I made three 
claims. First, the origins of the contemporary realist theory are to be found in the 
nationalist revolution of the nineteenth century, and I used Leopold Ranke’s work to 
illustrate this claim. It was this tradition of ‘nationalist realpolitik> that Hans 
Morgenthau brought to the discipline of International Relations, during its ‘second’ 
founding moment, just after World War II. Secondly, I argued that a strong ontological 
separation between domestic and international politics is the central consequence of 
such a nationalist definition of the world political system. Thirdly, I demonstrated how 
the tradition of realpolitik presents modern political history in nationalist terms. It was 
against this approach to the study of international relations that the British Committee 
reacted, and as a consequence its members developed the idea of international society. 
This suggests two reasons that justify my discussion of the realpolitik tradition in 
chapter 1. First, given that the condition of anarchy constitutes the strongest realist 
claim to validate its view of the international system, it is fundamental to show that 
anarchy itself can be theorised in different ways. It is important to constantly remind 
ourselves that the realist conception of anarchy, as a state of war, reveals a particular 
view of international politics, which is deeply rooted in the nationalist and realpolitik 
traditions. This is what, ultimately, the work of the English school demonstrates. In this 
regard, and secondly, we only properly understand the significance of the English 
school’s idea of international society if we grasp that the school reacted against the 
realist view of international anarchy. This takes me to the second stage of the thesis.
In chapter 2, I discussed the reaction of the English school against realism. My 
claim is that the members of the British Committee were strongly committed to develop 
an alternative approach to the study of international relations. As a result of such an
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attempt, the British Committee built the tradition of rationalism, and formulated the 
concept of international society, with both resting on a re-interpretation of past political 
thought. This shows that the conceptual effort was from the very beginning 
accompanied by what I called the ‘return to history’. Crucially, the members of the 
English school sought to demonstrate that it was possible, in opposition to realism, to 
define modernity in a non-nationalist way, emphasising the internationalist, or 
rationalist, elements of modern international society. This belief that theory cannot be 
divorced from history constitutes, in my view, one of the most valuable legacies of the 
English school, and one that inspires this thesis. As it was also argued in chapter 2, the 
concept of international society constitutes the initial step to overcome the ontological 
divide between domestic and international politics. This point is specially clear in 
Martin Wight’s early contribution to the British Committee, ‘Western Values in 
International Relations’. Indeed, as it was argued, Wight put forward the idea of an 
international political society not only as a critique of the realist idea of the state of war 
but also as in opposition to the legal positivist notion of the society o f states. However, 
in the end it was the latter concept that prevailed, and the view of international society 
as a society of states became the conceptual legacy of the school.
Chapter 3 addresses the problems that result from the way the English school 
finally conceptualised international society. The problematic definition of international 
society is clearly visible in three claims. First, in both Wight’s, in particular in the 
Systems o f States, and Hedley Bull’s accounts of the origins of modern international 
society, where the state has an ontological priority over international society. Secondly, 
and related with the first, in their view that international society evolves necessarily 
from a states system. Thirdly, from these two first claims it follows that the notion of 
‘world society’, the domain that includes the non-statist and universal elements of 
international relations, is opposed to international society. As a result, the concept of 
society of states is not fully able to escape the ontological divide and in this sense the 
English school did not entirely succeed in its fundamental conceptual task. In the end, 
as realism, although adopting a different conception, the English school also starts from 
the idea of international anarchy.
The final, and crucial, step of the thesis is the attempt to reformulate the concept 
of international society, building on Wight’s views presented in ‘Western Values’. Such 
an enterprise proceeded in the light of the republican tradition, never fully explored by 
the English school. This third step of the thesis was accomplished in chapters 4, 5, and 
6. In chapter 4, I addressed the issue of the external conduct of states and argued that
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reason of state should not be defined in accordance with any fixed historical definition. 
Against the realist conception, which stresses offensive and aggressive strategies, the 
republican tradition develops a notion of raison d'etat, which expresses a concern for 
the international public good. Such a concern was the result of the republican idea of 
political virtue. The ‘rational state’ and the normative principle of ‘virtuous raison 
d'etat’ were in historical terms both constituted by early modern republican conceptions 
of just political order and responsible political behaviour. Thus, this is yet another 
example where states’ practices were not self-constituted but rather constituted by 
international ideological factors. Chapter 5 discusses the constitutional nature of 
international agents. Contrary to statist approaches to international society, the chapter 
claims that modern international society is not exclusively composed of unitary 
sovereignty states. Such a claim results from a discussion of Pufendorf s analysis of the 
constitutional nature of the German empire after the Peace of Westphalia. The 
implication of such an analysis is the view that the ideas and practices of divided 
sovereignty and mixed polities were also an important part of the development of 
modern international society. The chapter attempts, to quote Ian Clark, ‘to break the 
exclusive link between sovereignty and the state by questioning the proposition that it is 
a concept which only applies to the state’.1 As the chapter tried to demonstrate, 
sovereignty also applies to international confederations and mixed polities.
In chapter 6 ,1 move from questions associated with the identity of international 
agents to the issue of the international normative structure. I address such an issue 
through the reconstruction of the idea of international respublica. This central 
republican concept emerged in the Renaissance, against the ideas of universal empire 
and territorial conquest, and was further developed in the eighteenth century by 
republican thinkers such as Hume and Montesquieu. As I argued in the chapter, 
international respublica, or the world political system, allows us to escape two problems 
identified in the work of the English school, namely that international society is 
anticipated by the emergence of the states system and that it is threatened by the idea of 
world society. Contrary to these assertions, the chapter argued that international society 
does not evolve from a states system, but rather the other way around. The modern 
states system emerged in a societal context, not in the state of nature. Moreover, the 
nature of the political institutions of such a system were constituted by normative 
practices, which were already firmly established, and which were inherited from older
1 Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p.72.
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social and political orders, such as for instance the Renaissance political system and 
classical Rome. Hence, historically, it is a mistake not only to give ontological priority 
to the emergence of the state over international society, but also to see the normative 
structure of the latter as a pure result of a consensus among states. In addition, the 
chapter argued that cosmopolitan ideas and principles have been a crucial, and highly 
influential, part of modern international society. Thus, it is again a mistake to oppose 
this meaning of the term world society to international society. To see international 
society as a society of states, whose existence is threatened by ‘revolutionary’ 
cosmopolitan ideas is not accurate. The right approach, I believe, is to explore the 
influence of cosmopolitanism in the nature and evolution of international society. 
Whereas some cosmopolitan ideas and principles are indeed rejected, others are part of 
the foundation of international society.
After the recapitulation of the argument of the thesis, it is now necessary to offer 
my reformulation of the concept of international society. It is helpful to return to the 
idea of the ontological divide between domestic and international politics and to the 
statist approach. As I observed in the beginning of the thesis, the identification between 
the international political system and the Hobbesian notion of the state of war is the first 
implication of the ontological divide. As we also saw, the English school disputed such 
a view by developing the concept of international society. Yet, by accepting the belief 
that states emerged in a pre-societal and a pre-normative condition, and only in a 
subsequent moment created the society of states, the English school failed to entirely 
escape the ontological divide. Thus, someone like Bull fails to notice that when states 
reach compromises regarding the normative structure of international society, they are 
embedded in an ideological and societal context that deeply affects their choices. 
Moreover, Bull also misunderstands the identity of modern international agents. In 
particular, on the one hand, he ignores the ideas of divided sovereignty and of mixed 
polities; and on the other hand, and contrary to some of the suggestions raised by his 
own work, he seems to accept the realist understanding of reason of state. It is in this 
sense that Bull ends up with a statist conception of international society, or a society o f 
states.
It is such a notion that this work tries to reformulate. The reformulated concept 
of international society rejects the second implication of the ontological divide, namely 
that the state precedes the international and gives rise to it. States did not emerge in the 
state of nature and have never enjoyed complete autonomy. Rather, states were 
constituted in an ideological and social framework. The nature of such a political
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condition has been excellently characterised by Nicholas Onuf as ‘the paradox of 
independence and connectedness’.2 The implication is that the international state of 
nature is a chimera. Indeed, in historical terms, it was the existence of previous societal 
and normative ideological beliefs and structures that made possible the very emergence 
of states, as agents enjoying certain political rights. This idea of the international 
embedded state was developed by chapters 4 and 5. Such a notion allows the concept of 
international society developed here to avoid the third and fourth implications of the 
ontological divide. Thus, the republican conception of international society includes the 
notions of mixed polities, which resulted from the international process of imperial 
fragmentation, and virtuous raison d ’etat, which is associated with the idea of the 
international public good. In other words, the early modem republican ideology offers 
the foundations to build a conception of international society in which institutions such 
as the balance of power, collective security, defensive confederations, and the 
international agents enjoy a distinct republican nature. In a fundamental way, such a 
conception escapes the ontological divide for all the components of international society 
ultimately derive from the overall republican world view, which includes both domestic 
and international politics.
Before I offer my definition of international society, it is appropriate to 
remember once again how Wight defined an international political society in ‘Western 
Values’. For Wight, international society is a constitutional entity greater than the states 
system, composed of individuals and political organisations other than the unitary 
sovereign state, which presupposes an international social consciousness, and whose 
political order rests on the practice of collective security. The result of my conceptual 
reformulation is the following definition of international society: International society is 
a constitutional entity greater than the states system, whose institutional structure 
results from the continuous adaptation o f inherited societal and normative practices, 
which ultimately derive from the ideological structure. Such a political society is 
composed both o f unitary sovereign states and mixed polities, whose political interests 
include a concern for the international public good. Thus, from Wight’s definition I 
sought to develop, and to clarify, three ideas: that international society is a 
constitutional entity greater than the states system; that it is also formed by international 
agents other than the unitary sovereign state (focusing in particular on mixed polities); 
and that collective security implies a conception of raison d ’etat that includes a concern
2 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p.4.
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for the international common good. I must recognise that such a definition looses the 
elegance of Bull’s conception, but political reality is not as elegant as Bull’s conception 
of the society of states suggests. In this regard, I believe that my reformulation better 
captures the intellectual and political diversity of modern international society, and in 
this sense it is historically more accurate. As I often argued throughout the thesis, for 
republican thinkers, the concept of international society was perceived to lie ‘between 
anarchy and empire’, as the title of the thesis indicates, and was never understood as an 
‘anarchical society’.
A word of caution is necessary at this point. The republican political order 
espoused in this thesis should not be taken as reflecting the view that it is possible to 
create such a political order once and for all times, a kind of political utopia. What is 
presented here is a view of international society which is bound to compete with other 
visions of world political order. The normative ideals embedded in the notion of 
international respublica, such as political virtue, liberty, division of power, defensive 
strategies, concern for the public good, are all fragile, even ambiguous, ideas which 
compete with power politics, expansionism, aggression, and so on. These conflicts and 
tensions will probably continue for a long period. However, such a recognition cannot 
stop us from developing a vision that offers the basis for a just and legitimate political 
order. I would even add that such a task is inevitable when one focuses on the concept 
of international society.
Besides the primary goal of reformulating the concept of international society, 
this thesis may also offer some subsidiary contributions for contemporary International 
Relations. It seems to me that there are three points worth noting. The first concerns the 
terms of my reformulation of the concept of international society. As it was indicated in 
the very beginning of the thesis, with the brief discussion of the work of Barry Buzan 
and Richard Little, Daniel Deudney, Andrew Linklater, Nicholas Onuf, and John Gerard 
Ruggie, such a reformulation shall be seen as part of a larger current enterprise within 
the discipline of International Relations. As I showed, a crucial task for many students 
of international relations is to reconceptualise international society in a way that escapes 
the ontological divide. In addition, this is related to other contemporary concerns 
regarding the nature of the post-Cold War international society. In particular, there is a 
growing interest in defining the constitutional structure of international society, with an 
emphasis on ideological causation, in addressing the case of mixed polities, and in 
developing a conception of political interest that includes a concern for the international 
common good.
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Secondly, this thesis may also offer a contribution to the recent revival in 
interest in the legacy of the English school. In particular, one of the points made here is 
that we should build our theoretical efforts on the English school’s view that theory and 
historical analyses are complementary tasks. In this regard, my reformulation of the 
concept of international society was accompanied by rethinking the nature of modern 
international political history. More specifically, this historical exercise occurred at the 
level of political thought. The thesis tells the ways in which some political thinkers have 
viewed the historical evolution and the nature of international society. As such, I 
focused on debates and on views on what international society should be rather than on 
what international politics actually were. This is linked with my belief that there is room 
to further explore the thought of the figures included by Wight in the category of 
rationalism. Such a belief takes me to my third and final point.
This thesis should also be seen as a contribution to the study of international 
political thought. On the one hand, I questioned current interpretations of past political 
thinkers; and, on the other hand, I emphasised the importance of political traditions that 
are often considered to be irrelevant to the study of international relations. Implicitly, 
this also involved a critique of the way the discipline of Political Theory has 
appropriated the thought of many past thinkers by stressing their ‘domestic’ dimension. 
Although to a certain extent this strategy may be legitimate, given that political theorists 
are often concerned with the political life of bounded societies, it constitutes a 
misunderstanding of the work of many of those past political thinkers. Yet, it is upon 
International Relations students that falls the burden to offer new interpretations of past 
political thought, in particular regarding its relevance for the understanding of modern 
world politics. This last point is related with the importance of historical studies to the 
understanding of modern international relations. It is the case, I believe, that our 
understanding of political modernity needs to be improved. In this respect, it is quite 
unfortunate to hear voices calling for the death of modernity and anticipating the advent 
of the post-Westphalian political order. Rather than showing such readiness to leave 
modernity we should try to improve our understanding of it. By reformulating the 
notion of modern international society, this thesis offers a contribution to such a crucial 
task.
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